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San Jose Revisited: A Proposal for
Negotiated Modification of Public
Sector Bargaining Agreements
Rejected Under Chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Code
By BARRY WINOGRAD*

On June 30, 1983, the San Jose Unified School District ("District")
filed a petition under Chapter 9 of the federal Bankruptcy Code.1 At the
same time, and without prior court approval, the District withheld
* Administrative Law Judge, California Public Employment Relations Board; Lecturer, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley. LL.M. 1985, J.D. 1971,
University of California, Berkeley; B.A., 1966, University of California, Santa Barbara. A
draft of this Article was prepared in conjunction with studies for the LL.M. degree. In this
regard, the assistance and suggestions of Professors David E. Feller and Stefan A. Riesenfeld
were especially helpful, although the comments and proposal are solely the author's responsibility. Inspiration for this Article was drawn from the author's work as an administrative law
judge for the California Public Employment Relations Board. In that capacity, he presided
over an unfair labor practice hearing involving the San Jose Unified School District after it had
filed a bankruptcy petition and unilaterally had modified its contractual salary obligations.
The case was settled after trial, but before a decision was rendered.
Facts related to the San Jose case provide a real-life, often dramatic background for the
legal propositions below. By using these facts as a setting for the legal reforms proposed
herein, however, the author does not imply any judgment about the merits of the case as a
whole or the arguments of any party. The author has drawn upon the official record of the
case, including unpublished arbitration and bankruptcy court decisions, but has limited the
statement of facts to those that are uncontested, as reflected in testimony, documentary evidence, or the parties' prehearing briefs. Additional factual material has been based on news
accounts and analyses. The entire record of the San Jose unfair labor practice proceeding is
available for inspection at the San Francisco regional office of the Public Employment Relations Board ("PERB").
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901-946 (1982). Chapter 9 is one of several proceedings authorized by
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101-151326 (1982)). Another is Chapter 11, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1982), which applies
to private sector reorganization cases. The history of public sector or "municipal" bankruptcy
law is discussed infra notes 164-208 & accompanying text. Literal use of the term "bankruptcy" is a misnomer in the public sector context because a political subdivision cannot be
liquidated. More accurate descriptions of the process are reorganization or adjustment of
debts. See generally infra notes 164-208, 250-73 & accompanying text.
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scheduled wage increases under three collective bargaining agreements
and denied promised salary increases to nonunion workers.
The District, one of the largest school systems in California, has an
annual budget of about $100 million. 2 It employs approximately 2800
3
workers, including almost 1400 teachers, and has over 30,000 students.
The District's bankruptcy and unilateral salary decisions affected two
years' worth of wages, amounting to more than $10 million. 4 Because
the District was the first public sector employer to use bankruptcy in an
attempt to sidestep contractual salary obligations, this bankruptcy proceeding was watched closely as a possible harbinger of other public sector
defaults. 5
The District's conduct was particularly noteworthy because it arose
in the shadow of a parallel private sector controversy, NLRB v. Bildisco
& Bildisco.6 In that case, the United States Supreme Court upheld the
2. District Exhibit 698 at 7 (June 30, 1983, audit report), San Jose Unified School Dist.,
P.E.R.B. Unfair Practice Cas. Nos. SF-CE-786, 787, 801, 802 (dismissed June 15, July 6,
1984). Some PERB exhibits also were part of the District's bankruptcy case. In re San Jose
Unified School Dist., No. 583-02387-A (Bankr. N.D. Cal. filed June 30, 1983).
3. CSEA Exhibit 32 at 2-3 (Feb. 7, 1984, proposed bankruptcy disclosure statement),
San Jose Unified School Dist., P.E.R.B. Unfair Practice Cas. Nos. SF-CE-786, 787, 801, 802
(dismissed June 15, July 6, 1984).
4. Id. at 39-40.
5. Not only was the District's case covered by the local press in the San Francisco Bay
Area, it also received statewide and national attention. See infra note 41. A factual summary
of events leading up to the bankruptcy petition was published at 57 CAL. PUB. EMPLOYEE
REL., June 1983, at 23. The most detailed popular account of the background was a three-part
series in the San Jose Mercury News. San Jose Mercury News, Aug. 7, 1983, at A1, col. 1; San
Jose Mercury News, Aug. 1, 1983, at A1, col. 1; San Jose Mercury News, July 31, 1983, at A1,
col. 1.
A recent report to Congress by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Affairs
indicated that municipal bankruptcy problems may increase, as demonstrated by the filings of
several small communities, because large tort awards test the limits of public revenue. L.A.
Daily J., Apr. 10, 1985, at 1, col. 7.
6. 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984). In Bildisco, the Court reviewed two cases consolidated in In
re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982). Prior to the Supreme Court's decision, the debate
surrounding the relationship between bankruptcy and collective bargaining laws was discussed
by a number of law review authors. See, e.g., Bordewieck & Countryman, The Rejection of
Collective Bargaining Agreements by Chapter 11 Debtors, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 293 (1983);
Pulliam, The Rejection of Collective BargainingAgreements Under Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, 58 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1984); Note, The Bankruptcy Law's Effect on Collective
BargainingAgreements, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 391 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Bankruptcy
Law's Effect]; Note, The Labor-BankruptcyConflict:Rejection of a Debtor's Collective Bargaining Agreement, 80 MICH. L. REV. 134 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Labor-Bankruptcy
Conflict].
Several articles contain reviews of the Supreme Court's decision and the subsequent congressional debate over a new law to alter Bildisco's effect. See, e.g., Gibson, The New Law on
Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements in Chapter 11: An Analysis of 11 US.CA.
§ 1113, 58 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325 (1984); Gregory, Labor Contract Rejection in Bankruptcy:
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right of a private employer to modify unilaterally a collective bargaining
agreement after filing a bankruptcy petition, but without prior court ap7
proval of a contract rejection request.
Two months after the District ified its petition, the bankruptcy court
overruled union objections and granted the employer's request to reject
the collective bargaining agreements.8 Between December 1983 and February 1984, the California Public Employment Relations Board
("PERB") heard the subsequent unfair labor practice charges. 9 Two unThe Supreme Court's Attack on Labor in NLRB v. Bildisco, 25 B.C.L. REV. 539 (1984);
Miller, Chapter11 of the Bankruptcy Act and Collective BargainingAgreements, 52 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1120 (1984); Pulliam, The Collision of Labor and Bankruptcy Law: Bildisco and the
Legislative Response, 36 LAR. L.J. 390 (1985); Rosenberg, Bankruptcy and the Collective Bargaining Agreement-A Brief Lesson in the Use of the ConstitutionalSystem of Checks and
Balances, 58 AM. BANKR. L.J. 293 (1984); Simon & Mehlsack, Filing a Post-Bildisco Chapter
11 Petition to Reject a Labor Contract,52 FORDHAM L. REv. 1134 (1984); White, The Bildisco
Case and the CongressionalResponse, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 1169 (1984); Note, Rejection of
Collective BargainingAgreements in Bankruptcy: NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco andthe Legislative Response, 33 CATI. U.L. REV. 943 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Note, Rejection]; Note,
Bildisco: Are Some CreditorsMore Equal Than Others?, 35 S.C.L. REV. 573 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Note, Creditors].
7. "Contract rejection" is a term of art in bankruptcy law referring to a court order
under 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982). That provision allows a petitioner in Chapter 9 or 11 cases, and
a trustee in other situations, subject to court approval, to "assume or reject any executory
contract." Id. § 365(a). In this fashion, the reorganizing debtor either can assure continuing
performance of favorable contracts, by direct assumption or by assignment to a third party, or
can shed remaining obligations that are unfavorable. As Bildisco demonstrated, collective bargaining agreements are considered executory contracts within the ambit of § 365. Bildisco, 104
S. Ct. at 1194-95; see also infra note 76.
In 1982 and 1983, Bildisco was one of several cases involving an employer's unilateral
change in labor contract terms in anticipation of bankruptcy court rejection consent. Two
well-publicized cases involved Continental Airlines and the Wilson Foods Corporation. See
Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1208 n.16 (newspaper articles cited); In re Continental Airlines Corp., 38
Bankr. 67 (S.D. Tex. 1984); In re Wilson Food Corp., 31 Bankr. 261 (W.D. Okla. 1983); see
also White, supra note 6, at 1184-85 n.49 (list of 33 reported cases since 1975 involving labor
contract rejection).
8. District Exhibit 663 at 5-6, 31 (transcript of bankruptcy court oral decision), San Jose
Unified School Dist., P.E.R.B. Unfair Practice Cas. Nos. SF-CE-786, 787, 801, 802 (dismissed
June 15, July 6, 1984). The unpublished bankruptcy court decision, In re San Jose Unified
School Dist., No. 583-02387-A (Bankr. N.D. Cal. filed June 30, 1983), was submitted as an
exhibit in the PERB proceeding.
9. The PERB administers public school representation and unfair practice proceedings
under the Educational Employment Relations Act ("EERA"), CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 35403549 (West Supp. 1986). The PERB oversees labor relations for the state government under
the State Employer-Employee Relations Act ("SEERA"), id. §§ 3512-3524 (West 1980 &
Supp. 1986), and for the public university and college system under the Higher Education
Employer-Employee Relations Act ("HEERA"), id. §§ 3560-3599. The PERB does not have
jurisdiction over labor relations at the local government level for cities, counties, and special
districts, which are covered by the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act ("MMBA"), id. §§ 3500-3535.
In 1983, there were about 1,400,000 public employees in California, distributed roughly as
follows: 174,000 state government; 139,000 state education; 591,000 local education; 190,000
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ions charged that the employer's unilateral actions constituted an unlawful refusal to bargain under California's Educational Employment
°
Relations Act ("EERA").'
One week after the PERB hearing concluded, the Supreme Court
issued the Bildisco decision, which met a firestorm of criticism. The
Court's five-to-four approval of the private employer's unilateral wage
and benefit modifications was particularly unpopular. " In the aftermath
of Bildisco, congressional critics introduced legislation designed to overturn the Court's ruling.' 2 For several months, however, these efforts
3
were stymied.'
Despite the delay in Congress, the parties settled the San Jose case
in May 1984. The parties dismissed the bankruptcy proceeding, withdrew the unfair labor practice charges, and entered into wage agreements
covering the next school year. Compared to the prior contract commitments, the settlement "saved" the District an estimated four million
dollars. 14
New federal legislation signed in July 1984 overturned a key portion
city; 218,000 county; and 87,000 special district. See Schneider, California Employment
Trends in the Public and Private Sectors, 62 CAL. PUB. EMPLOYEE REL., Sept. 1984, at 10, 13.
10. The California Government Code provides that it shall be unlawful for a public
school employer to "refuse or fail to meet and negotiate in good faith with an exclusive representative." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3543.5(c) (West 1980). Subject to limited exceptions, this
provision has been construed to prohibit unilateral alteration of terms and conditions of employment by an employer who has failed to provide notice or an opportunity to negotiate. See,
e.g., Moreno Valley Unified School Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 142 Cal. App.
3d 191, 198-200, 191 Cal. Rptr. 60, 65-67 (1983); cases cited infra notes 307-14.
11. The reaction of labor representatives was especially vehement. Some characterized
the Bildisco result as an invitation to union-busting by employers. See, e.g., TIME, Mar. 5,
1984, at 14; Wall St. J., Feb. 24, 1984, at 1, col. 6; L.A. Daily J., Feb. 23, 1984, at 1, col. 2;
L.A. Times, Feb. 23, 1984, at 1, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1984, at 1, col. 3. One commentator also wondered whether management approval of Bildisco was consistent with employer
self-interest: "What is hard to fathom is the knee-jerk reaction of major business lobbies,
which thoughtlessly applauded the Bildisco decision.., it encourages the least efficient, marginal producers to use a questionable procedure to get huge reductions in their labor costssomething hardly in the interest of sounder corporations." Rowan, Labor Loses Another One,
Washington Post, Mar. 1, 1984, at All, col. 1.
12. See infra notes 122-27 & accompanying text. This proposed legislation was tied to a
larger package of federal bankruptcy reforms centering upon the jurisdictional scope, tenure,
and status of bankruptcy judges. These subjects were placed at issue when the Supreme Court
invalidated the 1978 expansion of the authority and term of the judges in Northern Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
13. See infra notes 129-30 & accompanying text.
14. This estimate was provided by the parties in press accounts summarizing the May
1984 settlement. See San Jose Mercury News, June 9, 1984, at Al, col. 5; San Jose Mercury
News, June 5, 1984, at Al, col. 5; San Jose Mercury News, May 25, 1984, at Al, col. 5; San
Jose Mercury News, May 24, 1984, at Al, col. 6; San Jose Mercury News, May 20, 1984, at
Al, col. 5.
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of Bildisco by establishing a procedure to restrict unilateral employer actions.15 The new statute, however, expressly applies only to Chapter 11
reorganization proceedings and has not been incorporated into Chapter
9. Therefore, if the San Jose case is an omen of future public sector bankruptcy cases involving unilateral contract modifications, several issues
arise. Is Bildisco viable in the public sector context, or is it distinguishable because of different statutory designs and labor policies? Because
this question involves both federal bankruptcy legislation and state labor
16
law, what are the tenth amendment implications for states' rights?
In offering answers to these questions, this Article advances a proposal for negotiated modification of public sector bargaining agreements
during bankruptcy proceedings. Although the factual setting involves a
California public sector employer and focuses particularly on education,
the Article's analysis and proposal are applicable to public sector laws in
other jurisdictions. 17
First, the Article reviews the San Jose school district cases. This
sketch illustrates the relevant legal principles and suggests that the bankruptcy court's ratification of unilateral employer action had profound effects, dramatically altering the balance of bargaining power between the
parties and impeding a prompt negotiated solution of the District's
problems. Next, the Article describes the relevant private sector bankruptcy and labor laws. Although these laws provide some examples and
guidance for public sector analysis, they cannot be applied wholesale in
this context without the danger of obscuring real differences between the
two areas. The Article then provides a background to public sector
bankruptcy, from congressional legislation in the 1930's to major revisions enacted in 1976. The revisions, modeled in part on private sector
experience, included authorization for bankruptcy court rejection of pub15. Bankruptcy and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 333, 390 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (Supp. 11 1984)); see
infra notes 122-63 & accompanying text.
16. The tenth amendment dispute over the appropriate division of state and federal authority was enlivened in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968). In that case, the Court
upheld coverage of some state and local public employees under the wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982). H'owever, the decision
was overruled in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The latest decision,
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985), overruled National
League of Cities, again upholding extension of federal wage laws to local entities. A fuller
discussion of tenth amendment doctrine and its relationship to issues in this Article is
presented infra notes 361-412 & accompanying text.
17. A general discussion of the recent development of public sector labor relations, common themes and principles, and points of divergence throughout the United States is set forth
in Note, Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1616-18,
1678-82 (1984).
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lic sector labor agreements. The proper deference to be accorded state
labor law negotiating requirements, however, remained unclear.
Next, the Article presents an analytical framework for reconciling
federal baA kruptcy law and state or local bargaining arrangements. This
section first examines the 1976 legislative history and scholarly commentary in an attempt to discern congressional intent regarding collective
bargaining and public sector contract rejection. The section then details
the differences between public and private sector bankruptcy proceedings, and between public and private sector labor relations. Finally, the
section discusses the public employer's unique ability to invoke fiscal crises to justify contract modifications. The latter portions of the analytical
framework, scrutinizing public and private sector differences, have not
been addressed previously in scholarly accounts of labor issues in public
sector bankruptcy proceedings.
The Article then assesses recent developments in tenth amendment
law. These changes raise questions about judicial review of the potential
conflict between federal bankruptcy law and state negotiating requirements. Finally, the Article proposes a policy reconciliation of these conflicting interests. 18 The Article concludes that public employers who file
for bankruptcy should maintain the terms established by public sector
collective bargaining agreements when state law prohibits changes during
or after the term of an agreement. Thus, at the outset of bankruptcy,
unilateral action would be barred. Even after a bankruptcy court approves a public entity's request for contract rejection, renegotiation
should be required before any changes are made. A public employer's
modification of employment terms should be allowed only after negotiations reach impasse or if a financial emergency requires a change before
the parties can conclude negotiations.
Under this proposal, a bankruptcy court rejection order would authorize midterm negotiations when a union could otherwise resist. Beyond that limited circumstance, unilateral changes by a bankrupt public
employer, in contravention of state bargaining laws, would run the substantial risk of disregarding congressional policy and potentially intruding on state sovereignty.
18. The final proposal advanced is amenable either to judicial application or to congressional reform of the existing statutory design. Additionally, state legislative action could resolve many of the issues and ambiguities described herein. Although statutory revision often is
difficult to accomplish, that approach would be beneficial because diverse state and federal
adjudicatory forums each could have an interpretive role, potentially compounding uncertainty, whereas legislative relief could be swift and sure.
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The San Jose Conflict
After the boom years of the 1960's and early 1970's, the San Jose
school district, like school districts throughout California, suffered an enrollment decline and a related loss of income. 19 The property tax limits
contained in the 1978 enactment of California's Proposition 13 compounded this revenue decline. 20 As a result, between the 1978-1979 and
19. San Jose's loss of 16% enrollment from 1977 through 1983 was reportedly the largest
decline among the state's big city school systems. L.A. Times, May 21, 1983, at 1, col. 4.
California education is financed in large part by property tax proceeds allocated according to a
per-pupil formula that is designed to eliminate substantial wealth-related disparities between
districts, an approach that was adopted following landmark decisions in the 1970's that required equalization of revenues among school districts. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487
P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971), aff'd, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345
(1976). Each district operates within a revenue limit that involves a calculation of minimum
state aid plus income computed on the basis of average daily attendance. CAL. EDUC. CODE
§§ 42238-42282 (West 1978 & Supp. 1986). The state's contribution of basic aid varies inversely to the wealth of each district, as determined by property tax proceeds, with poorer
districts therefore receiving larger amounts as a state guarantee. Id § 42238.4 (West Supp.
1986). Financial aid for federally funded categorical programs, such as special vocational
training, is not included within a district's revenue limit. Fullerton Union High School Dist. v.
Riles, 139 Cal. App. 3d 369, 188 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1983); San Miguel Joint Union High School
Dist. v. Ross, 118 Cal. App. 3d 82, 193 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1981). Districts also receive income
from property taxes to pay bond indebtedness incurred for school building construction and
site acquisitions. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 15250, 15252 (West 1978). Generally, school systems
maintain separate accounts or funds to meet budgeted needs for general operating expenses,
for bond indebtedness, and for categorical programs. Id. §§ 41010-41022 (West 1978 & Supp.
1986). Usually, a reserve fund also is maintained, the amount being left to the school board's
discretion, California School Employees Ass'n v. Pasadena Unified School Dist., 71 Cal. App.
3d 318, 322, 139 Cal. Rptr. 633, 635 (1977), unless unlawful conduct such as a retaliatory
discharge is demonstrated. Short v. Nevada Joint Union High School Dist., 163 Cal. App. 3d
1087, 210 Cal. Rptr. 397 (1985).
Statewide, according to one California school finance specialist, most unrestricted revenue
comes from the "revenue limit," and 87% of the average 1982-1983 operating budget was tied
to salaries and benefits. Hall, "Ability to Pay" Under Fact-finding: A Management Comment,
63 CAL. PUB. EMPLOYEE REL., Dec. 1984, at 2, 4,
20. CAL. CONsT. art. XIII-A. Proposition 13 placed a substantial limitation on the total
amount of money raised by property taxes and available for use by school districts and other
local agencies. By restricting the assessed valuation allowed for property tax computation to no
more than one percent of full cash value, Proposition 13 curbed the rate of income growth. An
additional curb was enacted by the so-called Gann Initiative, approved in November 1979. Id.
art. XIII-B. This amendment placed a ceiling on annual appropriations from tax revenues.
Proposition 13, however, also makes special allowance for payment of bond indebtedness incurred prior to passage of the initiative by permitting a tax override to the extent necessary to
pay interest and redemption charges. Id. art. XIII-A, § 1(b). Districts are barred from using
these bond override tax revenues to pay general operating expenses. CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 15251 (West Supp. 1986).
Following Proposition 13, school districts wishing to raise general operating funds beyond
the revenue limit established under state law may do so only after a special tax has been
approved by two-thirds of the electorate. CAL. CONST. art. XIII-A, § 4; see Amador Valley
Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 237, 583 P.2d
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the 1982-1983 school years, the District significantly cut staff, closed
more than a dozen schools, and reduced elective courses and athletic
2
budgets. '
By mid-1980, a showdown developed between District management
and the San Jose Teachers Association ("SJTA") over the diminishing
resources available for programs and salaries. An eleven-day strike in
September 1980 was settled when teachers received a 6.67% salary increase, but harmony was short-lived. 22 Negotiations for a successor
agreement were unsuccessful until winter 1982, when the school board
approved a retroactive pay raise of 9.66% for the current school term,
and agreed to increases of 6.1% and 6% for succeeding years. 23 The
District reached similar three-year agreements in spring 1982 with the
other major unions, the California School Employees Association
("CSEA") and the American Federation of State, County, and Munici24
pal Employees ("AFSCME").
1281, 1294-95, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 252-53 (1978). Two articles reviewing the aftermath of
Proposition 13 are Doerr, The CaliforniaLegislature'sResponse to Proposition 13, 53 S. CAL.
L. REV. 77 (1979), and Lefcoe & Allison, The Legal Aspects of Proposition 13: The Amador
Valley Case, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 173 (1979).
21. District Exhibit 161 app. A (Management Assistance Team Study No. 43-69666,
May 1983), San Jose Unified School Dist., P.E.R.B. Unfair Practice Cas. Nos. SF-CE-786,
787, 801, 802 (dismissed June 15, July 6, 1984). Proposition 13 was largely responsible, along
with declining enrollment, for public school employment cutbacks of about 7.2% in California
during this period. This contrasts with employment growth of 23.2% from 1972 to 1978.
School enrollment decline was 2.3% in the pre-1978 period and 7% through 1982. See Schneider, supra note 9, at 11.
22. The first installment of a lengthy three-part series by San Jose Mercury News reporters after the 1983 bankruptcy petition focused on District affairs after 1980. The series painted
a bleak picture of a floundering system, with disputes not only between the employer and the
local unions, particularly the teachers' union, but of intense fighting within the ranks of the
school board and the administrators. For example, the 1980 strike settlement reportedly was
opposed by senior management, including a new superintendent, and two board members.
The next year, three board members resigned, as did the District's business manager in early
1982. For discussion of subsequent school board disputes and resignations, see San Jose Mercury News, July 31, 1983, at Al, col. 1. See also San Jose Mercury News, Aug. 2, 1983, at Al,
col. 1; San Jose Mercury News, Aug. 1, 1983, at Al, col. 1.
23. 57 CAL. PUB. EMPLOYEE REL., June 1983, at 23, 23; see also SJTA Exhibit 28 (fact
finders' report), San Jose Unified School Dist., P.E.R.B. Unfair Practice Cas. Nos. SF-CE-786,
787, 801, 802 (dismissed June 15, July 6, 1984); id. SJTA Exhibit 1 (collective bargaining
agreement).
24. 57 CAL. PUB. EMPLOYEE REL., June 1983, at 23; see also CSEA Exhibit 1 (CSEA
collective bargaining agreement), San Jose Unified School Dist., P.E.R.B. Unfair Practice Cas.
Nos. SF-CE-786, 787, 801, 802 (dismissed June 15, July 6, 1984); id. CSEA Exhibit 27
(AFSCME collective bargaining agreement). The school board extended comparable pay increases to confidential, managerial, and supervisorial employees. Id. Record at 1203-06 (testimony of Beck). Employees in those groups were organized on an informal basis, without
PERB certification, to discuss wages with the District. Another noncertified group representing skilled craft employees, the Trades Council, was not given a raise. A District witness
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The retroactive salary increases were funded by large year-end balances carried over by the District. In July 1982, however, the California
legislature's budget act 25 failed to fund a previously promised two-year
statewide budget increase for schools. 26 As a result, the school board
voted to defer all wage increases for the next school year, promising to
pay when funds became available, and restored the 1981-1982 salary
schedule.
Three unions filed contract grievances over the salary deferral,
although only SJTA and CSEA pursued the case to hearing. The arbitrator issued his decision in May 1983.27 The arbitrator rejected the District's main defense of fiscal impossibility to meet the contract salary
levels, finding that the employer had failed to show that the crisis was
unforeseeable. He concluded that the employer's unilateral action violated not only the contract, but the EERA as well.28 The arbitrator ordered the District to restore the contractual salary level and to make the
employees whole. The estimated salary and benefit cost of the makewhole award for 1982-1983 amounted to more than $2.8 million. 29
In his decision, the arbitrator also reviewed the District's argument
that an SJTA "side letter" to the three-year package required contract
reopening to deal with fiscal problems, and authorized the District's unilateral wage postponement once SJTA declined to renegotiate. 30 He
found the side letter to be a commitment to consider financial alternatives and possible contract reopening in the event of a revenue shortfall.
recalled that a raise was denied because craft employees already were receiving a comparatively high wage and had been unwilling to give up several extra paid holidays. Id. at 784-86,
964-65.
25. 1982 Cal. Stat. 326.
26. 1981 Cal. Stat. 100 (codified in scattered sections of CAL. EDUC. CODE, CAL. GOV'T
CODE, & CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE)

27. CSEA Exhibit 4 (arbitrator's decision and award), San Jose Unified School Dist.,
P.E.R.B. Unfair Practice Cas. Nos. SF-CE-786, 787, 801, 802 (dismissed June 15, July 6,
1984). The unpublished arbitrator's decision was issued May 12, 1983. In re San Jose Unified
School Dist., Am. Arb. Ass'n Cas. No. 74-30-0419-82 (arbitrator's decision and award issued
May 12, 1983) (Staudohar, Arb.).
28. The unions had filed unfair practice charges with the PERB in August 1982, after the
initial salary deferral. However, the charges were dismissed, as required by the mandatory
arbitration deferral provision of the EERA. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3541.5(a) (West 1980). The
parties stipulated that the arbitrator should decide not only the contract violation claim, but
also the alleged violations of the EERA. See CSEA Exhibit 4 at 17-18 (arbitrator's decision
and award), San Jose Unified School Dist., P.E.R.B. Unfair Practice Cas. Nos. SF-CE-786,
787, 801, 802 (dismissed June 15, July 6, 1984).
29. CSEA Exhibit 4 at 6 (arbitrator's decision and award), San Jose Unified School Dist.,
P.E.R.B. Unfair Practice Cas. Nos. SF-CE-786, 787, 801, 802 (dismissed June 15, July 6,

1984).
30.

Id. at 19-23.
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However, he determined that the District's unilateral salary action was
not authorized by the letter, by the limited talks between the parties, or
by the monetary circumstances. The SJTA side letter assumed renewed
importance in 1983, when the District sought to reopen the contract and
31
to negotiate new language before filing its bankruptcy petition.
While the arbitration decision was pending, the early budget projections of the District anticipated a deficit of some twelve to thirteen million dollars for 1983-1984.32 This outlook was based in part on paying
the scheduled salary increases under the contract. A management study
team from the State Department of Education confirmed these projections. 33 About the same time, the District realized that hopes were fad-

ing for a financial bailout by the state legislature. Legislative reluctance
reportedly was related to the comparatively high salaries enjoyed by San
Jose's teachers, 34 as well as to spreading fiscal problems throughout the
state's schools.

35

31. See, e.g., id. District Exhibit 649 at 3 (May 18, 1983, negotiating minutes).
32. See id. District Exhibits 694-697.
33. According to a news account of an interview with the District Superintendent, the
study team was planned by local and state officials to "give credibility to the district's need and
push legislators for more funding and the public for more support through tax initiatives."
San Francisco Examiner, Mar. 27, 1983, at 1, col. 2.
A contingent liability approach had enabled the District to defer salary payments and to
submit a balanced budget in September, 1982. But months later, the county office insisted that
the 1982-1983 salary figures be counted as an actual liability, immediately throwing the yearend accounting forecast out of balance.
34. This view apparently was shared by the State Superintendent of Schools. L.A. Times,
May 21, 1983, at 1, col. 5. The San Jose teachers ranked at, or near, the top of statewide
salaries for large school districts when the contract rates were added in, but the discrepancy
was much less when examined in conjunction with other districts in Santa Clara County.
Class size averages also were higher in San Jose than in many other districts, a factor cited by
SJTA as a trade-off for higher wage levels. See generally District Exhibits 151-155, San Jose
Unified School Dist., P.E.R.B. Unfair Practice Cas. Nos. SF-CE-786, 787, 801, 802 (dismissed
June 15, July 6, 1984).
35. In late March 1983, just three months before adoption of the state budget, a newspaper reported that San Jose was but one of six districts in need of special financial aid because of
anticipated deficits at the end of the fiscal year. Oakland Tribune, Mar. 28, 1983, at A7, col. 1.
In the same article, a former legislator serving as a consultant to the Department of Education
stated that "20 other districts are teetering on the brink this year and 75 percent of the school
districts in the state have survived 1982-83 by living off the last of their reserves and could face
deficits next year." Id.
While local districts have a large degree of budgeting autonomy, the overall process is
carried out under the aegis of county and state education officials to ensure that the budget
conforms to the state-dictated revenue limit and to mandated accounting practices. CAL.
EDUC. CODE §§ 42100-42128 (West 1978 & Supp. 1986). For example, the budget preparation process goes through both a tentative and a final phase in which county officials review a
district's financial projections, submitted on forms that are identical to those used by all local
districts throughout the state. Further, county officials have authority to reject a local governing board's adopted budget, id. §§ 42127-42128, or to withhold apportionments after an
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Against this background, the arbitrator's decision later in May came
as a shock. In the District's view, the make-whole award for SJTA and
CSEA members meant that the District also legally owed payment to
AFSCME, as well as to the affected confidential and supervisory employees. 36 This assumption was based on the District's promise of future repayment at the time of the August 1982 across-the-board reductions.
When the District announced its plans to extend the back-pay award to
all of its employees, SJTA and CSEA objected because only those unions
had pursued the case to arbitration. The unions argued that the employer's decision was discriminatory because it diminished the pool of
37
money available to the SJTA and CSEA units.
Nevertheless, the District began talks with all groups about parcelling out the anticipated cash-on-hand, supplemented by the cash receivables due before the close of the fiscal year. The District informed all
employee groups that, absent negotiated concessions by the unions, a
bankruptcy petition was a likely option.
With the prospect of default looming, AFSCME, confidential, and
supervisory employees reached understandings with the District.38 They
agreed to a cutback of 1983-1984 wages to the 1981-1982 level, accepted
a District promise to pay the retroactive back-pay award with registered
warrants, and received assurances that the District would pay in full the
June 1983 salaries. For AFSCME, the agreement was sweetened by an
automatic dues deduction in its contract and by promising equitable
treatment to SJTA and CSEA unit employees in bankruptcy pro39
ceedings.
audit if the reviewing official determines that there has been an improper allocation of funds.
See, eg., Cory v. Poway Unified School Dist., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1158, 195 Cal. Rptr. 586
(1983) (state controller properly denied revenue limit upward adjustment to compensate for a
court-ordered retroactive back-pay award). This intricate budgeting process flows from a
long-held perspective that "the public schools of this state are a matter of statewide rather than
local or municipal concern; their establishment, regulation and operation are covered by the
Constitution and the state legislature is given comprehensive powers in relation thereto." Hall
v. City of Taft, 47 Cal. 2d 177, 179, 302 P.2d 574, 576 (1956); see also 56 CAL. JUR. 3D Schools
§§ 4, 58, 366 (1980) (discussing the legal nature of state control and delegation of functions to

local districts).
36. See District Exhibit 656 at 4 (July 20, 1983, negotiating minutes), San Jose Unified
School Dist., P.E.R.B. Unfair Practice Cas. Nos. SF-CE-786, 787, 801, 802 (dismissed June
15, July 6, 1984); id. CSEA Exhibit 12 at 14 (June 23, 1983, negotiating minutes); see also id
Record at 1203-06 (testimony of Beck).
37. See id. CSEA Exhibit 12 at 10 (June 23, 1983, negotiating minutes); id. SJTA Exhibit
7 at 4-5 (June 23, 1983, negotiating minutes); id. CSEA Exhibit 9 at 4-5 (June 2, 1983, negotiating minutes).
38. Id. District Exhibit 671 (June 22, 1983, agreement with AFSCME); see also id. CSEA
Exhibit 25 (July 28, 1983, agreement with AFSCME).
39. The District also reached agreement with the Trades Council to remain at the 1981-
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SJTA and CSEA, however, failed to reach agreement. They argued
that the retroactive money should be paid in full to their members. They
also proposed that the June 1983 salaries should be paid to all employees
by apportioning the year-end balance and, if necessary, using registered
40
warrants.
Unable to secure the hoped-for concessions from SJTA and CSEA,
the District filed its bankruptcy petition on June 30, 4 t and the school

board approved a wage rollback to the 1981-1982 level. The District
carried out these decisions even though SJTA and CSEA had urged delay, arguing that the state legislature had not yet adopted the next year's
budget and that the District's projections were too low. 42 While awaiting

approval of the new budget in mid-July, many expected it to include up
43
to four million dollars over the District's earlier budget assumptions.
Although the District disputed the figure, it contended that even that
increase would not resolve the crisis because the employer had insuffi1982 wage level. Although, in the employer's view, no wage increase was owed for 1983-1984,
the basis for this belief about prior bargaining was disputed by the Trades negotiator in June
1983. At the same time, the Trades also raised concerns about continuing to do in-house
building work that was usually given to outside contractors. In the end, the Trades were given
assurances of parity treatment with other unions with respect to retroactive payments for
1982-1983, as well as for any renegotiated schedule for 1983-1984. Id. District Exhibit 677
(July 12, 1983, negotiating minutes); id. District Exhibit 674 (June 30, 1983, negotiating minutes); id. CSEA Exhibit 26 (July 14, 1983, letter of agreement).
40. See id. CSEA Exhibit 12 (June 23, 1983, negotiating minutes and attachments).
41. The District actually authorized a possible bankruptcy filing in May 1983, deciding to
go ahead at the end of June. For accounts of these decisions, see San Jose Mercury News, June
30, 1983. at 1, col. 5; San Francisco Chron., June 29, 1983, at 2, col. 5; San Jose Mercury
News, June 29, 1983, at Al, col. 1; Oakland Tribune, June 28, 1983, at A9, col. 2; San Francisco Chron., May 27, 1983, at 1, col. 5; L.A. Times, May 21, 1983, at 1, col. 4. The District's
actions drew press coverage across the country as well. See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, July 11, 1983.
at 26; Wall St. J., July 14, 1983, at 29, col. 4; N.Y. Times, June 30, 1983, at A14, col. 1; Wall
St. J., June 30, 1983, at 22, col. 2; Washington Post, May 21, 1983, at A8, col. I. In one
article, the District's bankruptcy counsel was quoted as warning that, in the wake of taxcutting Proposition 13, "it's quite likely there will be other filings (of bankruptcy) by other
school districts." Wall St. J., June 30, 1983, at 27, col. 2.
In the District's view, even though the bankruptcy petition was pending, this cash
shortage did not affect its ability to meet bond payments of $603,000 on July 1, 1983, which
were to be paid from the proceeds of special tax levies. San Jose Mercury News, June 30, 1983.
at A], col. 5. Despite this assurance, the same report indicated that questions had been raised
among brokers and dealers about the impact of the bankruptcy on $28 million worth of general
obligation bonds. In May 1983, according to this account, Moody's Investors Service had
suspended the District's AA rating after initial bankruptcy plans were approved. Id.
42. See, e.g., CSEA Exhibit 12 at 9 (June 23, 1983, negotiating minutes), San Jose Unified
School Dist., P.E.R.B. Unfair Practice Cas. Nos. SF-CE-786, 787, 801, 802 (dismissed June
15, July 6, 1984).
43. See, e.g., id. District Exhibit 656 at 2 (July 20, 1983, negotiating minutes and news
article).
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cient cash-on-hand to meet its current debts.44 Additionally, the District's bankruptcy counsel had advised that a petition at the end of the
fiscal year might excuse a unilateral wage reduction and might reduce
45
damages in later proceedings.
The decision to file for bankruptcy also affected the arbitrator's retroactive make-whole award. For weeks, the District had promised to
honor the award. Yet, again on the advice of bankruptcy counsel, the
District withheld the warrants out of concern that they could be consid46
ered preferences under the Bankruptcy Code.
Nor, in the District's view, could the arbitration payment be funded
with income expected in 1983-1984, for two reasons. First, the California Education Code required a balanced budget of future income and
future expenses as a condition for state funding. 47 Second, the California
Constitution prohibited payment of past compensation from revenues in
44. See exhibits cited supra notes 42-43.
45. This advice presumably was based on a "relation-back" doctrine under 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(g)(1) (1982). That provision states that rejection constitutes a contract breach, "immediately before the date of the filing of the petition." Id. The relation-back issue was an important aspect of Bildisco, which was pending while the San Jose case unfolded. See generally
infra text accompanying notes 98-100, 106-12. In Bildisco, the relation-back doctrine was used
to remove any unfair practice liability for post-petition unilateral changes by the employer.
The effect of rejection also is to convert a post-petition claim for damages, which may be
entitled to priority recovery, to a pre-petition or unsecured creditor claim with a lower priority. See infra notes 98-101, 107-12 & accompanying text.
46. Preferential payments in the period preceding a filing are subject to recovery upon
order of the court. See generally I I U.S.C. § 547 (1982). Although the make-whole warrants
were not issued to employees continuing to work for the District, the employer made an exception, with union consent, for retiring or departing workers. Arguably, even if payments on the
arbitration award had been made within the 90-day period preceding the bankruptcy petition,
thus falling within the literal scope of § 547, they might have qualified as nonavoidable to the
extent the arbitrator's contract interpretation authorized employee back-pay as "payment of a
debt incurred in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs." Id. § 547(c)(2).
47. The California Education Code authorizes action by a County Superintendent of
Schools to ensure a balanced, realistic budget. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 42127(b)(2) (West Supp.
1986). Failure to submit a proper budget can result in a loss of revenue apportionments and
school income. Id. § 42128 (West 1978). The District relied on the potential withholding of
apportionments as an argument for speedy resolution of negotiations, without reference to
future income levels as they might affect past unpaid wages. The District's concern about
inflexible legal restraints, however, might have been overstated. A variety of temporary and
short-term advances are available for school districts, some of which require repayment only at
the end of the next fiscal year. See infra note 49. Additionally, other statutes provide for
apportionments in emergencies or in extraordinary situations even if a full school year is not
completed. See, eg., CAL. EDUC. CODE. §§ 41310, 41422 (West 1978 & Supp. 1986). If the
District was unable to keep all of its schools open in 1983-1984, the penalty would not have
been a complete loss of funding, but rather a proportional reduction determined by a statutory
formula. Id. § 41420 (West Supp. 1986). If an emergency apportionment were secured, it
could have been subject to a five-year repayment plan. Id. § 41323. In the last analysis, deferral of a definitive balanced budget, to be modified later in the year, was probably not limited by
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future years. 48
The District also argued that, because it could not project sufficient

revenues to balance its budget, it could not borrow against its share of
future state and county revenue apportionments. 49 The District also resisted union demands to undertake a special tax election to generate inrigid state law per se, but by the need for a political accord between the District, the unions,
and relevant county, state, and legislative officials.
48. One provision cited by the District bars "extra compensation" to public employees
after service has been rendered if made "without authority of law." CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 17.
Another provision prohibits indebtedness beyond the revenues in a fiscal year unless approved
by a two-thirds vote of the electorate. Id. art. XVI, § 18. Despite the sweeping constitutional
language relied upon by the District, California authority interpreting these provisions holds
that funds could be spent in a future year if the purpose was not to pay a gratuity or bonus, but
to honor a preexisting legal obligation or to resolve an uncertain salary schedule for employees
who had continued to work. In a case with striking similarities to San Jose, decided eight
months after the settlement, the court stated that the debt limitation could not bar repayment
of salaries deferred in a prior year by a financially troubled district. Compton Community
College Fed'n of Teachers v. Compton Community College Dist., 165 Cal. App. 3d 82, 211
Cal. Rptr. 231 (1985). The court concluded that the constitutional limit did not apply because
the employer was obliged legally to set salaries by collective bargaining in order to hire teachers and provide public education. Id. at 92-94, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 237-39.
Decisions preceding Compton strongly indicated that bargaining rights would be protected. For example, two cases upheld retroactive wage increases for a period covered by
collective negotiations required by state labor laws. See Goleta Educators Ass'n v. DalI' Armi,
68 Cal. App. 3d 830, 137 Cal. Rptr. 324 (1977); San Joaquin County Employees' Ass'n, Inc. v.
County of San Joaquin, 39 Cal. App. 3d 83, 133 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1974). In Jarvis v. Cory, 28
Cal. 3d 562, 620 P.2d 598, 170 Cal. Rptr. 11 (1980), the court upheld retroactive salary legislation after Proposition 13 because the uncertain wage levels existing at the time were a matter of
ongoing dispute, and thus subject to legislative settlement. See also Longshore v. County of
Ventura, 25 Cal. 3d 14, 598 P.2d 866, 157 Cal. Rptr. 701 (1979); Wright v. Compton Unified
School Dist., 46 Cal. App. 3d 177, 120 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1975). Of course, even this permissive
interpretation establishing a right to payment does not resolve whether there would have been
sufficient funds in subsequent fiscal years to pay the prior obligation while maintaining minimal educational services.
49. Short-term temporary advances and loans to meet cash flow shortages are available
under several California statutes. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 42601, 42603 (West 1978 &
Supp. 1986) (inter-fund transfers); id. § 42621 (West 1978) (temporary county transfers); id.
§ 42622 (conditional apportionments); id. § 41310 (emergency apportionments); CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 53821 (West 1983) (end-of-year short-term borrowing); id. § 53823 (short-term summer borrowing); id. § 53852 (new fiscal year temporary borrowing). According to the District,
it did not pursue formally any of these alternative financing options because, assuming the
unlikely approval of county or state officials, a short-term arrangement only would have postponed the day of reckoning with unbalanced income and expenses. The unions argued that use
of one or more of these temporary procedures before and after June 30, 1983, would have
alleviated immediate pressure until the Legislature approved a new budget and would have
provided breathing space for negotiations leading to eventual contract modification. Once the
District petitioned under Chapter 9, discussion of these alternative short-term financing steps
virtually ceased. Such a temporary practice might have survived scrutiny of state administrators. One newspaper report stated that a school district in another Bay Area county had used
loans from restricted funds to keep functioning despite yearly deficits and the possible illegality
of the technique. San Jose Mercury News, Aug. 2, 1983, at Al, col. I. A state education
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come because it anticipated that a tax measure, needing two-thirds voter
approval, would be defeated at the polls and would further deplete the
District's financial resources. 50
Thus, by the beginning of July 1983, employees had to await payment of the arbitration award, and they faced a third successive year at
1981-1982 wages.51 Two weeks after the Chapter 9 petition was filed,
when SJTA and CSEA demanded to know whether the District would
seek formal rejection of its collective bargaining agreements, the District
went forward with such a request. 52 Thereafter, once the legislature approved funding of almost four million dollars above initial projections,
settlement talks gained momentum, but were unsuccessful. The court
joined the contract rejection issue with union objections to the bankruptcy case and heard the entire matter during a week-long trial in late
August 1983.
On August 29, 1983, the bankruptcy judge concluded that the District could not meet its debts as they matured, and that, without contract
rejection, the District would face a $6.5 million deficit for the next school
year.53 In the judge's view, rejection would allow the District to submit a
balanced 1983-1984 budget by September, as state law required, so that
future apportionments could be disbursed. 54 In effect, the judge deterofficial commented that "when the alternative is bankruptcy, the state tends to be more pragmatic." Id.
50. See, e.g., District Exhibit 656 at 11 (July 20, 1983, negotiating minutes), San Jose
Unified School Dist., P.E.R.B. Unfair Practice Cas. Nos. SF-CE-786, 787, 801, 802 (dismissed
June 15, July 6, 1984); id. Record at 989, 1107 (testimony of Beck).
51. Id. SJTA Exhibit 35 (June 30, 1983, school board minutes); id. District Exhibit 656
(July 20, 1985, negotiating minutes).
52. The unions apparently accelerated submission of a District rejection plan already prepared by its bankruptcy counsel. Id. SJTA Exhibit 43 (itemization of attorney services); id.
Record at 2275-77 (testimony of Beck).
53. The bankruptcy judge presented his opinion verbally on August 29, 1983, and did not
issue a written decision. In re San Jose Unified School Dist., No. 583-02387-A (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. filed June 30, 1983). The account given above is based on a transcript of the opinion
submitted as part of the PERB record. District Exhibit 663 (transcript of bankruptcy court
oral decision), San Jose Unified School Dist., P.E.R.B. Unfair Practice Cas. Nos. SF-CE-786,
787, 801, 802 (dismissed June 15, July 6, 1984).
54. In his analysis, the judge only considered assets in the District's general operating
fund. Thus, he excluded from his calculations the transfer of other funds and assets held in
restricted accounts, including food service, building, and special education funds. He also
excluded the value of the District's unused properties. Further, he reasoned that California
public finance law precluded payment of a past year's debts from future income, thereby minimizing the benefit to be gained from fiscal reforms, property sales, or events that would increase revenue, including a tax election if one were held. These conclusions were linked to
interpretations of state laws regulating school district finances. District Exhibit 663 at 12-14,
27 (transcript of bankruptcy court oral decision), San Jose Unified School Dist., P.E.R.B. Unfair Practice Cas. Nos. SF-CE-786, 787, 801, 802 (dismissed June 15, July 6, 1984).
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mined that the Chapter 9 sensitivity to state sovereignty prohibited his
interference with school finance laws.
Although the judge recognized that the state EERA regulated labor
negotiations, he determined that the bargaining law had to give way, and
the salary agreements along with it, in order to balance the District's
budget for 1983-1984 and to avoid operational collapse. 55 Instead of rejecting the contracts entirely or allowing the District to set the wage
base, however, the judge ordered a partial modification. 56 While ruling
that the wages should be paid at the 1981-1982 level, he kept other provisions in effect and allowed the unions to seek relief from noneconomic
terms if such terms had been linked to wages in prior bargaining. 57 The
judge also emphasized his hope that the employees would not resort to a
58
strike.
The bankruptcy court's reasoning regarding contract rejection was
influenced by the large portion of the District's budget that was represented by the agreed-upon salaries. In the judge's view, without sufficient
time to negotiate before submitting the required final budget, the District
needed the rejection remedy in order to avoid further massive layoffs and
59
program cutbacks.

In analyzing available options, the bankruptcy judge rejected the argument that contractual salary terms should remain in effect pending
further negotiations. Instead, he believed that rejection would stimulate
efforts toward a negotiated settlement. 60 The judge conceded that the
legislative history of Chapter 9 showed a congressional intent to require
the maintenance of contract terms after rejection was approved. 6' The
62
judge concluded, however, that the legislative history was ambiguous.
Alluding to the issues pending in Bildisco, the judge decided that, under
any legal standard he could apply to the San Jose facts, the balance of the
55. Id. at 5-6, 18-19, 31.
56. Id. at 6. The judge so ruled despite the objection that traditionally an "all or nothing" approach has been used for contract rejection. See, e.g., In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 25
Bankr. 216, 217-18 (N.D. Tex. 1982); In re Klaber Bros., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 83, 85 (S.D.N.Y.
1959).
57. District Exhibit 663 at 6 (transcript of bankruptcy court oral decision), San Jose Unified School Dist., P.E.R.B. Unfair Practice Cas. Nos. SF-CE-786, 787, 801, 802 (dismissed
June 15, July 6, 1984).
58. Id. at 21-22.
59. Id. at 24-27.

60. Id. at 7, 19, 32.
61. Id. at 29-31.
62. In his analysis, the judge referred to Note, Executory Labor Contracts and Municipal
Bankruptcy, 85 YALE L.J. 957 (1976). Other relevant articles and the legislative history are
reviewed below. See infra notes 164-249 & accompanying text.
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equities compelled contract rejection because the District could not continue operations without a modified agreement. 63
Four months later, with appeals underway and having engaged in
few settlement discussions, the parties began an unfair labor practice
hearing on charges filed by SJTA and CSEA. 64 The unions charged that
the District's unilateral wage action constituted a midterm repudiation of
the bargaining agreements. The unions also charged that the District's
promise to distribute make-whole payments to all employees for deferred
wages constituted discrimination against SJTA and CSEA for having
pursued the earlier arbitration, because the decision reduced the total
amount of money available for make-whole payments to their unit
65
members.
The PERB hearing provided an exhaustive record of the events and
decisions which led up to and occurred shortly after the District's bankruptcy petition. To some extent, the hearing covered the issues presented
in the bankruptcy proceeding. The legal context of the PERB case, however, was distinct in that it focused on the bargaining relationship and the
discrimination claim. The District contended that either a negotiating
63. District Exhibit 663 at 20, 31 (transcript of bankruptcy court oral decision), San Jose
Unified School Dist., P.E.R.B. Unfair Practice Cas. Nos. SF-CE-786, 787, 801, 802 (dismissed
June 15, July 6, 1984); see infra text accompanying notes 83-84, 86-91 (discussion of appropriate standard for rejection of labor agreements).
64. The District was rebuffed in its attempt in October 1983 to have the PERB proceedings stayed by the federal bankruptcy court. Since PERB's governmental regulatory process
was not subject to the automatic stay statute, 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(1), (b)(4) (1982), any injunction would be discretionary, requiring an adequate showing that the proceedings threatened
the debtor's estate beyond the mere expense of the hearing. See NLRB v. Evans Plumbing
Co., 639 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Bel Air Chateau Hosp., Inc., 611 F,2d 1248 (9th Cir.
1979). But see NLRB v. Superior Forwarding, Inc., 762 F.2d 695 (8th Cir. 1985) (granting
stay under 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1982)). Historically, labor board proceedings have been used to
determine and to liquidate statutory violations, with the bankruptcy court then fixing the priority to be attached to the damages associated with such a violation. Nathanson v. NLRB, 344
U.S. 25 (1952); In re Tucson Yellow Cab, 27 Bankr. 621 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Price Chopper
Supermkts., 19 Bankr. 462 (S.D. Cal. 1982). In accord with these principles, at the outset of
the PERB hearing the unions agreed that any PERB monetary remedy would be subordinated
to the priority-determination process of the bankruptcy court. Also, the unions disclaimed any
challenge to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction, conceding that the District had authorization
under California law to file a petition for relief. See Charging Parties Prehearing Brief at 4-5,
12-13, 22, San Jose Unified School Dist., P.E.R.B. Unfair Practice Cas. Nos. SF-CE-786, 787,
801, 802 (dismissed June 15, July 6, 1984). But see infra note 427.
65. Other allegations advanced by SJTA and CSEA during the proceeding were that the
District altered the customary order of payment of June 1983 salaries, and that the District
encouraged improper bargaining by promising other employee groups parity agreements tied
to the outcome of the District's disputes with SJTA and CSEA. See PERB Unfair Practice
Charge Nos. SF-CE 786, 787 (June 10, 1983), San Jose Unified School Dist., P.E.R.B. Unfair
Practice Cas. Nos. SF-CE-786, 787, 801, 802 (dismissed June 15, July 6, 1984); id. Motion to
Amend Charges (Feb. 15, 1984).
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impasse or the impossibility of meeting contractual salary levels justified
66
its salary rollback and rejection decisions.
During the PERB hearing, the administrative law judge encouraged
the parties to use a mediator. Several developments after the filing of the
bankruptcy petition also contributed to a settlement momentum. In July
1983, the legislature enacted special legislation allowing the District,
with state administrative approval, to use funds from the sale of surplus
property to meet its operating deficit. 67 In 1983, the legislature also
adopted a package of school reform and financing incentives to channel
additional funds to complying districts. 68 Prospects for a full salary repayment were dampened in February 1984, however, by the District's
proposed bankruptcy plan, which committed the employer to full payment for 1982-1983, but only ten percent for the following year.69 And
66. It is important to note that the employer presented a vigorous defense, especially its
claims that a fiscal emergency and a bargaining impasse excused its unilateral actions or tolled
liability at some point. The impasse defense took on added meaning because of the SJTA "side
letter" and the apparent concession by summer 1983 that some budgetary deficit was bound to
occur. Regarding the discrimination and reprisal charge, the District argued that its decision
to apportion resources among all employees was not only morally correct, but also was legally
sound. See infra note 462.
This Article does not presume to present all the facts relevant to the state law issues raised
by the unions nor to express a judgment about the merits of either side's contentions.
67. 1983 Cal. Stat. 800 (codified at CAL. EDUC. CODE § 39619.3 (West Supp. 1986)).
State law provides that proceeds from the sale of surplus, unused property may be utilized for
general operating expenses only if the State Allocation Board approves a request, and if the
request is made in conjunction with a long-term plan to satisfy the deferred maintenance needs
of the district's buildings. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 39363, 39618 (West Supp. 1986).
San Jose has not been the only district to benefit from special legislation in the past few
years. All districts gained after adoption of Proposition 13, when the state legislature approved a series of "bailout" measures designed to offset property tax revenue losses by distributing surplus state funds to local agencies and schools. See, e.g., 1978 Cal. Stat. 292, amended
by 1978 Cal. Stat. 332 (codified in scattered sections of CAL EDUC. CODE, CAL. GOV'T CODE,
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, CAL REV. & TAX. CODE, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE, &
CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA). Moreover, in 1983 several legislative acts were approved to meet the
budgetary needs of some school districts unable to cope with expenses. These bills provided
either emergency apportionments or allowed fund transfers subject to repayment periods that
extended beyond previous statutory limits. See, e.g., 1983 Cal. Stat. 171 (Westwood, Val
Verde, South Whittier); 1983 Cal. Stat. 113 (Grant); 1983 Cal. Stat. 38 (Emeryville).
The District estimated that property proceeds would permit full payment of the 19821983 wage deferral for all employees, particularly since the ending balance for that year was
over $2 million.
68. 1983 Cal. Stat 498 (codified in scattered sections of CAL. EDUC. CODE, CAL GOV'T
CODE, CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE & CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE). This measure, popularly
known as "SB 813," was designed largely to benefit budgets for the 1984-1985 school year and
thereafter.
69. A motion by the unions for a reclassification of the claim categories advocated by the
District also was pending during the spring 1984 negotiations. Instead of separate unsecured
creditor classes, the unions urged a single unsecured class. This also would include 1983-1984
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one week after the PERB hearing concluded, union hopes were dimmed
further when the Supreme Court's Bildisco decision upheld the unilateral
wage reductions made by an employer prior to bankruptcy court approval. 70 In this context, each side appeared ready to reach a settlement
and to avoid years of protracted litigation. 7 1 Four months after the
PERB hearing, and nearly a year after the bankruptcy petition, the parties achieved a comprehensive settlement. 72 Pursuant to the agreement,
73
all unfair practice charges were dismissed, as was the bankruptcy case.
damages arising from rejection of the bargaining agreements, of which the employer proposed
to pay 10%. If successful, the unions' motion not only would have increased the division of
funds going to employees in the SJTA and CSEA units, assuming that the state constitutional
limits on using future income would not apply, but it also would have made it more difficult for
the District to have had its plan confirmed over the objections of nonconsenting union and
employee creditors. If confirmation were defeated through resistance to the District's proposed classes, the bankruptcy court would have been required to dismiss the case. See infra
notes 268-72.
Throughout this period, the growing cost of the District's bankruptcy effort threatened to
deplete available financial resources, assuming court approval of the expenses. See infra note
256. One press report stated that by spring 1984, substantial legal fees of about $300,000
already had been billed to the District in connection with the bankruptcy and labor cases. San
Jose Mercury News, Mar. 20, 1984, at Al, col. 3. District officials estimated that another
$200,000 in legal bills could be expected, even though, because a public entity was involved, its
bankruptcy counsel was charging about 75% of its normal hourly rate. Id. On the union side,
although no cost estimate is available, staffing included several in-house counsel as well as
outside bankruptcy counsel.
70. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984); see infra notes 74-121 & accompanying text. The District had relied on this case in preparing unfair labor practice defense.
See District Prehearing Brief at 5-9, San Jose Unified School Dist., P.E.R.B. Unfair Practice
Cas. Nos. SF-CE-786, 787, 801, 802 (dismissed June 15, July 6, 1984).
71. Two other events in the late spring of 1984 helped. The District hired a new school
superintendent who, early on, proved instrumental in reaching an agreement. San Jose Mercury News, May 21, 1984, at BI, col. 1. Perhaps the final push toward a tentative settlement
occurred on May 18, the day before final agreement, when a court found that the District
intentionally maintained segregrated schools and ordered integration, a directive that the District could focus on with the bankruptcy case out of the way. Diaz v. San Jose Unified School
Dist., 733 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1984), cerL denied, 105 S. Ct. 2140 (1985); L.A. Times, May 18,
1984, at 3, col. 3.
72. See supra note 14 & accompanying text; see also Ott & Meyers, San Jose Unified
School DistrictBankruptcy: The FinalChapter,3 LAB. & EMPLOYMENT NEWS, Winter 1984,
at 16; 61 CAL. PUB. EMPLOYEE REL., June 1984, at 39.

The lengthy settlement agreement saved an estimated $4 million for the District. The
settlement included full payment for the 1982-1983 salaries and payment of a portion of the
1983-1984 wage bill, subject to the sale of property and state administrative approval. The
agreement also provided for a modest wage increase in 1984-1985, contingent on forthcoming
legislative funding, and allowed the District to maintain a larger monetary reserve than in
prior years. In exchange, anticipating funds available under legislative reforms, the teachers
agreed to modify their work schedule. Further, the employer made concessions on
noneconomic terms and conditions, including automatic dues deductions for the unions.
73. Oakland Tribune, June 9, 1984, at A6, col. I; San Jose Mercury News, June 9, 1984,
at Al, col. 5. By mid-summer 1984, the District reportedly was projecting operations in the
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Private Sector Shadows
Bildiscoll

Bildisco & Bildisco, a New Jersey building supply distributor, had a
three-year bargaining agreement with a Teamsters local union that was
due to expire in April 1982. In January 1980, the employer failed to
meet certain obligations, including health plan and pension payments
and union dues deductions. In April, Bildisco petitioned for reorganization in bankruptcy under Chapter 11. 75 The next month, the employer
refused to pay contractual wage increases. In December 1980, Bildisco
sought bankruptcy court authorization to reject the bargaining agreement under section 365.76 In January 1981, the court granted the rejection request. A district court affirmed the order in an unreported opinion
77
and the union appealed to the Third Circuit.
While the bankruptcy proceedings progressed, the union filed unfair
labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board
black for the 1984-1985 fiscal year, including restoration of a six-period school day and special
instructional programs. San Jose Mercury News, Aug. 3, 1984, at BI, col. 4. This positive
outlook was based not only on the previous settlement agreement, but also on the gubernatorial and legislative funding boosts given to statewide education in the California budget in Jul)
1984. Id.
74. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S.Ct. 1188 (1984).
75. Id. at 1192; see 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1982).
76. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1192; see It U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982), which states in relesant
part: "Except as provided in sections 765 and 766 of this title and in subsections (b). (c) and
(d) of this section, the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor." Id. While permitting assumption or rejection
of executory contracts, the code does not define the term "executory." Congressional comment
before passage of the 1978 reform legislation indicated that executory agreements are those
"on which performance remains to some extent on both sides," H.R. REP. No. 595. 95th
Cong., IstSess. 397 (1977), thereby retaining in effect the pre-1978 practice. See Bildisco. 104
S. Ct. at 1194 n.6. A leading bankruptcy authority has defined an executory contract as one
"under which the obligations of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so
far unperformed that the failure of either to complete the performance would constitute a
material breach excusing the performance of the other." Countryman, Executory Contractsin
Bankruptcy (pt. I), 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Countryman, (pt.
I)]. Professor Countryman applied this definitioin to collective bargaining agreements,
although not to individual, at-will employment contracts. Countryman, Executory Contracts
in Bankruptcy (pt. II), 58 MINN. L. REV. 479, 482-84 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Countryman,
(pt. II)]. Federal courts also have relied upon the definition. See Gloria Mfg. Corp. v.
ILGWU, 734 F.2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1984); see also cases cited id. at 1021 n.3. In Gloria, the
contract had expired, thus precluding rejection. Accord In re Pesce Baking Co., 43 Bankr. 949.
957 (N.D. Ohio 1984). In another case, a contract was no longer executory because plant
operations had been terminated. In re Total Transp. Serv., 37 Bankr. 904 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
Additionally, one court recently held that rejection would be denied when the labor contract
was not in effect at the time the petition was filed, but was only agreed upon thereafter. In re
Schuld Mfg. Co., 43 Bankr. 535 (W.D. Wis. 1984).
77. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1192.
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("NLRB") in the summer of 1980. After a hearing, the NLRB concluded that Bildisco had refused to bargain with the union by unilaterally
changing the terms of the collective agreement in violation of section
8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"). 78 The Board
issued a make-whole order. After the employer refused to comply, the
NLRB petitioned the Third Circuit for enforcement. The two appellate
matters were consolidated for decision.
79
The Third Circuit held that the employer's actions were lawful.
The court reasoned that the bargaining agreement was an executory contract subject to rejection under section 365(a),80 and that the company's
action was not proscribed by section 8(d) of the NLRA, which prohibits
midterm contract changes. 8 1
The Third Circuit found section 8(d) inapplicable because it deemed
the debtor a "new entity," freed from the prior agreement, in the same
way that some successor employers are free of prior contract terms under
labor law principles. 82 In order to reconcile the bankruptcy and labor
laws, however, the Third Circuit adopted a test for contract rejection
that was more demanding than the traditional business judgment standard used by bankruptcy courts. 83 Applying criteria established earlier
by the Second Circuit,8 4 the court decided that rejection was appropriate
if the contract was burdensome and if the balance of the equities favored
rejection. The court remanded the case to the bankruptcy court for it to
apply this standard.
Nevertheless, the Third Circuit declined to enforce the NLRB order. The court exonerated the "new entity" from unilateral change viola78. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-168, 171-182, 185-187 (1982); see Bildisco & Bildisco, 255
N.L.R.B. 1203 (1981). Section 8(a)(5) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of its employees ....
29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982). For the seminal federal case regarding the unilateral change rule,
see NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 754 (1967) (Circumvention "of the duty to negotiate ...
frustrates the objectives.., much as does a flat refusal."). Under the NLRA, the definition of
"employer" includes persons serving as bankruptcy trustees. 29 U.S.C. § 152(1), (2) (1982).
79. In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
80. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982); see supra note 76.
81. The pertinent text of § 8(d) states that "where there is in effect a collective-bargaining
contract covering employees in an industry affecting commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract
... " 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).

82. See infra note 112.
83. See, e.g., In re Chi-Feng Huang, 23 Bankr. 798 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Tilco, Inc., 558
F.2d 1369 (10th Cir. 1977).
84. See Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., Inc., 519 F.2d 698 (2d
Cir. 1975) (relying on In re Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 359, 361 (E.D.N.Y.
1965)).
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tions on the theory that, under section 365, the court-approved rejection
related back to the date immediately preceding the filing of the bankruptcy petition, 85 thus precluding any unfair labor practice violation for
post-petition unilateral conduct. The Supreme Court granted certiorari
based on a conflict with a Second Circuit decision, Brotherhood of Railway Employees v. REA Express, Inc.,8 6 that had set forth a tougher business-failure test for rejection of a labor agreement.
The Supreme Court's Bildisco opinion is actually two decisions.
First, on the issue of the appropriate bankruptcy standard to assess the
need for contract rejection, the Court unanimously adopted the Third
Circuit's burden and balancing test. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
Court, recognized that the special nature of bargaining agreements justified a stricter standard than the business judgment test for review of a
rejection request.8 7 The REA Express standard, however, was too strict,
because requiring a showing that rejection was needed to forestall liquidation was "fundamentally at odds with the policies of flexibility and
equity built into Chapter 11.1"88 The Court adopted a middle ground
between the two competing federal laws: "Before acting on a petition to
modify or reject a collective bargaining agreement, . . . the Bankruptcy
Court should be persuaded that reasonable efforts to negotiate a voluntary modification have been made and are not likely to produce a prompt
and satisfactory solution. The NLRA requires no less."' 89 Then, the
85. In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72, 84 (3d Cir. 1982), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984). In
relevant part, the statute provides that rejection of an unassumed executory contract "constitutes a breach of such contract... immediately before the date of the filing of the petition." 11
U.S.C. § 365(g)(I) (1982).
86. 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975); see NLRB v. Bildisco &
Bildisco, 464 U.S. 912 (1983) (granting certiorari). The reason for granting review was expressed in the Court's decision. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1194. Bildisco was in apparent conflict
with REA Express, in which the Second Circuit remanded a rejection decision to determine
whether the contract was so "onerous and burdensome" that it would "thwart efforts to save a
failing carrier." 523 F.2d at 169.
87. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1196.
88. Id.
89. Id.; see also Note, Labor-Bankruptcy Conflict, supra note 6, at 148-52 (proposing a
pre-rejection negotiating requirement). One court suggested that the willingness to negotiate
was a factor in assessing a debtor's good faith, but until Bildisco, that factor had not been fixed
as a firm precondition. See In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., Inc., 702 F.2d 890, 900 (11 th Cir.
1983). In two cases decided after Bildisco, however, rejection requests were denied, in part
because of an employer's bad faith and unreasonable negotiating conduct. See In re Pesce
Baking Co., 43 Bankr. 949 (N.D. Ohio 1984); In re C. & W. Mining Co., 38 Bankr. 496 (N.D.
Ohio 1984). At least one decision has assessed a union's unwillingness to negotiate as a consideration in approving an employer's rejection application. In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 25
Bankr. 216 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
A separate issue not resolved by Bildisco or by the negotiating requirements of the new
statute is whether there is a duty to bargain over the decision to petition for bankruptcy, in
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Court observed that, although the duty to bargain continues, it does not
require negotiations to the point of impasse. The Court directed that the
bankruptcy court
must make a reasoned finding on the record why it has determined
that rejection should be permitted. Determining what would constitute a successful rehabilitation involves balancing the interests of the
affected parties-the debtor, creditors and employees. The Bankruptcy Court must consider the likelihood and consequences of liquidation for the debtor absent rejection, the reduced value of the
creditors' claims that would follow from affirmance and the hardship
that would impose on them, and the impact of rejection on the employees. In striking the balance, the Bankruptcy Court must consider not
only the degree of hardship faced by each party, but also any qualitative difference between the types of hardship each may face. 90
The Court nonetheless cautioned against a "free-wheeling consideration
of every conceivable equity," reminding lower courts that the equitable
inquiry was to be made in the context of the ultimate Chapter 11 goal of
achieving a successful reorganization. 9 1
addition to the effects of such action. See infra notes 122-63 & accompanying text. Presumably, the bankruptcy petition decision would not itself be deemed suitable for bargaining because it has all the trappings of a fundamental management decision about the nature and
direction of the enterprise. First Nat'l Maintenance v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674-86 (1981);
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 222 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
Nonetheless, fruitful negotiations could take place over bankruptcy-related issues, including
notice, implementation, and other effects. FirstNatl Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 677 n.15.
90. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1197. As apparent in one decision rendered during the period
between the Third Circuit and Supreme Court Bildisco rulings, the bankruptcy court's analysis
need not be confined rigidly to the petitioning entity. See In re Maverick Mining Corp., 36
Bankr. 837 (W.D. Va. 1984) (rejection request denied based upon a review of other coal company operations). Earlier bankruptcy cases also support reference to competition in assessing a
rejection request. See, eg., In re Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 359 (E.D.N.Y.
1965) (insufficient evidence of competitors' finances to support onerous contract claim); In re
Mamie Conti Gowns, 12 F. Supp. 478, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1935) (destabilizing impact on competitors as a factor justifying denial). There are, however, limits to the balancing inquiry. For
example, although rejection may provide a labor cost advantage to the reorganizing debtor,
one court has held that competitors lack standing to object. Bormans v. Allied Supermkt.,
Inc., 706 F.2d 187 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908 (1983).
91. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1197. One article otherwise critical of Bildisco drew upon the
Court's reference to the rehabilitation goal of Chapter 11 to conclude that petitions filed to
repudiate a contract or to coerce labor concessions, rather than to restructure debt or to
streamline operations, could be dismissed for bad faith, particularly if rejection granted the
employer an economic advantage over others. Simon & Mehlsack, supra note 6, at 1138-39;
see also White, supra note 6, at 1189-90.
Three recent cases suggest that bankruptcy court authority extends to approving any
agreement reached by the debtor or trustee and a concerned union. Yorke v. NLRB, 709 F.2d
1138 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1276 (1984); Joint Executive Bd. v. Hotel Circle,
613 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Air Florida Sys., Inc., 48 Bankr. 440 (S.D. Fla. 1985). But
see International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Dalfort Corp., 117 LRRM
2257 (N.D. Tex. 1984) (bankruptcy court approval of contract by union agent not required for
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The Court split five-to-four on the second issue, holding that the
employer did not commit an unfair labor practice by its unilateral modification before the bankruptcy court approved contract rejection. 92 The
majority departed from the Third Circuit's analysis and agreed with the
NLRB and the union that a Chapter 11 petitioner is not a "new entity."' 93 If it were, there would be no need to seek court-approved con-

tract rejection. 94 Instead, the majority concluded that the Bankruptcy
Code by "operation of law" allows the debtor "to deal with its contracts
and property in a manner it could not have done absent the bankruptcy
filing."'95 In the majority's view, this leeway was necessary to accomplish
the underlying purpose of Chapter 11, which is to avoid liquidation, the
accompanying loss of jobs, and the waste of economic resources. 96 For
this reason, once the bankruptcy petition is filed, collection actions to
enforce the bargaining agreement, along with other agreements, are
stayed.

97

Additionally, the majority interpreted the Bankruptcy Code as permitting the retroactive diminishment of contract obligations under the
statutory provision that rejection of a contract constitutes a breach that
relates back to the date immediately preceding the filing of the bankruptcy petition.9 8 Damages available for that breach are accorded the
low priority given to unsecured creditors and are recoverable only
binding effect, distinguishing Hotel Circle as a pre-Code case); 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107-1108 (1982)
(authorizing contracts in the ordinary course of business).
A related issue is whether a contractual duty to arbitrate survives the filing of a bankruptcy petition and contract rejection even if the hankruptcy court has not given prior approval of arbitration. Most courts have required prior authorization in order to enforce the
duty to arbitrate. See, e.g., Truck Drivers Local No. 807 v. Bohack Corp., 541 F.2d 312 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 825 (1978); Berger, The Collective BargainingAgreement ill
Bankruptcy: Does the Duty to Arbitrate Survive?, 35 LAB. L.J. 685 (1984); Note, PartialRepudiation and the Survivability of Labor Arbitration Agreements in the Context of Bankruptcy, I
BANKR. DEV. J. 177 (1984). One decision after Bildisco permitted processing of pre-petition
contract grievances, while denying the request for those filed after the petition but before the
contract was rejected, reasoning that the contract was rendered unenforceable under the relation-back doctrine. In re Midwest Emery Freight Sys., Inc., 48 Bankr. 566 (N.D. I11. 1985).
In any event, the value of an arbitration award will vary depending on its priority in bankruptcy. Berger, supra, at 692.
92. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1197.
93. Id.
94. Id. The Court stated that "[o]bviously if the latter were a wholly 'new entity,* it
would be unnecessary for the Bankruptcy Court to allow it to reject executory contracts, since
it would not be bound by such contracts in the first place." Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. The automatic stay is provided in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982).
98. Id. § 365(g)(1), cited in Bildisco. 104 S. Ct. at 1198 n. 11.
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through bankruptcy court administration of the debtor's estate. 99 If this
were not the case, and if the employer were treated as having assumed
the contract during the period preceding rejection, the wages and related
liabilities would be considered first-priority administrative expenses payable at the full contract rate. 0° Thus, the majority determined that to
allow NLRB enforcement of a claimed midterm violation of section 8(d)
"would run directly counter to the express provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code and to the Code's overall effort to give [an employer] some flexibil-

10
ity and breathing space." '
Related to that conclusion, the Court also decided that the preliminary bargaining requirements of section 8(d) were inapplicable, including

99. Bildisco, 104 S.Ct. at 1198-99; 11 U.S.C. § 502(g) (1982). Post-petition wage claims
in the period prior to rejection are to be assessed according to the "reasonable value of those
services." Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1199. The value may be that specified in the contract, or it
may be less, "depending on the circumstances." Id. Wages in the interim pre-rejection period
are considered first priority administrative expenses, as "the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 503 (b)(1)(a) (1982); 3 W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 1 503.04 (15th ed. 1985).
100. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (1982). In fact, although considered a "problematic" contract assumption, in a number of cases the post-petition acceptance of employee services at a
previous or newly agreed rate has been so treated, even without express court approval. See In
re Public Ledger, Inc., 161 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1947); Countryman, (pt. II), supra note 76, at
494-95, 557. The significance of the priority distinction was actually relied upon by one bankruptcy court as a factor weighing in favor of rejection. In re Concrete Pipe Mach. Co., 28
Bankr. 837 (N.D. Iowa 1983) (pension fund withdrawal liability to be treated as a more manageable unsecured claim, and not as an administrative priority expense, to facilitate sale of the
company).
The importance of how damage claims are characterized is underscored by the results of a
study published in 1971. See Note, The Priorityof a Severance Pay Claim in Bankruptcy, 27
UCLA L. REv. 722, 727 n.31 (1980) (citing D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROcEss, REFORM (1971)). In reorganization proceedings, priority creditors were generally paid in full, but unsecured creditors received only 19% under one-payment plans, or
between 10% and 100% if payments were deferred. The figures also are revealing if the comparative percentage claims are measured against the total value of the estate. In the period
1965 through 1968,
[t]he return varied among different classes of creditors: secured creditors, whose
claims during this interval totaled 11 percent of all creditors' claims.., received an
average total of 66 cents on the dollar; priority creditors, who held 9 percent of all
claims, received 35.5 cents on the dollar; the largest class-the unsecured [no priority] creditors, whose claims were 80 percent of the total-received an average of just
7 cents on the dollar.
Note, supra, at 733 n.66.
101. Bildisco, 104 S.Ct. at 1199. In reaching this conclusion, the majority stated:
Though the Board's action is nominally one to enforce § 8(d) of the Act, the practical effect of the enforcement action would be to require adherence to the terms of the
collective-bargaining agreement. But the filing of the petition in bankruptcy means
that the collective-bargaining agreement is no longer immediately enforceable, and
may never be enforceable again.

256
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the need to bargain to impasse while maintaining the existing terms of an
agreement. 0 2 The majority held that neither the bargaining requirements of section 8(d), nor the prohibitory terms of section 8(a)(5), apply
to the post-petition debtor's action because, by operation of bankruptcy
law, these provisions must be "subordinated to the exigencies of
0 3
bankruptcy." 1

Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun,
dissented from the portion of the decision allowing unilateral contract
changes in the period prior to bankruptcy court approval of a rejection
request. The dissent charged that the majority had failed to reconcile
bankruptcy and labor laws in preserving the duty to bargain and had
ignored both the special nature of collective agreements and the absence
of any express statutory language making section 8(d) inapplicable in
such contexts. 0 4 In the dissent's view, the majority's approval of unilateral action would promote labor unrest, undermine the effectiveness of
labor laws, and, in the long run, hamper stable reorganization efforts
0 5
through discord and distrust.1

At the heart of the majority's reasoning, according to the dissent,
was an erroneous interpretation of the relationship between the rejection
authorization of section 365 and the bargaining mandate of section
8(d).10 6 The implication of the majority's conclusion was that, under section 365, the bargaining agreement was not "in effect" according to section 8(d). For the majority, the agreement was therefore unenforceable,
not merely suspended, from the time the petition was filed because of the
automatic stay and the "relation-back" doctrine.' 0 7 But, the dissent
noted, section 365(g)(1) establishes relation-back only as a way of fixing
102. Id. at 1200.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1203-04 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring and
dissenting).
105. Id. at 1208, 1211. Elaborating on this view, one observer has argued that Bildisco
was the "predictable and ineluctable" consequence of a series of Supreme Court decisions
favoring managerial prerogatives and promoting employer expedience over worker rights, resulting in long-term damage to a "rough equilibrium" between labor and management. Gregory, supra note 6, at 543 (citing First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674-80
(1981)).
106. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1206 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.. concurring
and dissenting). The dissent's critique was reviewed and expanded in post-Bildisco commentaries. See, e.g., Gregory, supra note 6, at 592-97; Note, Rejection, supra note 6, at 992-95; Note,
Creditors,supra note 6, at 600-04. An analysis favoring the majority's viewpoint and charging
the dissent with failing to account for business realities is set forth in Miller, supra note 6. at
1129-33.
107. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1199-200 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring and dissenting).
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of the breach arising
priorities of payment and damages for the period
10 8
from the bankruptcy court's rejection decision.
Thus, for the dissenters, the appropriate reconciliation of bankruptcy and labor law did not entail retroactive diminishment of claims
arising from unilateral employer action after filing, but before court-approved rejection. 10 9 The measure of damages for that period should be
the reasonable value of services rendered, usually the contract rate, and
should be treated as first priority administrative expenses. 110 Only after
court-approved rejection would a new wage rate go into effect, presumably pending further negotiations."' Post-petition claims, therefore,
should be subject to two levels of damages, depending112on the different
wage rates during the pre- and post-rejection periods.
108. Id. at 1203 n.8, 1205-06 n. 11. In the dissent's view, ongoing employer liability under
§ 365(g) was an example of how the contract remained "in effect" and had post-petition
consequences:
Some of these damages will stem from the employer's obligations under the contract
in the post-filing period. Therefore, whether the contract is accepted or rejected, it
will support a claim that arises out of the debtor's obligations in the post-petition
period.
Additionally, even under the Court's approach... during the interim between
filing and rejection or assumption, the estate will be liable to the employees for the
reasonable value of any services they perform. The contract rate frequently will be
the measure of the reasonable value of those services.
Id. at 1206-07.
109. Id. at 1205-07; see also 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(a) (1982).
110. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1203 n.8, 1207 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring and dissenting).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1206-07; see also Bordewieck & Countryman, supra note 6, at 330-31; Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 300-02; Note, Rejection, supra note 6, at 993-94; Note, Bankruptcy Law's
Effect, supra note 6, at 393-94.
The dissent argued, in the alternative, that even if the agreement were not "in effect"
under section 8(d), "it does not necessarily follow that the debtor in possession may unilaterally alter terms and conditions of employment." Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1207 n.14 (Brennan,
White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring and dissenting) (citing NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S.
736, 743 (1969)). The dissent observed, in the same passage, that the bar to unilateral action on
negotiable matters extends to the period after a contract has expired. The majority's rejoinder
asserted that "our determination that sec. 8(d) cannot be used to enforce the terms of a labor
contract after the filing of a petition in bankruptcy and prior to formal rejection necessarily
means that sec. 8(a)(5) cannot be used to achieve the same end." Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1200
n. 14.
The dissent's distinction between bankruptcy priority for damages and unfair labor practices for unilateral changes serves the further purpose of giving full meaning to that portion of
the automatic stay statute that excepts "an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to
enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory power." 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1982).
In this respect, a labor board's make-whole order for post-petition unfair practices should be
treated as an administrative priority expense to deter further unlawful conduct and to avoid
benefiting other unsecured creditors over employees. See Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471
(1968) (negligence damages caused by the receiver's agent held to be expenses to preserve the
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The dissenters also disagreed with the majority's conclusions regarding differences between Chapter 7 liquidation and Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings. 1 3 Under Chapter 7, the classic bankruptcy proceeding, a contract is deemed rejected unless a motion to assume or to
reject is made within sixty days of the action's commencement. 1 4 In a
Chapter 11 case, however, the debtor need not seek rejection until the
reorganization plan is confirmed, subject to a creditor's request for a
shorter time period."15 The majority argued that this difference justified
broad latitude for an employer deciding to reject a contract as part of a

Chapter 11 plan."16
In contrast, the dissent contended that the provision allowing Chapter 11 creditors the option of accelerating a rejection decision demonstrated that Congress did not favor a result in which debtor rights
outweighed other considerations. 1 7 The dissent also disputed the claim
that requiring an early decision on rejection would impede reorganization efforts by forcing premature rejection of a contract that could be
advantageous in the long run:
In the case of a collective-bargaining agreement, however, this danger
is largely illusory. Because the union members will lose their jobs if
the reorganization fails, it is highly likely that the debtor in possession
will be able to negotiate a contract that is at least as favorable as the
estate and entitled to administrative priority); accord Yorke v. NLRB, 709 F.2d 1138 (7th Cir.
1983) (back-pay order for post-petition failure to bargain over plant closure effects treated as
administrative priority), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1276 (1984); In re Price Chopper Supermkts.,
19 Bankr. 462 (S.D. Cal. 1982) (priority for unfair treatment in post-petition period);
Bordewieck & Countryman, supra note 6, at 333-34.
One irony of the majority's analysis is that, although it rejected the "new entity" analogy
as inconsistent with the duty to bargain, Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1197, an employer after Bildisco
would be free to make unilateral changes without being subject to the same restraint that
applies to a successor or new entity employer that had begun operations without changing
established employment terms. Successor employers, while possibly free to set initial working
conditions, cannot unilaterally alter established terms that have remained in effect. See also
Note, Bankruptcy Law's Effect, supra note 6, at 397 n.56; cf. NLRB v. Burns Sec. Servs., Inc.,
406 U.S. 272, 295 (1972) (successor employer may be required to consult with employee representatives). Under Bildisco, the mere filing of the petition allows such changes regardless of
the amount of time that has elapsed since the petition effectively terminated enforcement of the
agreement and regardless of the maintenance of terms in the period prior to rejection. Plainly,
the distinction could have been drawn and an independent statutory violation found and remedied for the unilateral action in Bildisco. Such a finding would not have intruded upon the
separate issues of bankruptcy court jurisdiction and implementation of rejection requests that
have been approved. See also Bordewieck & Countryman, supra note 6, at 335-36.
113. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1209-10 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring and dissenting).
114. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(1) (1982).
115. Id. § 365(d)(2).
116. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1198.
117. Id. at 1210 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring and dissenting).
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In addition, because unions have a
contract that he has rejected ....
strong incentive to avoid rejection of contracts, they frequently may be
willing to enter into negotiated settlements for the interim period that
will at least forestall rejection. Consequently, in many cases, requiring
of an existing agreethe debtor in possession to adhere to the terms
1 18
ment will not lead to early rejection at all.

Nonetheless, even the dissent conceded that the reconciliation of
bankruptcy and labor laws required judicial subordination of the preliminary notice and impasse requirements of section 8(d). 119 Thus, all of the
justices agreed that the need for expeditious bankruptcy determinations
would preclude literal application of the NLRA. The alternative view
offered by the dissent, however, drew the line at unilateral employer
modification of contract terms without court approval. 20 They predicted that the social cost of permitting contract repudiation without
court consent would be the type of labor strife that the NLRA was
118. Id. The dissent's implication in this passage that there are differences between labor
contracts and other types of agreements was not elaborated on further, but deserves mention.
In any bankruptcy case, the decision to assume or reject "depends, presumably, on... comparative appraisal of the value of the remaining performance by the other party and the cost to
the estate of the unperformed obligation of the bankrupt .... " Countryman, (pt. I), supra
note 76, at 461. Additionally, the debtor-in-possession will have to weigh the likelihood that
unilateral abrogation or later rejection will be treated as a material breach excusing or delaying
performance in order to mitigate further damages. See Countryman, (pt. II), supra note 76, at
514-19. But f In re Whitcomb & Keller Mortgage Co., 715 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1983) (requiring provision of essential computer service pending debtor's decision to assume or reject with
full post-petition payment as administrative expense); Bordewieck, The Postpetition,Pre-Rejection, Pre-Assumption Status of an Executory Contract, 59 AM. BANKR. L.J. 197 (1985) (questioning right of nondebtor to terminate as contrary to Bildisco and 1978 bankruptcy reforms).
Unilateral breach also may spur a demand to reclaim goods previously delivered to the bankrupt. 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (1982).
Based on the above considerations, one can foresee that a debtor typically will regard
executory contracts with labor unions differently than contracts with suppliers, builders, shippers, advisors, and other providers. Unless the labor skills are hard to get and the union's
strike potential is great, the debtor's risk in breaching or rejecting an agreement will be reduced. Not only may other nonemployee providers realistically have alternative options following a material breach, possibly subject to a counterclaim for damages, In re Cochise
College Park, Inc., 703 F.2d 1339, 1355 (9th Cir. 1983), but market forces can put the debtor
in a bind, compelling assumption of the contract and curing of defaults, 11 U.S.C. § 365 (b)(1)
(1982), requiring assurances of payment prior to shipment, In re Ike Kempner & Bros., 4
Bankr. 31 (E.D. Ark. 1980), or forcing the negotiation of a new agreement even more protective of the provider's interests. See, for example, the "super-priority" financing authority provided by 11 U.S.C § 364(c) (1982), discussed in Simon & Mehlsack, supra note 6, at 1136-37.
In any case, the required contract payment would be considered a first priority administrative
expense during the reorganization process as an incentive to ongoing performance of the executory contract.
119. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at i204 n.9 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring and dissenting).
120. Id. at 1206-07.
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designed to prevent.' 2 1
New Legislation in 1984

Criticism of the Bildisco decision from labor quarters was swift and
22
prompted the introduction of new bankruptcy legislation in Congress.'
Fearing that bankruptcy would be used as a bargaining ploy or unionbusting tool, congressional sponsors proposed legislation that focused on
both aspects of the Supreme Court opinion.' 23 First, the proposed legislation toughened the standard for rejection of labor agreements by incorporating the REA Express business-failure test. 124 Second, it barred
unilateral employer contract modifications without bankruptcy court approval. 125 The legislation also established guidelines for bargaining duties leading up to the rejection decision 26 and provided that the new law
27
would be retroactive. 1
121. Id. at 1208, 1211. At its root, this prediction is based on a view that organized labor
would react to Bildisco as inherently unfair because it allowed the retroactive elimination of
contract duties, with minimal risk to an employer acting unilaterally and with a built-in incentive for management to reject the contract sooner rather than later. See Note, Rejection, supra
note 6, at 955 n.294 (summarizing the negotiating imbalance theory).
122. See Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 312-19; White, supra note 6, at 1190-1200. See also
other commentaries cited supra note 6 for a summary of the post-Bildisco legislative developments.
Some pro-management authors challenged the need for any legislative action. One stated
that "pledges to obtain legislation disallowing the rejection of labor contracts are calculated
and unwarranted hyperbole." Pulliam & Smith, The Supreme Court in the Workplace. L.A.
Times, Feb. 29, 1984, § II, at 5, col. 3. Even Bildisco's president questioned whether the
Court's decision would make bankruptcy an attractive alternative: "Going into Chapter II is
debilitating. Doing it just to solve a union problem would be like cutting off your nose to spite
your face." TIME, Mar. 5, 1984, at 14.
123. H.R. 4908, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H780 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1984).
This proposal was superseded in the House in March 1984 by H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess..
130 CONG. REC. H1842 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1984).
124. H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., § 1113(g)(2), 130 CONG. REC. H1842 (daily ed.
Mar. 21, 1984); see Brotherhood of Ry. Employees v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164, 169
(2d Cir), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975); supra note 86.
125. H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., § 1113(b), (h), 130 CONG. REC. H1842 (daily ed.
Mar. 21, 1984).
126. Id. § 1113(d).
127. No express provision of the original H.R. 5174 restricted application of the proposal,
unlike the law eventually passed, which permitted rejection under the prior law in any case
filed before the effective date of the post-Bildisco legislation. Bankruptcy and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 541(c), 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98
Stat.) 333, 390 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1113(a) (Supp. 11 1984)). The strategy pursued to pass
the congressional proposals was to offer them as part of a diverse package of Bankruptcy Code
amendments that had been negotiated as Congress grappled with the Supreme Court's decision
two years earlier in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50
(1982), discussed supra note 12. In that case, the Court invalidated the tenure and status of
bankruptcy judges under the 1978 reform of the bankruptcy system. See supra note I. Presum-
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In March, the House approved the proposed bankruptcy reform
package, including, without debate, the labor amendments overturning
Bildisco.128 Senate action on the bill was stalled, however, and Congress
authorized monthly extensions of the interim bankruptcy system in effect
since Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. 129
Finally, in June the logjam in the Senate was broken, but only after Democrats and moderate Republicans accepted a Senate bankruptcy package
without any provision overruling Bildisco.130 The final battleground
shifted to the legislative conference committee. In June, both houses
passed a compromise package, and the President signed the bill on July
10.131

The new bankruptcy provision governing rejection of labor agreements appeared as a separate component, section 1113, within Chapter
11.132 The terms of the new law do not apply expressly to municipal
ably, the disparate interests in line to benefit from elements of the package, which included
consumer credit institutions, shopping center developers, grain farmers, and, most important,
a President with a potential windfall of judicial appointments, would ensure success of the
entire compromise.
Without widespread agitation over a variety of perceived problems in the bankruptcy
process after 1978, it is unclear whether labor acting alone could have mounted a successful
amendment campaign. The background of these Bankruptcy Code issues is summarized in
Cifelli, Management by Bankruptcy, FORTUNE, Oct. 31, 1983, at 69; see also Washington Post,
Mar. 4, 1984, at HI, col. 1. A vast increase in the number of business reorganization filings
that took place between 1979 and 1983 (from about 4000 in 1979 to over 18,000 in 1983)
contributed to public and congressional concern. San Francisco Examiner, Nov. 6, 1983, at
Dl, col. 2. By 1984, with an economic recovery in progress, the number of bankruptcy filings
was leveling off, but one financial analyst predicted a continuing high number because of new
high-risk businesses as well as consolidation of older flagging industries. Washington Post,
Mar. 4, 1984, at HI, col. 1.
128. L.A. Daily J., Mar. 22, 1984, at 1, col. 1; see also Lunnie, Chapter11 and Collective
Bargaining, 35 LAB. L.J. 516 (1984) (critical review of the deliberative process in the House).
129. 458 U.S. 50 (1972); see, e.g., White, supra note 6, at 1191 n.68; L.A. Daily J., June 6,
1984, at 1,col. 6; L.A. Daily J., Mar. 29, 1984, at 1, col. 2. The post-Marathon interim system
essentially provided for district court supervision and review of bankruptcy court cases. L.A.
Daily J., Mar. 22, 1984, at 1, col. 6.
130. 130 CONG. REC. 87,617-25 (1984).
131. 127 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-9, A-9 to A-12 (July 2, 1984); 116 LAB. REL. REP.
(BNA) 232, 232-33 (July 23, 1984). The final bill was the compromise arising from months of
effort by a variety of groups and their supporters in Congress. These groups included organized labor, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, and
the National Bankruptcy Conference. See Larson, The Rejection of Collective Bargaining
Agreements in Bankruptcy, Section 1113-LegitimateProgeny of Bildisco, EMPLOYMENT REL.
BULL., Oct. 1984, at 4.
132. Bankruptcy and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 541(a), 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 333, 390 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c) (Supp. II
1984) ("Title I1 of the United States Code is amended by adding after section 1112 the following .... ")).
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bankruptcies under Chapter 9,133 nor is any portion of Chapter 9
amended to incorporate the congressional action.
Section 1113 creates an involved process for bankruptcy court rejection of collective bargaining agreements. 134 First, after filing a petition,
but before making a motion to reject the contract, an employer must
submit the proposed contract modification to the union or unions. 35
The proposal must be supported by disclosure of information appropriate
to evaluate the offer. 136 The modification sought by the employer must
be "necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor and [assure] that
all creditors, the debtor and all of the affected parties are treated fairly
,,137
and equitably ....
Next, the employer must meet with the bargaining representative
"to confer in good faith in attempting to reach mutually satisfactory
modifications of such agreement ....,,t38 In the event the parties do not
reach agreement, a bankruptcy court may authorize rejection only if the
required negotiations were pursued, 139 the union refused to accept the
proposal "without good cause,"' 40 and "the balance of the equities
133. But see II U.S.C. § 1113(f) (Supp. 11 1984). This subsection provides: "'No provision of this title shall be construed to permit a trustee to unilaterally terminate or alter any
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement prior to compliance with the provisions of this
section." Id. The "title" referred to is title I1 of the United States Code. Arguably, the broad
text of the new legislation has established a framework for contract rejection analysis under
Chapter 9, as well as under Chapter 11, but this would not be a fair reading of the statute and
the Code as a whole because an earlier definitional limitation states that rejection pursuant to
§ 1113 is limited to "[t]he debtor in possession, or the trustee if one has been appointed under
the provisions of this chapter, other than a trustee in a case covered by subchapter IV of this
chapter and by title I of the Railway Labor Act." Id. § 1113(a). The specified exception
applies to trustees under Chapter 11 railway reorganization proceedings. In any event, Chapter 9 is governed by its unique statutes, and by other bankruptcy provisions expressly incorporated by §§ 901(a) or 103(e). These provisions were not amended to incorporate the new
§ 1113. This interpretation is further supported by the final bill's omission of Chapter 9 coverage that was included in earlier substitute legislation introduced by Senator Thurmond. See
130 CONG.REC. S6081, S6126 (daily ed. May 21, 1984).
134. See supra note 6 for sources describing the new statute and related legislative history.
135. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A), (B) (Supp. 11 1984).
136. Id.
137. Id. This text was a substitute for a requirement that the debtor's proposal contain
only "minimum modifications" of the contract. 126 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-8, A-9 (June
29, 1984). Under the new statute, either party might reasonably suggest that the court examine
the contract and review the bargaining history, a complicated and time-consuming task, for
the purpose of distinguishing provisions linked to proposed modifications from those that are
not, and thereby argue for or against rejection. Since many bargaining agreements in labor
relations today are quite lengthy, the difficulty of such a task, if not an impossibility, underscores the desirability of having the parties themselves negotiate solutions.
138. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(2) (Supp. 11 1984).
139. Id. § 1113(c)(1).
140. Id. § 1113(c)(2).
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clearly favors rejection." 1 4 1 This procedure applies only to cases arising
after the effective date of the legislation, thus denying unions the sought14 2
after retroactivity.
Procedurally, rejection requires that a noticed motion be heard not
more than fourteen days from the date the request is filed, subject to a
seven-day extension. 143 Once the hearing commences, the court has
thirty days in which to rule on the request. 144 If the court does not issue
a ruling within that time, and if the parties do not agree to an extension,
the employer is free to alter any contract provisions pending the eventual
ruling. 4 5 The employer also is allowed to modify the contract through
interim relief under the new law. 146 If the employer shows that temporary relief "is essential to the continuation of the debtor's business, or in
order to avoid irreparable injury,"' 147 the court may authorize contract
141. Id. § 11 13(c)(3). Some commentators believe that adopting the "balance of equities"
test approved in Bildisco, instead of the REA Express standard, will not make much practical
difference. See, e.g., Simon & Mehlsack, supra note 6, at 1137; White, supra note 6, at 1182-83.
142. See supra note 127. The NLRB continues to apply Bildisco to limit unfair practice
findings and remedies in contract-based bargaining cases arising before passage of the new law,
using the date of the bankruptcy petition as the cut-off. See, e.g., Tucson Yellow Cab, 275
N.L.R.B. No. 32, 1985 NLRB Apr. (CCH) 17,214 (1985); Edward Cooper Painting, Inc.,
273 N.L.R.B. No. 224, 1985 NLRB Feb. (CCH) t 17,109 (1985). Trustees remain liable,
however, for pre-petition anti-union discrimination. Ohio Container Servs., 277 N.L.R.B. No.
25, 1985 NLRB Nov. (CCH) 1 17,518 (1985)
143. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(d)(1) (Supp. 11 1984). Another portion of the 1984 bankruptcy
amendments requires that, on motion, the federal district court shall withdraw a case from the
bankruptcy court and hear the dispute itself if the issue involves bankruptcy law and other
laws "regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate commerce." Bankruptcy and
Federal Judgship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 1021(a), 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS (98 Stat.) 333, 341 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(d) (Supp. 1985)). Presumably, a
federal district judge may not share the reputed institutional bias of the bankruptcy courts.
Gibson, Chapter11 Is a Two-Edged Sword: Union Options in Corporate Chapter 11 Proceedings, 35 LAB. L.J. 624, 631 (1984).
144. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(d)(2) (Supp. 11 1984).
145. Id. Objections to this provision, which permits an employer to benefit from the
court's delay, were dropped in the final conference committee caucus. 126 DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) A-8, A-10 (June 29, 1984) The relationship between the freedom to act and the 30-day
provision is not entirely without precedent in the bankruptcy field. Section 362(e) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a request to lift the automatic stay will terminate the stay unless the
court, within 30 days of the request and after notice and hearing, orders continuation of the
stay pending a final hearing. 11 U.S.C.§ 362(e) (1982). Section 362(e)(2) requires that the
final hearing must then be commenced within 30 days of the preliminary hearing. Id.
§ 362(e)(2). Because the 30-day rules under §§ 362 and 1113 are not precisely parallel, it
remains to be determined to what extent interpretation and application of the former will
control situations involving the latter. One author also has noted that, in the event delay by
the court does prompt unilateral employer action, a stay still may be available from a reviewing court exercising broad discretion in bankruptcy cases. White, supra note 6, at 1198-200.
146. 11 U.S.C. §1113(e) (Supp. II 1984).
147. Id.
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changes pending further consideration of the rejection request. 4 Finally, the new law provides that the bankruptcy laws shall not be construed to authorize any unilateral contract changes unless an employer
49
follows the prescribed modification procedures. 1
The compromise legislation left many questions unresolved, as one
might expect in a field with strong competing interests. 50 For example,
does the new statute, as a practical matter, require an employer to submit
a virtually complete plan of reorganization along with its modification
proposal as a way of demonstrating to the union and to the court that all
concerned have been treated fairly and equitably? Without such a comprehensive plan, can a union freely resist negotiations?' 5 1 Moreover, to
what extent should "equity" involve considering such factors as top148. Id.
149. Id. § 1113(f). Despite the implication in § 1113(f) that Bildisco has been modified to
allow only post-rejection unilateral changes, it is arguable that such changes must be confined
to those proposed modifications over which the parties bargained to impasse and that the
NLRA duty to bargain over other established terms survives the contract's rejection. See
supra note 112. Under this view, established employment terms under § 8(a)(5) would be
protected unless further bargaining takes place. If Bildisco's concept of contract unenforceability were applied as justification for across the board unilateral action after rejection. the
salutary goal of the new law would be undermined by altering the negotiating balance bet%%een
the parties.
150. Like other labor legislation, the new statute is "to a marked degree, the result of
conflict and compromise between strong contending forces and deeply held views oil the role of
organized labor ... and the appropriate balance to be struck between the uncontrolled po%%er
of management and labor to further their respective interests." Local 1976. United Bhd. of
Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 99-100 (1957).
Additionally, as one court has observed, interpretative difficulty is compounded because
the legislative history largely is based on the comments of individual members of Congress and
not on a committee report, the preferred means of gauging legislative intent. III re CareN
Transp., Inc., 50 Bankr. 203, 206-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (quoting Garcia v. United States, 105 S.
Ct. 479, 483 (1984)).
151. Senator Hatch, the ranking Republican member of the Judiciary Committee and a
conferee, stated that the new law did not require "an entire reorganization plan at a premature
stage" or "a detailed accounting of how the difficult burden of reorganization is to be distributed amongst competing parties." 130 CONG. REC. S8891 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement
of Sen. Hatch). However, this comment, virtually the only postconference remark on the subject, begs the question of how detailed support for the proposal must be while clarifying that
diverse interests must be considered, at least in general categorical terms. See Gibson, supra
note 6, at 336-37. One court suggested that the proposal itself should include only "necessary
modifications" and denied rejection because the employer sought more than that in negotiations. In re Valley Kitchens, 52 Bankr. 493, 495-96 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
Perhaps more fundamentally, there is a lack of clarity about the nature of the test to be
applied: shall the proposal be measured by objective, third-party calculation, or by the subjective business judgment of the debtor? If the latter subjective measure is utilized, will labor
contract rejection have come full circle, abandoning the burdensome assessment required by
Bildisco and restoring the approach traditionally used in contract rejection proceedings? See
Pulliam, supra note 6, at 29, 42-43; see also supra note 83.
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heavy management or overexpanded operations as well as rank-and-file
152
labor costs as causes of the employer's financial distress?
Further, what information must an employer disclose to explain its
fiscal plight or to reveal alternatives if negotiations fail? 153 Would this
requirement apply if confidential talks with banks, suppliers, and other
creditors could be jeopardized by a third party's refusal to cooperate?
Even if the employer submits a plan, what risk does the union run in
rejecting the employer's claim that the modifications are "necessary to
permit reorganization of the debtor" and making its own counteroffers? 154 Could a union suggest, in response to the employer's plan, an
alternative that redistributes the benefits and burdens of reorganization,
152. Two Republican Senators, otherwise at odds in the congressional debate leading to
the eventual compromise, shared the view that reorganization sacrifices should be borne by
nonunion employees as well as by those covered under a labor agreement. Compare 130 CONG.
REC. 58888 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. Thurmond that interests of nonuhiion
employees should be as carefully considered as those of union workers) with 130 CONG. REc.
S8896 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. Packwood that sacrifices will be spread
among all affected parties). The latter comments cited with approval In re Blue Ribbon
Transp. Co., 30 Bankr. 783 (D.R.I. 1983) (labor contract rejection conditioned upon a major
reduction of management salaries and expenses). See also In re Cook United, Inc., 50 Bankr.
561 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (rejection denied, in part, because of adverse impact on senior employees); In re Russell Transfer, 48 Bankr. 241 (W.D. Va. 1985) (interim reduction of nonunion
administrative salaries as well as union wages pending rejection decision); InI re Parrot Packing, 42 Bankr. 323 (N.D. Ind. 1983) (requiring all employees to share sacrifices during reorganization). But cf. InI re Allied Delivery Sys. Co., 49 Bankr. 700 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (equitable
treatment does not mean identical or equal treatment).
Practically, union leverage in negotiating a fair reorganization may become a test of wills,
pitting organized labor against secured creditors, as in the 1985 bankruptcy filing by the
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corporation. 118 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 301 (Apr. 22, 1985);
N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1985, at DI, col. 5. The union, which previously had made substantial
wage concessions in exchange for stock, balked at any further surrender of benefits as part of a
$514 million debt restructuring plan unless the secured creditors also agreed to some debt
forgiveness. Management claimed that a Chapter 11 filing was compelled when pre-petition
talks failed. After a bankruptcy court approved the employer's contract rejection request in In
re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 50 Bankr. 969 (W.D. Pa. 1985), an 87-day strike followed
before the parties reached a wage and benefit reduction settlement. N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1985,
at 16, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1985, at 16, col. 2. The package was approved over lender
objections. Wall St. J., Oct 28, 1985, at 2, col. 3.
153. The court in In re K & B Mounting, Inc., 50 Bankr. 460 (N.D. Ind. 1985), denied a
rejection request because the employer's claim of necessary modifications was not substantiated by relevant information in the form of "detailed projections and recommendations, perhaps made by a management consultant, preferably one who is independent of the interested
parties." Id. at 467; see also In re Fiber Glass Indus., Inc., 49 Bankr. 202, 207 (N.D.N.Y.
1985) (rejection request denied in part because the employer did not disclose information
about possible layoffs as an element of the reorganization plan).
154. The prospect of give-and-take is evident in § 11 13(b)(2)'s use of the phrase "mutually
satisfactory modifications" in tandem with requiring the parties "to confer in good faith." 11
U.S.C. § 11 13(b)(2) (Supp. 111984); see also In re Cook United, Inc., 50 Bankr. 561, 563 (N.D.
Ohio 1985) (union steadfastness permitted when employer's explanation was inadequate).
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such as employee stock ownership and participation on a company's

board of directors? 155 In such a case, can the union's rejection ever be

"without good cause" if the alternative is also reasonable and attempts to
balance competing interests? 5 6 And, if the union does balk at the employer's plan while suggesting alternatives, does the new law requiring
that the parties "confer in good faith" revive the impasse rule of
Bildisco?157 Finally, as a matter of sound practice, should bankruptcy

155. The option of negotiating for a form of employee ownership surely does not guarantee
success, however, as demonstrated in 1985 by the second bankruptcy reorganization of Rath
Packing Company, in which an employee group has proposed a new series of employee concessions in an effort to take over the affairs of the concern created and bought by employees
during the first reorganization attempt. N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1985, at A16, col. 1;vee alo III
re Rath Packing Co., 36 Bankr. 979 (N.D. Iowa 1984), aff'd, 48 Bankr. 315 (N.D. Iowa 1985).
Nevertheless, given a union's potential influence over a final reorganization plan. one
commentator has suggested a wide variety of additional labor proposals that could be advanced in the course of bargaining, including: restructuring the debtor's stock or management
structures; deferring cash payments to employees in exchange for support by other creditors
for a union job-saving plan; and compelling management and nonunion employee paycuts and
layoffs. Gibson, supra note 143, at 632.
In another article, two ideas were put forward as an ultimate form of security for the %%age
portion of a labor agreement: a special trust fund and wage insurance. See Kohl & Stephens.
Altering the Impact of Bildisco: Multiple Optionsfor Labor Unions, 35 LAB. L.J. 560, 563-64
(1984).
156. Senator Hatch urged that "the union can only reject such a good faith offer for cause
good enough to justify the risk of the business' collapse." 130 CONG. REC. S8891 (daily ed.
June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. Hatch). Some decisions under § 1113 adopt this perspectie
and focus not on what the debtor can afford to pay and the union's good faith in making
objections, but on what the employer needs to do to attain the overall goal of a reorganizatIon
See, e.g., In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 50 Bankr. 969 (W.D. Pa. 1985); In re Allied
Delivery Sys. Co., 49 Bankr. 700 (N.D. Ohio 1985). However, the "without good cause"
requirement was based on a provision referring to an "unjustified" refusal in a reform amendment introduced by Senator Packwood. See 130 CONG. REC. S6181 (daily ed. May 22. 1984)
(statement of Sen. Packwood); 126 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-8, A-9 to A-10 (June 29.
1984). This was described as subject to a bad faith bargaining test. 130 CONG. Rt.c. S6182
(daily ed. May 22, 1984) (statement of Sen. Packwood); accord id. at H7496 (daily ed. Juie 29.
1984) (statement of Rep. Morrison). See generally Gibson, supra note 6, at 341-42; White.
supra note 6, at 1197-98; Note, Rejection, supra note 6, at 958 n.77. If, however, the courts
focus not on procedural good faith, but on "good cause" for substantive objections, the rejection process runs the risk of undermining the negotiating freedom of the parties, a hallmark of
American labor law. See H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970); 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d) (1982) (NLRA duty to bargain "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal
or require the making of a concession").
Throughout bankruptcy-related negotiations, a union probably would be given broad discretion in its talks with an employer in terms of liability for an alleged breach of the union's
duty of fair representation. For example, in one case a union did not violate the duty when it
traded a delay in extended vacation rights for a result maximizing the current wage level and
job preservation. Wolford v. Steelworkers Local 1054, 117 LRRM 2021, 2022 (S.D. Ind.
1984) (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 336-43 (1953)).
157. Senator Packwood, a key architect of the new law, believed impasse would be a precondition. See 130 CONG. REC. S6182 (daily ed. May 22, 1984) (statement of Sen. Packwood
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courts defer to the NLRB on issues within its realm of expertise, such as
good faith bargaining, impasse, and unilateral action? 158
Procedurally, the new law is fairly precise in setting a time schedule
for the court's consideration of the rejection request. If the court does not
rule in a timely fashion, can the debtor truly "terminate or alter any
provisions" of the agreement pending the eventual court ruling? Or, are
the employer's options limited either to the proposal described in the
pleadings seeking rejection or to revisions made in the course of prior
1 59
bargaining?
describing earlier version of § 1113). Even if the impasse rule is not revived by § 1113, other
standards of good faith bargaining still might apply, although there is some conflict in congressional history on this point. See Gibson, supra note note 6, at 329-30 (comparing remarks of
Sens. Moynihan and Hatch). Nevertheless, bankruptcy courts need not apply the NLRA literally to reach comparable results. For example, a recent case decided after enactment of § 1113
denied an employer's contract rejection request in part because there had been only one negotiating session, the union had expressed a willingness to meet further, and the employer did not
take advantage of the opportunity. See In re American Provision Co., 44 Bankr. 907 (D.
Minn. 1984). Overall, the court reviewed the several elements of the § 1113 process and noted
those aspects placing a burden of going forward on the union (for example, the debtor's failure
to provide relevant information or to confer in good faith, and the union's good cause objections), but cautioned that the ultimate proof burden remained with the party seeking rejection.
Id. at 909; see also In re Carey Transp., Inc., 50 Bankr. 203, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); cf.In re Salt
Creek Freightways, 47 Bankr. 835 (D. Wyo. 1985) (rejection granted following union failure to
show bad faith bargaining or that proposed changes were unnecessary).
158. In the end, however, the bankruptcy court must determine whether "the balance of
equities clearly favors rejection." 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)(3) (Supp. 11 1984). Although other
provisions of the new statute modified and reversed the unilateral change portion of Bildisco,
this balancing standard adopts the Supreme Court's ultimate test for rejection requests, thus
requiring practitioners to review pre-Bildisco case law to determine the needs for an effective
reorganization. See Gibson, supra note 6, at 342-47 (references to legislative history and relevant factors from previous bankruptcy decisions).
A Supreme Court decision in 1984, after Bildisco and after enactment of § 1113, suggests
an alternative means of protecting contractual rights that have been abridged in violation of a
labor relations statutory design. In Ohio v. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. 705 (1985), Justice O'Connor,
concurring, observed that even a bankruptcy discharge might not leave a state regulatory
agency without recourse if the money due was classified as a statutory lien or a perfected
security interest under state law, and thus would be subject to priority payment in bankruptcy.
Id. at 712 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 545 (1982)). The prospect of lien
status enhancing employee claims might prompt unions or interested governmental agencies to
lobby in appropriate legislative bodies for such protection. See also Kilroy, In re Bildisco:
New Hurdlesfor the Rejection of a Collective BargainingAgreement in Bankruptcy, 35 LAB.
L.J. 368, 372 (1984) (proposing use of state wage lien statutes to expand employee claims).
California, for example, prohibits withholding of wages due under a bargaining agreement,
CAL. LAB. CODE § 222 (West 1971), and provides for an independent penalty accruing to the
state's general treasury, id. § 225.5, but there is no "employee lien" law analogous to other
statutory liens. Additionally, withholding is permitted if the employer is "empowered" to do
so under federal law. Id. § 224.
159. This may have special significance in measuring the scope of damages potentially
arising from contract rejection, which still are paid under § 1113 as unsecured creditor claims.
If rejection is denied, however, at least two Congressmen believed that damages suffered dur-
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Further, the interim relief provision presents not only the question
of what relief is "essential to the continuation of the debtor's business,"160 but also the more troubling question of what relief is necessary
"in order to avoid irreparable damage to the estate."' 6 1 Including both
standards leads to the conclusion that Congress contemplated two distinct assessments. But if so, what dangers are included in the "irreparable damage" clause that are not already encompassed in the phrase
"essential to the continuation of the debtor's business"? 162

The Bildisco unilateral change rule thus led a short and unhappy
life. 1 Although Bildisco's labor and congressional opponents made sub63

ing an interim period are recoverable as administrative expenses. See 130 CONG. REC. H7496
(daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Rep. Morrison); id. at S8898 (statement of Sen.
Packwood). As noted supra note 137, allowing partial or interim unilateral changes also inevitably will complicate the bankruptcy court's task of liquidating less tangible but related elements of a bargaining agreement, such as seniority or leave of absence provisions, under
§ 502(c) of the code. See generally Note, Proceduresfor Estimating Contingent or Unliquidated Claims in Bankruptcy, 35 STAN. L. REV. 153 (1982). It will be even more difficult in
Chapter 9 proceedings to determine the value, as well as the effectiveness, of modifications that
alter civil service laws that have been incorporated into a contract to ease enforcement, or that
establish a statutory floor providing minimum protections that can be enhanced but not contravened by agreement. See San Mateo City School Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd.,
33 Cal. 3d 850, 864-67, 663 P.2d 523, 532-34, 191 Cal, Rptr. 800, 809-11 (1983), discussed
infra text accompanying note 288.
Permitting the unilateral change of a contract's substantive terms also can have long-term
consequences that affect basic representation rights. For example, in one case the court approved an employer's proposal to extend its bargaining agreement for five years rather than to
allow negotiations over a new duration when the agreement expired in 13 months. In re
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 50 Bankr. 969 (W.D. Pa. 1985). Fixing the length of an
agreement potentially thwarts not merely the principle of free bargaining over terms, see 29
U.S.C.A. § 158(d) (West Supp. 1985), but also threatens the right of employees to select a new
bargaining agent free from a contractual bar. See generally C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW 361-63, 373-76 (2d ed. 1983).
160. 11 U.S.C. § 1113(e) (Supp. 11 1984).
161. Id.
162. This uncertainty was evident in a post-passage colloquy between two Representatives.
One argued that the REA Express business-failure test had been adopted. The other agreed a
narrower standard was intended, but not one as restrictive as the earlier Second Circuit approach. 127 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-9, A-11 (July 2, 1984). A decision issued four
months after enactment of § 1113 rejected an interim relief request under either prong of the
new statute because of insufficient proof of employer need and a projected cost-benefit of less
than 10%. In re Wright Air Lines, Inc., 44 Bankr. 744 (N.D. Ohio 1984). But interim relief
was granted in a second case under the new statute, applying the REA Express test but concluding that imminent collapse would occur without temporary rejection. In re Salt Creek
Freightways, 46 Bankr. 347 (D. Wyo. 1985); see also In re Russell Transfer, 48 Bankr. 241
(W.D. Va. 1985); Gibson, supra note 6, at 334-35 (discussing other aspects of the interim relief
provision, including a limitation on the scope of relief to that proposed by the employer).
163. One labor law professor, in a major annual survey of Supreme Court labor and employment decisions, had this comment: "The decision of the Court in N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco has
already joined the ranks of that mercifully small group of labor law decisions so demonstrably
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stantial compromises, giving up retroactivity, accepting a balancing of
equities standard, and allowing unilateral changes on an interim basis as
well as after an accelerated negotiating and judicial process, unions nevertheless secured significant relief. The contours of this relief will unfold
in litigation to interpret the compromise legislation and will lead to further questions about the accommodation between the bankruptcy courts
and the NLRB. Nevertheless, it portends a new chapter for the labor
relations of distressed American businesses. Now, an employer must
bargain in good faith, disclose relevant information, prepare a fair proposal, and submit to expeditious court scrutiny. Most important, the employer must act affirmatively to have an agreement rejected prior to
making any changes. No longer can bargaining agreements lose their
force and effect "by operation of law."

Public Sector Bankruptcy Proceedings
Legislation Before 1976

The United States Constitution provides that Congress has the
power to "establish

. .

. uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies

throughout the United States."' 164 The development of bankruptcy legislation through the nineteenth century gradually expanded the scope of
bankruptcy, but did not include public sector entities. 165 It was not until
wrong that Congress immediately enacts corrective legislation." Hardin, Labor and Employinent Law Decisions: The October 1983 Term of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1
LAB. LAW. 49, 77 (1985).
Another professor has cautioned, however, that bankruptcy court skepticism of union
claims and reluctance to treat unionized employees differently from other creditors may negate
the impact of the new legislation. White, supra note 6, at 1200.
164. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
165. Patterson, MunicipalDebt Adjustments Under the Bankruptcy Act, 90 U. PA. L. REV.
520, 521 (1942). According to Professor Charles Warren, a leading bankruptcy historian, a
motion to extend bankruptcy to municipalities was defeated in 1864. C. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 102 (1935). Proponents of the major bankruptcy law
passed in 1898 also rejected the assumption that the bill applied to municipalities, one
Representatative noting that "they are agencies of sovereignty." Id. at 142. Interestingly, the
municipal exclusion cut against the historical current of expanding bankruptcy jurisdiction to
meet the needs of a growing national economy. See id. at 8-9. For other commentary summarizing the early history of municipal bankruptcy law, see Dession, MunicipalDebt Adjustment
and the Supreme Court, 46 YALE L.J. 199 (1936); Note, The Constitutionalityof the Municipal
Debt ReadjustmentAct, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 428 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Note, Municipal
Debt Readjustment].
For commentary concerning more recent developments, see Bond, Municipal Bankruptcy
Under the 1976 Amendments to ChapterIX of the Bankruptcy Act, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1
(1976); Greenberg, Municipal Bankruptcy: Some Basic Aspects, 10 URB. LAw. 266 (1978);
Harvey, Municipal Debt Adjustment, 33 Bus. LAW. 221 (1977); Hefner, New Power of the
ChapterIX Bankruptcy Court to Authorize the Issuance of Certificates of Indebtedness: Con-
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1910 that the public sector was mentioned at all, and then Congress ex66
pressly excluded municipal corporations from coverage. 1
By the 1930's, the need for municipal debt adjustment became a recognized political reality. 167 It was assumed at the time, however, that
public entities facing a revenue crisis were subject to a constitutional prohibition against state laws "impairing the Obligations of Contracts,"'' 68
and that states were virtually powerless to resolve impending public in169
solvencies absent federal legislation.
By 1934 Congress took action to fill the breach, 170 but the Supreme
Court ruled the legislation unconstitutional two years later in Ashton v.
Cameron County Water Improvement DistrictNo. 1.171 The five-to-four
decision perceived congressional authorization of debt readjustments as a
potentially dangerous intrusion upon state sovereignty. While not explicitly invoking the tenth amendment 172 as the basis for its decision, the
Court relied on federalism and cited earlier Supreme Court decisions that
gressionalRelief or CongressionalOverreaching?,51 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1977); King, Municipal Insolvency: ChapterIX, Old and New; ChapterIX Rules, 50 AM. BANKR. L.J. 55 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as King I]; King, MunicipalInsolvency: The New ChapterIX of the Bankruptcy Act, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1157 (1976) [hereinafter cited as King II]; Patchan & Collins, The
1976 Municipal Bankruptcy Law, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 287 (1977); Note, A Survey of Municipal Bankruptcy Law and Procedures, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 478 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Survey]; Note, The Recent Revision of the Federal Municipal Bankruptcy Statute: A
Potential Reprieve for Insolvent Cities?, 13 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 549 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Recent Revision]; Note, Municipal Bankruptcy, the Tenth Amendment and the New Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1871 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note, Municipal Bankruptcy];
Note, MunicipalBankruptcy: The Need for an Expanded ChapterIX, 10 MICH. J.L. REFORM
91 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note, Expanded ChapterIX]; Note, Reform of CreditorParticipation Procedures in Municipal Bankruptcy, 85 YALE L.J. 423 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Reform].
166. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 553 (codified as amended at I1 U.S.C.
§ 2216 (1982)), cited in City of Holland v. Holland City Gas Co., 257 F. 679, 686 (6th Cir.
1919); Patterson, supra note 165, at 521.
167. This recognition followed the collapse of real estate and irrigation developments, especially in the South and Far West, and the steep revenue losses suffered by some major cities.
Patterson, supra note 165, at 522.
168. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.1.
169. See Note, Municipal Debt Readjustment, supra note 165, at 429 n.9. The validity of
this premise is doubtful today, as evident in recent cases regarding state laws that do not
unconstitutionally impair contracts. See infra notes 326-60 & accompanying text.
170. Sumners-Wilcox Bill, ch. 345, §§ 78-80, 48 Stat. 798 (codified in scattered sections of
11 U.S.C.); Note, Municipal Debt Readjustment, supra note 165, at 428. Another contemporary summed up the effect of the new law as a "'short receivership' to be employed at the end
rather than at the beginning of readjustment negotiations." Dession, supra note 165, at 216.
171. 298 U.S. 513 (1936).
172. The tenth amendment states: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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did rely expressly on tenth amendment analysis. 173 The Court also believed that the law would permit state-created entities to impair contractual obligations under the guise of the federal bankruptcy power. 174
In dissent, Justice Cardozo argued that the voluntary nature of the
public entity's petition, requiring state consent, showed that the statute
"ha[d] been framed with sedulous regard to the structure of the Federal
system." 175
Proponents of municipal bankruptcy legislation quickly redrafted
legislation, hampered by the Ashton Court's failure to single out the deficiencies in the rejected 1934 act. 176 Congress promptly passed a new
law 177 that retained the voluntary and consensual requirements for the
petition, but emphasized the need for a majority of creditors to agree 17to
8
the municipality's debt composition plan prior to court approval. 17 9
Such an agreement had not been a prerequisite under the rejected law.
The Court upheld the revised legislation in Bekins v. LindsayStrathmore IrrigationDistrict.80 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice
Hughes sought to distinguish the Ashton view that federal law in this
area would interfere with the independence of the states to manage their
own affairs. The Court concluded that the voluntary nature of the proceeding, with no judicial control over the property and revenue of the
8
petitioner, was a satisfactory solution under the tenth amendment.' '
The Court also cited its recent approval of social security and unemployment legislation as an example of a federal and state consensual arrangement, 82 reasoning that comparable consensual arrangements under the
173. The Court stated that the bankruptcy law would impinge on the "separate and independent existence" of the states, Ashton, 298 U.S. at 528, reasoning that "neither consent
nor submission by the states can enlarge the powers of Congress; none can exist except those
which are granted." Id. at 531 (citing United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (agricultural
act as unconstitutional invasion of reserved state power under the tenth amendment)).
174. Ashton, 298 U.S. at 531.
175. Id. at 538 (Cardozo, J., dissenting). In a comment written soon after the Court's
decision, Professor Dession conceded that the 1934 law was limited and imperfect, but criticized the Court's sweeping enhancement of state interests. Dession, supra note 165, at 219.
Professor Dession believed the Court's action also was distressing because past decisions had
shown judicial receptivity to the claims of government creditors whenever they were substantially impaired by overbroad legislative action. Id. at 224.
176. Patterson, supra note 165, at 524-25.
177. Act of August 16, 1937, ch. 657, 50 Stat. 653 (codified in scattered sections of 11

U.S.C.).
178. Patterson, supra note 165, at 526.
179. Id. at 526-27.
180. 304 U.S. 27 (1938).
181. Id. at 51-52.
182. Id. at 53 (citing Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937)).
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As the owners of property within the boundaries of the district could
not pay adequate assessments, the power of taxation was useless. The
creditors of the district were helpless. The natural and reasonable remedy through composition of the debts of the district was not available
under state law by reason of the restriction imposed by the Federal
Constitution upon the impairment of contracts by state legislation.
The bankruptcy power is competent to give relief to debtors in such a
plight, and if there is any obstacle to its exercise in the case of the
districts organized under state law it lies in the right of the State to
oppose federal interference. The State steps in to remove that obstacle.
The State acts in aid, and not in derogation, of its sovereign powers. It
invites the intervention of the bankruptcy power to save its agency

which the State itself is powerless to rescue. Through its cooperation
with the national government the needed relief is given. We see no
ground for the conclusion that the Federal Constitution, in the interest
of state sovereignty,
has reduced both sovereigns to helplessness in
84
such a case. '

That passage belies the suggestion that congressional tinkering with
the earlier legislation had resolved the constitutional infirmity. t85 Both
laws were voluntary and consensual in nature, and both barred action
that would "limit or impair the power of any State to control, by legislation or otherwise, any political subdivision thereof in the exercise of its
political or governmental powers .... ,,t86 In fact, the technical changes
in the two laws were modest and the Bekins Court did not expressly rely
upon these changes in distinguishing Ashton.18 7 Constitutional analysts
have concluded that the Bekins result reflected a change in the Court's
composition rather than a substantive improvement in the legislative
183.

Bekins, 304 U.S. at 53-54.

184. Id.
185. Id. at 50-51.
186. Ashton, 298 U.S. at 526 (quoting Act of May 24, 1935, ch. 345, § 80(k), 48 Stat. 798);
vee Act of Aug. 16, 1937, ch. 657, § 83(i), 50 Stat. 653. The principal difference in the 1937
Act was insertion of the phrase "municipality or political subdivision of or in such State" for
-political subdivision thereof." The current statute retains the same bar to impairing state
control. See 11 U.S.C. § 903 (1982). This section plays an important role in developing the
analysis presented throughout this Article.
187. See, e.g., Note, Reform, supra note 165, at 436 n.80. One of the changes Congress
made, although not alluded to in Bekins, was elimination of federal court authority to reject
executory contracts. Id. The author believes that "no constitutional significance" could be
drawn from this change. Id. The failure of either the Ashton or Bekins Courts to refer to the
contract rejection issue, however, should not preclude examination five decades later, after
widespread adoption of public sector bargaining laws that play an important role in the internal affairs of state and local governments.
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scheme. 188
Finally, Bekins, which involved a San Joaquin Valley irrigation district, approved the 1934 California legislation that authorized public
agencies to file federal bankruptcy petitions. 18 9 This legislation, amended
in 1949, remains a published statute, but has not been conformed to subsequent changes in federal bankruptcy law. 190
After Bekins, public sector bankruptqy proceedings between the
1930's and the 1970's were relatively infrequent. Although several thousand public agency defaults formed the background to the 1930's legislation,t9 1 there were few actual filings under the new law. 192 Typically,
public sector bankruptcy cases have involved small entities, often performing special functions, defaulting on bondholder claims because of
diminishing tax revenues. Readjustment plans usually have provided that
debt payments would be extended to meet projected tax proceeds, 19 3 or
paid from the income of revenue-producing activities such as bridges,
highways, and harbors. 194 Only one reported case after Bekins found
that the federal proceeding interfered with state sovereignty. 195 This circuit court's conclusion was not surprising because the bankruptcy court's
196
order enjoined the election of new commissioners.
Another significant development in the 1940's was the Supreme
Court's decision in FaitouteIron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park.197 In
Asbury Park, the Court approved a state composition procedure that al188. See, e.g., Note, Municipal Bankruptcy, supra note 165, at 1897; Note, Expanded
ChapterIX, supra note 165, at 95 n.32; Note, supra note 62, at 968 n.62.
189. Bekins, 304 U.S. at 48.
190. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 53760-53761 (West 1983). The potential significance of
the unamended status of California's authorization and consent statutes is discussed infra text
accompanying note 427.
191. Hempel, An Evaluation of Municipal Bankruptcy Laws and Procedures, Testimony
to the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws at 3 (Oct. 6, 1972) (copy on file with The Hastings
Law Journal). There were several California defaults in addition to Bekins. See, e.g., Jordan
v. Palo Verde Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1940); Moody v. James Irrigation Dist.,
114 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1940); West Coast Life Ins. Co. v. Merced Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d
654 (9th Cir. 1940).
192. One authority computed only 352 cases after adoption of the act approved in Bekills.
Hempel, supra note 191, at 5. Another source noted that public sector proceedings were initiated 271 times after 1940, with 192 of these between 1940 and 1943 and only 12 between 1960
and 1975. Note, Recent Revisions, supra note 165, at 551. The yearly number of filings and
the dollar value of debts and assets is set forth in a table for 1938 to 1972 in Harvey, supra note
165, at 239.
193. Hempel, supra note 191, at 11.
194. Note, Survey, supra note 165, at 480 n.18.
195. Spellings v. Dewey, 122 F.2d 652 (8th Cir. 1941).
196. Id. at 653.
197. 316 U.S. 502 (1942).
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lowed for a plan's adoption if it was approved by creditors representing
eighty-five percent of the indebtedness. Municipal bondholders objecting
to the law argued that it was an unconstitutional state impairment of
contract obligations because, without consent of all creditors, a modification had been authorized pursuant to a procedure other than one arising
under federal law. The unanimous Court concluded that the state legislature
was entitled to find that in order to keep its insolvent municipalities
going, and at the same time fructify their languishing sources of revenue and thus avoid repudiation, fair and just arrangements by way of
compositions, scrutinized and authorized by a court, might be necessary, and that to be efficacious such a composition must bind all, after
85 percent of the creditors assent, in order to prevent unreasonable
minority obstruction.198
Fearing a surge of inconsistent state composition requirements, Congress
reacted in 1946 by amending the municipal bankruptcy law to prohibit
any state law that established a method of composition binding on nonconsenting creditors. 199
By the 1970's, however, there were problems with the municipal
composition process under federal law:
Many of the urban core cities have experienced shrinking tax bases and
increased costs. The diminishing tax base has been in the form of middle class, and, in some cases, commercial and industrial flight. The
increased costs have been felt in all municipal areas of operation, but
most severe has been the alarming pace at which labor costs have increased.... Compounding this factor is the fact that local government
is very labor intensive. A sleeping giant of a problem is the huge underfunding of municipal pension plans. This underfunding may actually place these public authorities within the 2technical definition of
insolvency-that is, liabilities exceeding assets. 00
Concerns such as these sparked reform efforts by bankruptcy experts and
20 1
by Congress.
1976 Revisions
Responding to these fiscal problems at the state and local level, Congress adopted several new features of municipal bankruptcy law. 20

2

The

198. Id. at 513.
199. This bar is now contained in 11 U.S.C. § 903(1) (1982), which states, "a state law
prescribing a method of composition of indebtedness of such municipality may not bind any
creditor that does not consent to such composition .... " As a practical matter, however, the
effect of Asbury Park still may survive, as suggested by Ropico, Inc. v. City of New York, 425
F. Supp. 970, 978-983 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), discussed infra notes 342-47 & accompanying text.
200. Hefner, supra note 165, at 2.
201. See infra note 202.

202.

Act of Apr. 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-260, 90 Stat. 315 (codified in scattered sections of
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major substantive changes included an authorization to issue certificates
of indebtedness as a refinancing vehicle 20 3 and a provision to reject exec-

utory contracts. 2° 4 The former was designed to restore municipal creditworthiness by providing high-priority status to the new issues, but some
regarded their sales prospects with skepticism. 20 5 The latter innovation,
rejection of executory contracts, applied a traditional bankruptcy mecha20 6
nism to municipalities.
Other significant congressional changes in 1976 eliminated two prefiling requirements: that the proposed composition plan be submitted
with the initial bankruptcy petition, and that at least fifty-one percent of
the creditors consent to the plan. Originally, these preconditions were
20 7
considered important elements in the constitutionality of the 1937 act.
By the 1970's, however, they were considered impractical requirements,
11 U.S.C.). The summary that follows in the text is drawn largely from 4 W. COLLIER, supra
note 99, the relevant legislative history, and related articles. See supra note 165. The 1976
revision originated as part of a comprehensive overhaul of bankruptcy law, which was later
enacted as the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at
11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982) and scattered sections of U.S.C.). See REPORT OF THE
COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d

Cong., Ist Sess. pt. 1 at 273-76, pt. 2 at 263-72 (1973).
The legislative history of the 1976 revision is set forth in the following reports: CONFERENCE REPORT, MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY LAW REVISION, H.R. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 3-23 (1976); HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BANKRUPTCY REVISION, H.R. REP.
No. 686, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 1-36 (1975); SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ADDITION OF
NEW CHAPTER PROVIDING FOR ADJUSTMENT OF DEBTS OF MAJOR MUNICIPALITIES, S.

REP. No. 458, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-22 (1975). Congressional debate over the proposed
legislation extended from December 1975 to passage on March 25, 1976. See 122 CONG. REC.
8215-17 (1976); 122 CONG. REC. 7963-73, 8010 (1976); 121 CONG. REC. 39,407-32 (1975); 121
CONG. REC. 39,349-57 (1975). The New York City fiscal crisis also prompted congressional
consideration of emergency loan and relief measures at the same time the municipal bankruptcy reform was being debated. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 686, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 61
(1975); 121 CONG. REC. 38,416-17, 39,424, 39,429 (1975).
203. Act of Apr. 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 82(b)(2), 90 Stat. 315 (1976) (codified at
11 U.S.C. § 402 (1982)); see 11 U.S.C. §§ 364(c)-(e) (incorporated by 11 U.S.C. § 901(a)
(1982) after 1978).
204. Act of Apr. 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 82(b)(1), 90 Stat. 315 (1976) (codified at
11 U.S.C. § 402 (1982)). After the 1978 stylistic revisions, § 365, the general statute regarding
contract rejection, was incorporated into the law governing municipalities by 11 U.S.C.
§ 901(a) (1982).
205. Representative Holtzmann warned that, absent federal guarantees, the instruments
could not be marketed to the extent necessary. H.R. REP. No. 686, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 55
(1975). Professor King expressed a similar doubt. King I, supra note 165, at 63. Issues regarding certificates of indebtedness also have been the subject of lengthy comments. See, e.g., Hefner, supra note 165; Note, Reform, supra note 165.
206. For a more detailed analysis of the legislative history of the rejection provision, see
infra notes 211-31 & accompanying text.
207. See, eg., 81 CONG. REC. 8547 (1937) (remarks by Sen. Pepper), cited in Patchan &
Collins, supra note 165, at 291 n.21.
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complicating and delaying relief when thousands of relatively small creditors might have a stake in arriving at a final composition accepted by the
court.

20 8

Congress also retained language in the new law barring court interference with a debtor's political or governmental powers, or with its
property or revenues. However, it modified the text to allow municipal
consent to a property disposition that the court otherwise could not direct. 20 9 Still, Congress preserved the 1934 and 1937 language barring
interference with, or impairment of, the state's power to control the political and governmental affairs of municipalities, including expenditures
for such exercise. 2t 0 Unfortunately, Congress did not set forth any statutory guidance on the potential clash between these two provisions. Such
a clash is apparent, for example, when a public employer consents to
midterm modification and rejection of a labor agreement subject to state
bargaining law.

A Framework for Reconcilation of State and Federal Law
Absent definitive language in the bankruptcy statutes regarding a
public employer's midterm unilateral action to modify a contract, one
must use other analytical devices in an attempt to determine congressional intent. These devices include not only review of the legislative
208. King I, supra note 165, at 56.
209. Act of Apr. 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-260, § 82(c), 90 Stat. 315 (codified at II U.S.C.
§ 904 (1982)) states:
Notwithstanding any power of the court, unless the debtor consents or the plan so
provides, the court may not, by any stay, order, or decree, in the case or otherwise.
interfere with(1) any of the political or governmental powers of the debtor;
(2) any of the property or revenues of the debtor; or
(3) the debtor's use or enjoyment of any income-producing property.
II U.S.C. § 904 (1982).
Comparable language was contained in the initial municipal bankruptcy act and was carried forward in the 1937 redrafting. 4 W. COLLIER, supra note 99, f 904.01, at 904-1 to -3.
There were two changes in the 1976 statute:
The first change eliminated the power of the court to determine what properties or
revenues were "necessary for essential governmental services.".... The second change
was made to codify the results in two cases ... that a municipality could consent,
when a plan was not confirmed, to a court order regarding disposition of funds deposited to implement a plan, but that the court could not enter such an order without
the consent of the municipality.
Id.
Even municipal consent, however, may not extend authority to a court that state law bars
a municipality from giving. See id. 904.02, at 904-05 (discussing the relationship between
this provision and 11 U.S.C. § 903 (1982)).
210. See Sumners-Wilcox Bill, ch. 345, § 83(k), 48 Stat. 798, 802 (codified at II U.S.C.
§ 903 (1982)); supra note 186.
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history and related scholarly commentary, but also an assessment of the
distinctions between bankruptcy and labor laws in the public and private
sectors. Commentators have yet to conduct a comparative survey of this
type. As a result of this analysis, this Article suggests a proposal concerning the role of labor negotiations when a public sector employer
seeks contract rejection under Chapter 9.
Legislative History

The 1976 reforms evidence congressional solicitude for state interests. Particularly with respect to the contract rejection issue, the House
Report required that rejection of a collective bargaining agreement in a
bankruptcy proceeding comply with applicable state labor laws. The Report stated:
In some instances, it will be necessary for the petitioner to renegotiate
a contract which has been rejected with the approval of the court.
Such renegotiation and formulation of a new contract would, of
course, have to be in accordance with applicable Federal, State or municipal law. For example, if a collective bargaining ageement had been
rejected, applicable law may provide a process or procedure for the
renegotiation and formation of a new collective bargaining agreement.
A rejection would also be sufficiently similar to a termination of such a
contract so that again, applicable law, if any, would apply to the rights
of the other contracting party between rejection and conclusion of the
bargaining process. For example, if State or other applicable law requires maintenance of terms and conditions of employment existing
under a terminated or rejected contract, during the interim period, that
applicable law would apply under section 85 [sec. 903] to a contract
rejected under the bill. That section does not permit Chapter IX to
interfere with or derogate from any State law that regulates the2way
in
1
which municipalities may execute this governmental function. '

Another part of the House Report, citing federal private sector cases
for the proposition that a more stringent test was required when a court
reviewed a requested rejection,2 1 2 indicates that the new legislation was
211. H.R. REP. No. 686, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1975). Another passage in the report
states that a municipal bankruptcy plan through use of rejection authority can modify employee rights in their capacity as creditors, but "not any rights they may have in a different
capacity, such as employee, pensioner, or officer or inhabitant of the petitioner." Id. at 12.
For example, the amount of an employee's back wages may be altered in a proposed plan, "but
it could not ... affect his status as an employee by altering terms or conditions of employment
merely because he happened to be a creditor of the petitioner." Id. Underscoring the distinction, the report cautioned that "[a]ny such alteration would have to be accomplished through
'such other agreement as the parties may desire,' but this need not and most likely would not
be effected through the plan." Id.
212. Id. at 17. The majority report referred first to reasons justifying ordinary contract
rejection cases, then drew a comparison to labor cases:
In summary, these reasons are that the contract is onerous and burdensome, and its
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to apply to collective bargaining agreements. Those cases, however, were
not cited on the issue of labor board violations for unilateral changes,
2 13
either before or after a court-approved rejection.
The supplemental views of House Republicans challenged the majority's comments requiring post-rejection renegotiation and maintenance of terms. 2 14 According to the supplemental views, the majority
report was not based on any discussion or legal memoranda offered during congressional hearings, but on private communications between majority staff and union lawyers. 215 In any event, nothing in the supplemental views referred to an employer's unilateral action modifying
contract terms without court approval. The conflict in the committee
focused only on what could occur after approval, with the House major2 16
ity favoring renegotiation if required by state law.
In their closing remarks, the supplemental authors also argued that
a new statutory package should apply only to large cities exceeding one
rejection will aid the petitioner in its reorganization and rehabilitation attempt. With
respect to labor contracts, the courts have taken a slightly different position on the
ground for rejection, requiring a showing of a greater burden on the petitioner.
Shopmen's Local No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Products, Inc., 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1432 (2d
Cir. 7-24-75); Brotherhood of Railway Employees v. REA Express, Inc., I Bankr. Ct.
Dec. 1237 (5th Cir. 8-27-75); In re Overseas Airways, 238 F. Supp. 359 (E.D.N.Y.
1965).

Id. at 17-18.
213. Id. Portions of the House debate support the House Report's conclusion disapproving unilateral employer contract modifications. Representative Edwards, then chair of the
House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, the subcommittee that reported the
bill, reviewed the procedural reforms contained in the proposed legislation, including contract
rejection, and stated:
All of these functions are in support of the petitioner's attempt to keep operating
while it negotiates with its creditors and its employees to develop a plan by which it
can repay as much of its debt as possible. The Bankruptcy Act, especially chapter
IX, is designed to determine little, if any, substantive result. That is left to the negotiations between the petitioner and its creditors and employees, and to other,
nonbankruptcy law. State law governs as much as possible.
121 CONG. REC. 39,429 (1975) (statement of Rep. Edwards). This view is consistent with the
respect usually paid to state law in bankruptcy cases. See infra note 420.
214. H.R. REP. No. 686, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 57-58 (1975).
215. Id.
216. On a related point, the dissenting Representative interpreted the new statutory text in
current § 904, permitting interference in local government affairs provided the petitioner consents, as satisfying any need for separation of federal and state powers. They argued that the
contrary implication in the preexisting text of § 903, barring impairment of state legislative
control, "has no relevance to the power of the court to permit a petitioning municipality to
reject an executory contract." Id. at 58-59. The source of this assertion is not indicated. It is
also at odds with the reference in the supplemental remarks that the new legislation, with its
varied reforms, posed serious constitutional issues under the tenth amendment. Id. at 60. In
any event, the issue of authorizing contract rejection is distinct from the question of postrejection negotiations under state law.
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million in population in order to limit the price pressure that reluctant
lenders could cause, which would force all municipal bond interest rates
to rise.2 17 By limiting the scope to major cities alone, they argued that
the constitutional cloud over new legislation could be dispelled under the
218
federal commerce power.
Neither the Senate nor conference reports referred to rejection and
renegotiation of executory labor agreements. 2 19 During the Senate floor
debate, however, there was one interchange that dealt with rejection of
collective bargaining agreements. 220 Senator Burdick, a floor manager
for the bill, stated: "In any case where the labor laws conflict with the
powers of the petitioner under this Act, it is the intent of the legislation
that the Federal, State and local labor laws should be overriden. ' '22 1 This
remark is the strongest legislative history supporting unilateral employer
actions. The weight of this remark, however, is limited not only by the
text of the House Report, but by subsequent comments in the House
when the final bill was passed. At that time, Representative Edwards
described the differences between the House and Senate as "technical in
nature and narrow in scope. ' '222 In particular, Representative Badillo, a
member of the conference committee and an original proponent of legislative reform, offered remarks that constituted nearly the entire discussion in the House. First, he stated that "[ilt is generally understood that
this legislation will also enable the city to renegotiate all of its purely
'22 3
executory contracts, subject to current labor arbitration practices.
Then, turning to municipal pension plans, Badillo interpreted the
relationship between contractual pension obligations and the new bank217. Id. at 61-62.
218. Id. at 67.
219. See S. REP. No. 458, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1975). No mention of the issue was
made in H.R. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-23 (1976).
220. See 122 CONG. REC. 8216 (1976) (reporting the discussion between Sens. Burdick
and Hruska).
221. Id. Senator Burdick expected that most municipalities would renegotiate rejected
bargaining agreements, but wanted to "make it clear that it will not be obligated to follow
State or local law in that regard." Id. The sweeping nature of this exemption from state or
local law was based on the Senator's application of the "new entity" theory to public sector
bankruptcy proceedings. In the private sector, however, the "new entity" or successor theory
was not designed to relieve an employer completely of the duty to bargain, which he still may
be required to do prior to taking unilateral action. See Bordewieck & Countryman, supra note
6, at 335-36; see also supra note 112.
222. 122 CONG. REC. 7970 (1976) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
223. Id. The phrase "current labor arbitration practices" was not explained, but can be
taken as shorthand for the traditional prohibition against midterm contract changes over subjects that are explicitly or implicitly covered by the agreement. See E. ELKOURI & E.
ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 418-29 (3d ed. 1979).
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ruptcy law. He contended that pension fund contributions and payments
were municipal obligations that were protected by section 83,224 by the
state constitution, and by state collective bargaining laws, even after a
225
bankruptcy court had authorized contract rejection.
Two years later, Congress incorporated the 1976 revisions into the
larger statutory overhaul known as the Bankruptcy Reform Act. 226 Congress' municipal bankruptcy changes were largely stylistic, including renumbering and incorporating provisions of the prior law to conform to
the new Bankruptcy Code structure. 227 At the time, the few congressional comments focused on the constitutionality of the municipal chapter in light of tenth amendment considerations expressed in National
22 8
League of Cities v. Usery.

Although there was no major statutory change between 1976 and
1978, the later Senate Report appears to contradict the earlier House
Report by noting that public sector employment terms may be set aside
by unilateral employer action after court-approved rejection. This passage states:
Incorporated by reference also is the power to accept or reject executory contracts and leases (section 365). Within the definition of executory contracts are collective bargaining agreements between the city
and its employees. Such contracts may be rejected despite contrary
State laws. Courts should readily allow the rejection of such contracts
where they are burdensome, the rejection will aid in the municipality's
reorganization and in consideration of the equities of each case. On
224. Sumners-Wilcox Bill, ch. 345, § 83, 48 Stat. 798, 802 (codified at II U.S.C. § 903
(1982)).
225. 122 CONG. REC. 7970, 7971-73 (1976) (statement of Rep. Badillo incorporating attorney's letter). Following Representative Badillo's statement, Representative Butler. one of the
supplemental dissenting authors of the House Report and a member of the Conference Committee, indicated that there were no further requests for debate. Id. at 7973. The final bill %%a.
then accepted.
However, passage of the bankruptcy bill did not guarantee acceptability and use. as reflected in the clear-cut opposition to bankruptcy expressed by New York City's Controller.
See New York City-What Lies Ahead?, 12 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 587, 611-13 (1976)
(remarks of Harrison J. Goldin). In his view, if bankruptcy were pursued "the key would be
thrown away" to credit market doors, there would be no assurance that cash amounts in restricted funds would be freed for operational uses, and the conduct of government would "repose in a Federal District Court Judge appointed for life." Id.
226. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 921 Stat. 2549 (codified at I I
U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982) and scattered sections of U.S.C.).
227. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 109-13 (1978); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th
Cong., Ist Sess. 262-64, 394-400 (1977).
228. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth.,
105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985). In National League of Cities, the Supreme Court relied upon the tenth
amendment to invalidate congressional action under the commerce power, applying federal
minimum wage and hour provisions to state and local employees. See infra notes 376-78 &
accompanying text.
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the last point, "[e]quities in favor of the city in chapter 9 will be far
more compelling than the equities in favor of the employer in chapter
11. Onerous employment obligations may prevent a city from balancing its budget for some time. The prospect of an unbalanced budget
may preclude judicial confirmation of the plan. Unless a city can reject
its labor contracts, lack of funds may force cutbacks in police, fire,
sanitation, and welfare services, imposing hardships on many citizens.
In addition, because cities in the past have often seemed immune to the
constraint of 'profitability' faced by private businesses, their wage contracts may be relatively more onerous than those in the private sector."
Executory Contracts and Municipal Bankruptcy, 85 YALE L.J. 957,
965 (1976) (footnote omitted). Rejection of the contracts may require
the municipalities to renegotiate such contracts by state collective bargaining laws. It is intended that the power to reject collective bargaining agreements will pre-empt state termination provisions, but not
state collective bargaining laws. Thus, a city would not be required to
existing employment terms during the renegotiation
maintain
229
period.
Curiously, this legislative statement draws upon and mischaracterizes a law review note that was written after the 1976 municipal bankruptcy reform. Contrary to the report's view of preemption, the author
had reasoned that this theoretical approach would be a "potpourri interpretation" of the 1976 legislative history and could not be reconciled
with traditional state and local government authority. 230 Rather than a
preemption analysis, the commentator proposed using the "new entity"
theory to justify construction of state laws so that a duty to bargain
would continue, but post-rejection maintenance of terms would not be
23 1
required.
Scholarly Commentary
Several law review commentators analyzed the 1976 revision authorizing rejection of public sector bargaining agreements in the course
of bankruptcy proceedings. 232 For example, Professor King specifically
discussed the post-rejection renegotiation requirement in two 1976 articles examining the new legislation. 2 33 His role in proposing the reform
229.

S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 112 (1978). The portion of the report quoted in

the text is set forth in explanation of 11 U.S.C. § 926 (1982), which deals with a trustee's
avoiding powers.
230. Note, supra note 62, at 970.
231. Id. at 971-74; see also infra notes 237-44 & accompanying text.

232. See supra note 165. Several of these authors discuss rejection of bargaining agreements in the context of a larger survey of the 1976 municipal revision, but do little more than
restate the post-rejection renegotiation requirement described in the House Report. See, e.g.,
Patchan & Collins, supra note 165, at 299.
233. See King I, supra note 165, at 61-65; King II, supra note 165, at 1169-71.
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234
legislation gives his remarks particular relevance:
Rejection of executory contracts is not new to the Act, just to
Chapter IX. Such authority exists in secs. 70b, 116 and 313. How such
rejection will work in Chapter IX remains to be seen. Vendors' contracts can be rejected, as in Chapters X and XI, as well as construction
contracts. But in the context of New York City, it is the labor union
contract and pensions which have received the publicity and attention.
May a collective bargaining agreement be rejected? Some case law
reaches that conclusion in Chapter XI cases even though it is in conflict with other federal law; the Bankruptcy Act reigns supreme. In
Chapter IX, suppose a collective bargaining agreement is rejected or
authority is sought for its rejection; what happens next? The obvious
purpose of this rejection is not to displace employees but rather to renegotiate a more favorable or less burdensome agreement. Does the
court negotiate? Obviously (I hope), it does not. What should occur is
renegotiation through the collective bargaining process pursuant to applicable state and municipal law, if any. For example, New York has
both state and city law with respect to collective bargaining. These
procedures should be followed. Nothing in Chapter IX of the Act is to
be construed to limit or impair the governmental or political power of
the city. The labor law is an exercise of the governmental power. Additionally, if such law requires that current conditions of employment
be maintained during the bargaining process, that
requirement would,
2 35
presumably, be enforceable under Chapter IX.
Another law review author on the rejection issue, later mischaracterized in the Senate, 2 36 examined the 1976 legislative reports and
floor debate and concluded that the House majority views were entitled
to deference. 237 Nevertheless, the author found both the majority and
minority views unsatisfactory. 2 38 The author reasoned that the majority
interpretation requiring maintenance of terms pending renegotiation
would facilitate excessive delay by unions, thus impeding a municipality's need for immediate relief.239 The author also argued, however, that
the preemption view, suspending state bargaining rights entirely, was inequitable, uncertain in effect or duration, and ignored fundamental bargaining policies.2 40 The author contended that "[a] more workable result
would be one which preserves a municipal debtor's obligation to follow
applicable collective bargaining procedures in renegotiating a rejected

234. Professor King was a member of the National Bankruptcy Conference and associate
reporter for the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules of the Judicial Conference of the
United States.
235. King I, supra note 165, at 62 (citations omitted); see also King II, supra note 165, at
1169-70; King, Municipal Bankruptcy, 50 AM. BANKR. L.J. 389 (1976).
236. See supra text accompanying notes 229-30.
237. Note, supra note 62, at 970 n.69.
238. Id. at 969.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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duty during renegotiation to
contract, yet which absolves the city of24any
1
maintain existing employment terms.
This result admittedly conflicted with legislative history and raised
substantial tenth amendment questions under National League of Cities. 24 2 However, the comment borrowed the "new entity," or successorship, doctrine from private sector labor bankruptcy cases to avoid outright preemption of state labor laws. 243 Under this approach, the state
law duty to bargain could be preserved after the court had acted, while
the petitioning debtor, as a type of successor employer, would be freed
from specific contract terms: "State law would then present no bar to a
city's unilateral alteration of employment terms after rejection."244
A third law review author acknowledged "an apparent paradox" in
allowing contract rejection by incorporating section 365, while at the
same time requiring noninterference with state government power under
section 903.245 The author concurred in resorting to the "new entity"
and successorship theory. In addition, in view of the ambiguity inherent
in this paradox, the author argued that a judicial construction of state
authorization statutes could resolve the dilemma of a public employer's
need for prompt financial relief.24 6 The author stated:
Reaching such a result inevitably raises a constitutional controversy. Under this approach, the federal government would essentially
be giving the city a power to act in a way that its own state expressly
forbids or may not permit. This would appear to be a direct federalstate clash. But given that the city must have at least the general consent of its state to petition under this Act, the courts could easily find

that such authorization impliedly gave the petitioner the power to utilize all the provisions of the Chapter, including the power to reject all
executory contracts. The restrictions on rejection of collective bargaining agreements would thus be superseded by the authorization to
reject. 247
241. Id. at 970.
242. Id. at 990 & n.70.
243. Id. at 971-74.
244. Id. at 973 (emphasis added). In addition to the fact that the Bildisco Court rejected
the new entity or successorship model, NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S.Ct. 1188, 1197
(1984), this approach was premised on court-approved rejection as a prerequisite for an employer's unilateral action.
245. Note, Recent Revision, supra note 165, at 571.
246. Id. at 571-72.
247. Id. at 572 (footnotes omitted). Three reported decisions support a liberal interpretation of a state's general authorization allowing a public entity to sue or manage its affairs,
including initiation of bankruptcy proceedings, without requiring specific consent for a particular Chapter 9 filing. See In re City of Wellston, 43 Bankr. 348 (E.D. Mo. 1984); In re Pleasant View Utility Dist., 24 Bankr. 632, 635-39 (M.D. Tenn. 1982); In re N. & S. Shenango Joint
Mun. Auth., 14 Bankr. 414, 416-21 (W.D. Pa. 1981). This appears to satisfy the requirement
of 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (1982), which states:
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Even so, relying on the state's authorization to file a petition does
not preclude the need for court-approved rejection to allow the municipality the "important escape valve" that can lead to new terms and con248
ditions of employment pending further negotiations.
An obvious difficulty with relying on the authorization doctrine
alone is explaining why any state-created duty to bargain survives.
Under the consent rationale, authority for a bankruptcy court to reject a
bargaining agreement also would serve to override state bargaining law
in its entirety. Other than to note that bargaining laws would not be "a
substantial hinderance to the bankruptcy proceedings, ' 249 the author did
not discuss the problem of choosing one, but not both, potential effects of
the consent doctrine.
In sum, the few scholarly analyses of the rejection issue in a public
sector context differ on whether contract terms need be retained after
rejection and pending renegotiation. Professor King believed that maintenance of terms is required, if state bargaining law so provides. Two
commentators, however, favor greater employer leeway to institute unilateral changes, but differ on the analytical approach justifying such action. One of these authors approved of the new entity rationale as
sufficient justification, while the second relied as well on state authorization to file a Chapter 9 petition. Significantly, no author suggested the
outcome upheld in Bildisco: allowing an employer's post-petition unilateral contract modification without prior court-approved rejection.
An entity may be a debtor under chapter 9 of ttiis title if and only if such entity ...
(2) is generally authorized to be a debtor under such chapter by State law, or by
a governmental officer or organization empowered by State law to authorize such
entity to be a debtor under such chapter ....
Id.
The legislative compromise underlying the 1976 revision is consistent with the interpretation that general state authorization to file a Chapter 9 petition would be sufficient. Prior to
1976, specific state authorization was not a requirement and a state could have prohibited a
filing. See King II, supra note 165, at 1159. The House bill in 1976 stated that an entity must
not be prohibited from filing, while the Senate bill took an opposite course, requiring specific
authorization for a particular petition. Id. at 1159 n.12. The final compromise in the conference committee allowed for general state authorization, but did not compel that it be responsive to a specific situation. Id. at 1159-60.
248. Note, Recent Revision, supra note 165, at 570. Another writer viewed general state
consent to filing as sufficient to override tenth amendment objections, but did not consider the
issue in the specific context of labor contract rejection. Note, Expanded Chapter IX, supra
note 165, at 101-02. The author argued that Chapter 9 was only an "incidental" impairment
of state sovereignty that was justified by the federal interest in protecting municipal creditors
and promoting rehabilitation. Id.
249. Note, Recent Revision, supra note 165, at 570.

November 1985]

PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING AGREEMENTS

285

Differences Between Chapter 9 and Chapter 11

A comparison of Chapter 9 municipality proceedings and Chapter
11 private sector reorganizations reveals dramatic differences that are
significant in determining the appropriate accommodation of federal
25 0
bankruptcy and state labor laws.

The first set of differences between Chapters 9 and 11 reflects the
relative absence of creditor power to affect the outcome of the public
sector proceeding. Under Chapter 9, only voluntary employer petitions
can be filed. 2 51 Without the possibility of involuntary liquidation, as in

the private arena, public sector creditors lack an important degree of leverage if they wish to preserve remaining assets. 25 2 In a Chapter 9 case,
only the debtor can proffer a reorganization plan, 253 and creditors have
250. While there are many respects in which Chapter 9 differs from Chapter 7 liquidation
proceedings and Chapter 13 individual wage-earner cases, the most appropriate comparison is
with Chapter 11 reorganizations. Both Chapters 9 and 11 are intended to adjust the operations of ongoing entities, and they have in common the key principle of continuing control by
the debtor-in-possession.
This discussion is not intended to understate or to ignore the drawbacks of a bankruptcy
filing, similar for both public and private entities, often arising from factors and perceptions
largely external to the bankruptcy proceeding itself. In particular, commentators have emphasized the mismanagement stigma, capital market risks and impediments, and the draining
bankruptcy litigation process that restricts employer freedom to act. See, e.g., Greenberg,
supra note 165, at 283-84; White, supra note 6, at 1186-89. Despite these shared problems, the
significant distinctions in public and private bankruptcy proceedings should be considered in
assessing the rejection issue and the role of unilateral employer action.
251. 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 921(a) (1982). Provision for involuntary petitions was not incorporated into Chapter 9. 4 W. COLLIER, supra note 99, T 901.03, at 901-6.
252. Compare II U.S.C. § 943(b)(6) (1982) (stating the "best interests" test) with id.
§ I 129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (providing for approval of a Chapter 11 plan if each class will receive "not
less than the amount that such holder would so receive or retain under Chapter 7"). See also
Newhouse v. Corcoran Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 690 (9th Cir. 1940); 4 W. COLLIER, supra
note 99, 943.03, at 943-30.
Professor King has described the municipality confirmation process as an approach that
differs from the typical private sector case in which a business is valued on a going concern
basis:
The municipality cannot be valued on a going concern basis because it is not a profitmaking enterprise. The fair and equitable and feasible test should more properly
involve a comparison between the expenditures and the income necessary for the
particular municipality, considering in the assessment of income the extent to which
taxes can be raised and obtained. Feasibility would be determined by ascertaining
whether the petitioner is presently, or in the future will be, in a position to carry out
the specific provisions of that plan.
King II, supra note 165, at 1174. The unavailability of liquidation, however, has not been
considered a bar to municipal bankruptcy proceedings. As in the private sector, a reorganization may not entail property distribution, and debtors without assets or with exempt property
also are entitled to use the bankruptcy remedy. Note, Municipal Debt Readjustment, supra
note 165, at 432-33.
253. 11 U.S.C. § 941 (1982); 4 W. COLLIER, supra note 99, $ 941.1, at 941-1 to -3.
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no control over the debtor's daily business or officer and director selection. Such influence and indirect control are potential features of creditor committee involvement in the private realm, which includes the
opportunity for creditor-proposed plans after a lapse of time or after the
plan fails to gain acceptance.2 54 Under Chapter 9, while there is creditor
committee participation, 255 "it would be highly inappropriate for the
creditors to become involved in any way with the administration of the
case other than the actual court proceeding ....,,256
257
Further, Chapter 9 does not provide for appointment of trustees
other than for the limited purpose of recovering improperly distributed
funds. 258 Nor does Chapter 9 incorporate the private sector priority for

payment of employee wages, vacation, severance, sick leave, or pension
plan benefits. 259 The practical effect of this omission is that public em254. 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (1982). Private sector creditors can include a union serving on a
committee in a representative capacity. In re Altair Airlines, Inc., 727 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1984).
A Chapter 11 creditor can propose contract rejection if the debtor's management does not do
so. In re Parrott Packing, 42 Bankr. 323 (N.D. Ind. 1983). In a Chapter 9 case, there is no
provision for acceptance of a comparable creditor proposal. See generally Haggard, The Appointment of Union Representatives to Creditors' Committees Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 35 S.C.L. REV. 517 (1984) (critical discussion of Altair, the expanded influence
gained by unions serving on committees, and potential conflicts of interest with employees); see
also McDonald, Bankruptcy Reorganization: Labor Considerationsfor the Debtor-Employer,
11 EMPLOYMENT REL. L.J. 7, 13-15, 18-28 (1985).
255. 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (1982), which applies to municipality bankruptcy, incorporates II
U.S.C. §§ 1102-1103 (1982), which apply to private sector bankruptcy.
256. 4 W. COLLIER, supra note 99, 901.03, at 901-26 to -27. Another complication arises
from uncertainty about creditor committee recovery of professional fees and expenses, including attorney's fees, which are customarily available in Chapter 11 proceedings, see 1I U.S.C.
§§ 327-330 (1982), but which are not incorporated in Chapter 9 by § 901(a). In a large and
complex private sector proceeding, hundreds of thousands of dollars may be spent representing
union and employee interests as creditors, with the payment ultimately coming from the reorganized debtor. See, e.g., In re White Motor Credit Corp., 50 Bankr. 885 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
Although § 503(b)(3)(D), which is incorporated in Chapter 9, allows recovery of reasonable
fees as administrative expenses, only the municipal debtor can propose a payment plan and "it
is an open question whether the court can deny confirmation" if the debtor refuses. 4 W.
COLLIER, supra note 99,
901.03, at 901-15 & n.53. Collier believes the answer is "probably
affirmative," id., but unlike Chapter 11, both the creditors and the court are at a disadvantage
because recovery from a limited public purse will be the result of bargaining rather than compensation compelled by statute.
257. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1104-1106 (1982) are not incorporated into Chapter 9.
258. Id. § 926. Although this power resembles the private sector practice of recovering
prior preferential payments or fraudulent transfers, id. §§ 547, 548, it only occurs after the
filing of a petition. Under Chapter 9, this effectively eliminates the private sector creditor
option of filing an involuntary petition in order to avoid expiration of the time limit on recapture of preferential distributions.
259. Chapter 9 does not incorporate 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3)-(4) (1982), applicable in Chapter 11 cases, which provides for up to $2000 of priority payments for wages due in the 90 days
preceding the petition. A proposal that public employees be assured of priority status for four
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ployees recover wages after rejection as unsecured creditors, without the
wage or benefit priority that private sector employees retain under Chap-

ter 11.260
Finally, in the private sector, a Chapter 11 proceeding does not bar
the right to strike, nor is there an exemption from the anti-injunction
picketing protection of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.2 61 In the public sector, however, strikes often are prohibited by state laws or are subject to
much greater restraint than private sector work stoppages. 262 In California, for example, public school strikes are treated as presumptively unlawful bargaining tactics, subject to injunctive restraint if undertaken
before the exhaustion of mandatory mediation and fact-finding proce263
dures, unless provoked by employer unfair labor practices.
months' wages was omitted from the final bill. See King I, supra note 165, at 63, for the earlier
provision. The failure of Chapter 9 to provide any wage priority, unless treated as an administrative expense, stands in sharp contrast to other bankruptcy chapters, which are, as one commentator observed, "especially sensitive to the plight of the worker" affected by bankruptcies.
Note, supra note 100, at 730. This legislative sensitivity provides private sector employees
"with a protective cushion," assuming that many workers have inadequate reserves and few
employment alternatives, and that it would be "unrealistic and unfair to make them bear the
full credit risk of their employer's bankruptcy." In re Sleep Prods., Inc., 141 F. Supp. 463, 467
(S.D.N.Y. 1957).
260. Moreover, while a municipality's debts, with limited exceptions, may be discharged
after confirmation of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 944(b)-(c) (1982), Chapter 9 does not incorporate
other bankruptcy provisions providing a variety of specific exceptions or objections to discharge. Id. §§ 523, 727. In particular, there is no exception "for willful and malicious injury
by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity," id. § 523(6), or "to the
extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit ....
Id. § 523(7). The omission of such exceptions in a Chapter 9 case raises
troubling questions about preserving the integrity of administrative and judicial findings that a
petitioning entity has engaged in unfair bargaining and discriminatory practices, as was alleged
in the San Jose case. State law judgments in these respects, however, would be subject to full
discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1) (1982), which is incorporated in Chapter 9.
261. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-1 15 (1982); see also Briggs Transp. Co. v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 739 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Crowe, 713 F.2d 211 (6th Cir. 1983); Petrusch
v. Teamsters Local 317, 667 F.2d 297 (2d Cir. 1981). In these cases, courts upheld congressional anti-injunctive intent even though the employer's ability to comply with a bankruptcy
plan was jeopardized, id. at 297-300, or a delinquent payment was being coerced despite the
automatic stay, Crowe, 713 F.2d at 714-15, or court approval of contract rejection already was
received. Briggs, 739 F.2d at 343-44. Compare Note, The Automatic Stay of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code Versus the Norris-LaGuardiaAct: A Bankruptcy Court's Dilemma, 61 TEX. L.
REV. 321 (1982) (questioning the viability of the anti-injunction bar) with Note, Worker Rights
Against a Bankrupt Employer, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 545 (1985) (favoring anti-injunction
prohibition).
262. For a general survey of state by state regulation, see G. STERRETT & A. ABOUD, THE
RIGHT TO STRIKE IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT (2d ed. 1982).

263. El Rancho Unified School Dist. v. National Educ. Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 946, 593 P.2d
838, 192 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1983); San Diego Teacher's Ass'n v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 1, 593
P.2d 838, 154 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1979); see Modesto City Schools, P.E.R.B. Dec. No. 291, at 62-
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The second set of differences between Chapters 9 and 11 concerns
the relative absence of bankruptcy court authority over the debtor's affairs. Section 904 of Chapter 9 provides that, "notwithstanding any
power of the court, unless the debtor consents or the plan so provides,"' 2 64 the court is barred from interfering with the property or revenues of the debtor.265 In at least two respects, this restraint has been
viewed as crucial to preserving the constitutionality of municipal bankruptcy law.
First, in order to avoid interfering with the debtor's political and
governmental powers, judicial authority is limited under Chapter 9 because the bankruptcy court has no control over the post-petition administrative expenses or operations of the debtor, other than those directly
related to case processing costs. 266 In contrast, administrative expenses
in general are recoverable under Chapter 11.267
Second, the requirements for confirming a proposed plan in a Chapter 9 case limit court authority to determine whether the plan is feasible
and is in the best interests of creditors. 268 In a private sector reorganization, the court can assess the "best interests" criteria by gauging the po63 (1983). This strike-related distinction between the public and private sectors is discussed in
greater detail infra notes 291-300 & accompanying text.
264. 11 U.S.C. § 904 (1982); see supra note 209.
265. 4 W. COLLIER, supra note 99, 904.01, at 904-3. The phrase "or the plan so provides" is considered redundant. Id. at 904-2.
266. See id., 4r904.03, at 901-14 to -15, 943-27 to -30 (construing the confines of a court's
power to confirm a plan and review administrative expenses pursuant to I1 U.S.C. § 943(b)(3)
(1982), without interfering with government operations protected by 11 U.S.C. § 904 (1982)).
As Collier observed, Congress expected that first priority expenses would be paid: "Without
some assurance of payment, the petitioner's suppliers, employees and those connected with
formulating and executing the plan could not be expected to perform at all." H.R. REP. No.
686, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1975), quoted in 4 W. Collier, supra note 99, 943.03, at 943-28.
To this end, despite the potential constitutional conflict, Chapter 9's confirmation provision, 11
U.S.C. § 943 (1982), requires payment of claims specified in 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (1982),
which includes administrative expenses under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1) (1982). Nevertheless, Collier considered this power "a dead letter in chapter 9 cases, and should have been made expressly inapplicable by 901(a)." 4 W. COLLIER, supra note 99, 901.03, at 901-15.
267. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(A) (1982).
268. The full confirmation requirements are set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 943 (1982). In addition to satisfying general bankruptcy provisions incorporated in Chapter 9, id. § 943(b)(1), the
actions specified in the plan must not be "prohibited by law," id. § 943(b)(4), case-related
administrative expenses must be paid, id. § 943(b)(5), and the plan must be "in the best interests of creditors and . . . feasible." Id. § 943(b)(6). Implied in confirmation is a finding that
the plan does not discriminate unfairly among creditors. See 4 W. COLLIER, supra note 99. 1
943.03, at 943-20 (citing American United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, 311 U.S.
138 (1940) (city's fiscal agent had unfair pecuniary advantage in outcome)). However, in reviewing a plan, the bankruptcy court is not required to pass upon the municipality's budgetary
judgments as a sole criteria for confirmation. Indeed, a Senate proposal to require a projected
balanced budget as a confirmation condition was rejected in the conference committee in favor
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tential proceeds of liquidation as an alternative. 269 If the court cannot
confirm the public employer's proposal, the only express authority it has
is to dismiss the case. 270 Unlike the private sector, there is no latitude to
rewrite or to modify the submission over the employer's objection, 27 1 or
to convert a reorganization proceeding to a liquidation proceeding in or272
der to avoid waste and to maximize the value of the remaining assets.
Taken together, the limited involvement and prerogatives of creditors and the bankruptcy court in a Chapter 9 case demonstrate the imbalance of power underlying the relationship between the public sector
participants. The public entity debtor stands virtually alone in determining what operations, services, and expenses will continue, both before
and after plan approval. It is unclear, in light of the publicity and community concern generated by such a case, that a court would exercise its
limited authority to deny confirmation and dismiss a petition. If the
court did so, it would risk blame for the resulting financial and operational turmoil. Moreover, if a union seeks to go beyond the confines of
of permitting the court to consider budget balancing as but one factor in the weighing process.
H.R. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1976).
269. See 4 W. COLLIER, supra note 99, t 943.03, at 943-30 to -31 (comparing § 943(b)(6)
with § 1129(a)(7)). For each creditor class, acceptance of a plan for confirmation requires
approval by creditors "that hold at least two-thirds in amount and more than one-half in
number of the allowed claims of such class." 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1982).
270. 11 U.S.C. § 927(a)(5) (1982).
271. Cf. id §1121(c) (allowing a party in interest to file a plan under certain circumstances).
272. Cf. id. § 1112 (allowing a debtor or the court to convert a case under certain circumstances). Creditors, as in San Jose, still have the right to oppose confirmation of a municipality's plan, and if joined by others, may thwart a reorganization attempt. Id. § 901(a),
incorporating, in part, § 1126. Of course, under some circumstances, a plan can be imposed on
nonconsenting creditors by virtue of the "cram-down" provision. See id. §§ 943, 1129(b).
This could lead to a strategy by a debtor municipality and cooperating creditors to isolate
labor claimants into a separate class, id. § 1122(a), thereby permitting another class of impaired claimants to accept the proposed plan, id. § 1129(a)(10), which, if "fair and equitable,"
would override the objections of the nonaccepting classes. Id. § 1129(b). In San Jose, union
anticipation of the cram-down threat was implicit in the motion for reclassification challenging
the separate unsecured creditor classes proposed by the District. See supra note 69.
A related question that was not directly raised by the unions' motion is whether Chapter
9's cram-down authorization is a theoretical contradiction given the statutory requirement that
"the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of such [unsecured] class will
not receive or retain [under the plan] on account of such junior claim or interest any property." 11 U.S.C. § 129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1982); see also 4 W. COLLIER, supra note 99, 1129.03,
at 1129-58. If a municipality cannot be liquidated in bankruptcy, and there are no equity
interests to be eliminated, such as stockholders in Chapter 11 cases, the Chapter 9 cram-down
permits ultimate taxpayer beneficiaries to retain the dividends of future property use and services while higher interests still receive less. The leading commentary does not consider this
issue expressly, but, on an analogous point regarding treatment of impaired classes, reasons
that the "fair and equitable" test should be assessed in terms of ongoing and possibly increased
municipal revenues. Id. 943.03, at 943-15 to -921; see also supra note 252.
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Chapter 9, as in the case of strikes, the restraints on public sector work
stoppages diminish the likelihood that external pressures will force the
debtor to adopt a different calculation. Under these circumstances, any
273
negotiations with creditors are necessarily tipped in the debtor's favor.
Differences Between Public and Private Sector Labor Relations
The differences between public and private sector labor laws provide
further reason to limit unilateral modification of bargaining agreements
in Chapter 9 cases. When these distinctions are coupled with the statutory history of Chapter 9 and the differences between Chapter 9 and
Chapter 11 proceedings, Bildisco's274 applicability to the public sector is
questionable, as is the model of the newly-enacted section 1113.
At the simplest level, direct application of private sector labor law is
inappropriate because Congress expressly excluded from the NLRA definition of employer "any State or political subdivision thereof."'2 75 The

implications of this congressional exclusion of state and local entities
27 6
warrant consideration in light of tenth amendment developments.
However, for the present analysis, the exclusion is consistent with a
277
traditional distinction between public and private labor relations.
First, public sector labor relations laws typically are premised on the
state's exercise of its police power and on legislative delegation of deci273. This overall one-sided result prompted sharp criticism of Chapter 9 as an "anomaly"
because it "binds nonconsenting creditors to a plan formulated by a debtor which cannot be
compelled to rid itself of financial mismanagement. Unfairness is inherent in such a situation,
and remedial inadequacy is practically assured." Note, Expanded ChapterIX, supra note 165,
at 96-97 (citations omitted). The note author proposed stronger federal judicial authority to
provide an improved bankruptcy remedy. Id. at 104-08. Ultimately, of course, threatened or
actual removal by the electorate could influence municipal management, at least in the governing councils, but this "remedy" may be draconian, as well as uncertain, in its effectiveness
because of election timelines.
274. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984); see supra notes 74-121 & accompanying text.
275. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982).
276. See itfra note 405.
277. Without a doubt, in certain functional respects, the collective bargaining agreement
shares common features in both private and public employment, distinguishing such agreements from other types of contracts. There are in particular three common features. See
Feller, A General Theory of the Collective BargainingAgreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663, 76471 (1973). First, bargaining agreements establish a mechanism for obtaining employee corsent
to work rules and conditions, thereby justifying managerial authority under, as well as apart,
from the agreement, while also providing a channel for expressions of employee aspiration and
discontent. Id. at 765. Second, in a complex enterprise labor agreements serve as an internal
device to monitor compliance by lower ranks of supervisory and managerial staff in enforcing
the agreement. Id. at 766. Sometimes, for example in the case of seniority rules, this monitoring function limits the discretion of employer agents that could hamper employee morale. A
third function is to enact a balance of power for the length of the agreement: "'[M]anagement
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sion-making to the bargaining process. 278 For example, in rejecting a
challenge to a statewide law that applied to cities with home rule authority, the California Supreme Court described the overriding purpose of
that state's public sector labor laws:
The total effect of all this legislation was not to deprive local government (chartered city or otherwise) of the right to manage and control
its fire departments but to create uniform fair labor practices throughout the state. As such, the legislation may impinge upon local control
279
to a limited extent, but it is nonetheless a matter of state concern.
As in the private sector, the delegation of decision-making authority
to the bargaining process is carried out by negotiations within a prescribed scope of representation. 280 Agreements have a binding force once
ratified. 2 81 In effect, the bargaining process is both power-sharing and
power-limiting, albeit one that exists within a defined range that was previously the prerogative of management. 28 2 This principle, for example,
loses the right to change those rules for the duration of the agreement, but the employees lose
the legal right to exert economic force to compel changes." Id. at 770.
In Professor Feller's view, this functional perspective explains the relative acceptability of
collective bargaining in the United States, even though acceptability also may be explained
because the law requires it, employees stand to gain, and there is a "desire for certainty or
stability with respect to labor matters." Id. at 764. Aside from these shared characteristics,
however, a deeper probing of the differences between the public and private realms has a bearing on union bargaining rights in the course of bankruptcy proceedings.
278. Pacific Legal Found. v. Brown, 29 Cal. 3d 168, 201, 624 P.2d 1215, 1234-35, 172 Cal.
Rptr. 487, 506-07 (1981); Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d
276, 294-95, 384 P.2d 158, 169, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830, 841 (1963); Nutter v. City of Santa Monica,
74 Cal. App. 2d 292, 300-02, 168 P.2d 741, 746-48 (1946); 7 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS §§ 24.429, .431 (3d ed. 1981).
For a review of the early history of public employee bargaining, beginning in 1961 in
California, see Pacific Legal Found., 29 Cal. 3d at 175-77, 624 P.2d at 1218-19, 172 Cal. Rptr.
at 490-91. See also Grodin, CaliforniaPublic Employee BargainingRevisited: Tile MMB Act
in the Appellate Courts, 21 CAL. PUB. EMPLOYEES REP., June 1974, at 2 [hereinafter cited as
Grodin, PublicEmployee BargainingRevisited]; Grodin, Public Employee Bargainingin California: The Meyers-Milias-BrownAct in the Courts, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 719 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Grodin, Public Employee Bargaining].
279. Professional Fire Fighters v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 276, 294-95, 384 P.2d
158, 169, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830, 841 (1963). Recent decisions applying the statewide interest rationale in labor and employment relations include People ex rel. Seal Beach Police Officers
Ass'n v. City of Seal Beach, 36 Cal. 3d 591, 600, 685 P.2d 1145, 1150-51, 205 Cal. Rptr. 794,
799-800 (1984) (negotiations required before charter amendment election); Baggett v. Gates,
32 Cal. 3d 128, 138-40, 649 P.2d 874, 879-81, 185 Cal. Rptr. 232, 237-39 (1982) (police officer
"bill of rights").
280. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3543.2 (West Supp. 1986), discussed infra text accompanying note 287.
281. Pacific Legal Found. v. Brown, 29 Cal. 3d 168, 201, 624 P.2d 1215, 1234, 172 Cal.
Rptr. 487, 506 (1981); Glendale City Employees v. Glendale, 15 Cal. 3d 328, 335, 540 P.2d
609, 613, 174 Cal. Rptr. 513, 517 (1975).
282. The Aaron Commission report, a landmark California legislative analysis of public
sector labor law, used the phrase "bilateralism" for the process of diluting management's uni-
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permits binding arbitration in California of unresolved bargaining disputes as well as of grievances challenging an employer's determination of
just cause for discharge. 28 3 Unlike the private arena, however, delegation
is permitted only if the arbitration or bargaining processes safeguard
2 84
state or local authority over fundamental policy or the public purse.
The ramifications of state control over the extent of delegated power thus
contrast with a private employer's comparative freedom to determine its
own destiny.
Conceptually, therefore, the state as a sovereign authority reserves
the power to alter the framework and breadth of the public sector barlateral authority. CAL. ASSEMBLY, FINAL REPORT OF THE ASSEMBLY ADVISORY COUNCIl
ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS 101 (Mar. 15, 1973) [hereinafter cited as ADVISORY
COUNCIL FINAL REPORT].
283. See Fire Fighters Union Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo, 12 Cal. 3d 608, 614-15, 622
n.13, 576 P.2d 971, 974-75, 981 n.13, 116 Cal. Rptr. 507, 510-12, 517 n.13 (1974) (interest
arbitration). But compare Taylor v. Crane, 24 Cal. 3d 442, 452-53, 595 P.2d 121, 135, 155 Cal.
Rptr. 695, 701-02 (1979) (permitting grievance arbitration) with United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Board of Educ., 162 Cal. App. 3d 823, 831-32, 209 Cal. Rptr. 16, 20 (1984) (applying statutory
limit to bar discipline arbitration).
284. The limitations on delegation of public authority demonstrate the basic distinction
that
[t]he uniqueness of public employment is not in the employees nor in the work performed; the uniqueness is in the special character of the employer. The employer is
government; the ones who act on behalf of the employer are public officials; and the
ones to whom those officials are answerable are citizens and voters.
Summers, PublicSector Bargaining.-Problems of Governmental Decisionmaking,44 U. CIN. L.
REV. 669, 670 (1975).
The special character of the government employer has constitutional reverberations affecting employees, providing a further distinction from the private sector setting. For example, with state action inherent in any public employer-employee relationship, federal and state
court decisions have protected a variety of constitutional rights, including: freedom of speech,
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); freedom of association, McLaughlin v.
Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968); the right to petition, Los Angeles Teachers Union v.
Los Angeles City Bd. of Educ., 71 Cal. 2d 551, 455 P.2d 827, 78 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969); objections to impermissible conditions based on political beliefs, Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589 (1967); and the right to some degree of due process when job or other property loss is
threatened, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985); Skelly v. State Personnel Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 194, 539 P.2d 774, 124 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1975).
In other respects, however, a line has been drawn that affirms a state's prerogative to
regulate the bargaining process. Thus, unions do not have a constitutional right to compel
collective bargaining by an employer in response to employee grievances. Smith v. Arkansas
State Highway Employees Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463 (1979). A state also may authorize exclusive representative status and mandatory bargaining fees for a majority union despite individual objections that beliefs are being coerced. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209
(1977). And a state may extend preferred status to an incumbent union, to the detriment of
competing organizations, by allowing the incumbent to monopolize access to the employer's
mail system, Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983), or by
restricting the right to consult on issues of professional concern otherwise removed from the
scope of negotiations. Minnesota State Bd. v. Knight, 104 S. Ct. 1058 (1984).
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gaining process. This power to reshape collective bargaining is not enjoyed by private sector employers complying with laws imposed upon
them by the government. Given this contrast, a bankruptcy court order
approving rejection and allowing a public employer to establish new
terms unilaterally serves as a substitute for the state's regulation of labor
relations. It potentially upsets the statutory balance that subordinates
labor rights and employer duties to the concept of the public entity's
28 5
mission.
Specifically, one set of restraints is built into public sector labor laws
defining the scope of representation. While terms such as wages and
hours are given a meaning akin to that normally used in the private sector under the NLRA,286 particular limitations or exclusions may be expressed, such as a bar to mandatory negotiations over course and curriculum content.2 87 Another set of bargaining restraints, largely unique
in the public sector, establishes statutory limits that can impede compro285. This limitation may be described as protection of both managerial prerogative and
public policy, with each involving political judgments. Note, supra note 17, at 1689, 1691-92.
In California, this restraint is sometimes embodied in language that excludes from the
scope of representation the "merits, necessity or organization of any service or activity provided by law or executive order." See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 3504, 3516 (West 1980 &
Supp. 1986); see also id. §§ 3562(q)(1), 3562(r)(1) (West Supp. 1986). The origin of this statutory phrase in 1968 was described in the following recollection of a union negotiator:
The Governor did not want employees to negotiate on matters that had to do with
organization or mission. And you hear the ringing down across the years, because he
said then, as he says now, he didn't want "those social workers negotiating with the
welfare people on the level of benefits to the clients ..
"
And so [I] was sent out to do some drafting. And I came back with those words
"except, however ..
" And the Governor said: "Well, with that in the Bill, I will
sign it......
Grodin, Public Employee Bargaining,supra note 278, at 750-51 n. 145.
286. Fire Fighters Union Local 1186 v. Vallejo, 12 Cal. 3d 608, 616, 526 P.2d 971, 976,
116 Cal. Rptr 507, 512 (1974).
287. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3543.2(a) (West Supp. 1986). This statute, the EERA scope
provision, provides for mandatory bargaining over wages, hours, and certain specifically enumerated subjects: health and welfare benefits, transfer and reassignment policies, safety conditions, class size, evaluation procedures, grievance procedures, and organizational security
arrangements. Further, unions have a right to consult, but not bargain, over a range of professional issues such as textbooks and courses. The scope statute prohibits bargaining over terms
other than those enumerated. No provision exists for "permissive" bargaining, as in the private sector, see NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958), and no
PERB case has provided for such a category under the EERA.
The PERB has developed a three-part test for determining whether a subject is negotiable
even though not expressly enumerated in the statute, inquiring whether
(1) it is logically and reasonably related to hours, wages or an enumerated term and
condition of employment, (2) the subject is of such concern to both management and
employees that conflict is likely to occur and the mediatory influence of collective
negotiations is the appropriate means of resolving the conflict, and (3) the employer's
obligation to negotiate would not significantly abridge his freedom to exercise those
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mise in a financial crisis by barring contractual supersession. 2 8
Similarly, states require some operations as part of the employer's
mission to serve the public. Transportation costs tied to integration programs, assistance to disabled and handicapped individuals, and bilingual
instruction are examples of necessary school services that increase the
cost of basic education. 2 9 Public employers cannot take money easily
from these areas to maintain, much less increase, worker salaries, at least
not without potential community and judicial repercussions. Nor can
schools or other public agencies charge fees for basic services that by law
290
are provided for little or no charge.
managerial prerogatives (including matters of fundamental policy) essential to the
achievement of the District's mission.
Anaheim Union High School Dist., P.E.R.B. Dec. No. 177, at 4-5 (1981). This test was approved in San Mateo City School Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 33 Cal. 3d 850,
855-64, 663 P.2d 523, 526-32, 191 Cal. Rptr. 800, 803-09 (1983).
288. The supersession rule for public school bargaining prohibits bargaining that supplants
state law or merit-based civil service systems. CAL GOV'T CODE § 3540 (West 1980). The
California Supreme Court has upheld the PERB's standard for applying this broad restriction:
" 'Unless the statutory language [of the Education Code] clearly evidences an intent to set an
inflexible standard or insure immutable provisions, the negotiability of a proposal should not
be precluded.'" San Mateo City School Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 33 Cal. 3d
850, 864-65, 663 P.2d 523, 532-33, 191 Cal. Rptr. 800, 809-10 (1983) (quoting Healdsburg
Union High School Dist., P.E.R.B. Dec. No. 132, at 18 (1980)). The effects of these statutory
obstacles can be troubling during times of fiscal stress. For example, California school districts
formerly provided a minimum 175 days of student instruction to receive a full share of revenue
from the state. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 41420 (West Supp. 1986). In San Jose, this precluded an
obvious compromise of exchanging lower salaries for a reduced workload. Other examples. in
areas of sick leave, vacation rights, personnel hearings, and so on, raise similar issues of eliminating civil service impediments to possible financial rehabilitation. Ironically, as the Aaron
Commission observed, a management objective to enhance its own authority through labor
negotiations may collide with union concerns to confine some aspects of bargaining in order to
protect benefits previously secured. ADVISORY COUNCIL FINAL REPORT, supra note 282. at
113. Unfortunately, the supersession barrier can impede both parties in their ability to settle a
fiscal crisis, especially if a bankruptcy court determines that those laws retain binding effect.
Not surprisingly, the Aaron Commission proposed a different model, in which a bargaining
agreement would prevail over conflicting laws and regulations. Id. at 175; see also Alleyne, A
Comment on the Constitutionalityof SEERA, 46 CAL. PUB. EMPLOYEES REP., Sept. 1980, at 2
(supersession issues in state employment); Note, The Impact of Collective Bargainingon California Education Code Laws Governing Teacher Tenure, Evaluations, and Dismissal, II PAC.
L.J. 799 (1980) (several examples of supersession conflicts); Note, California'sSEERA v. the
Civil Service System: Making State Employee Collective BargainingWork, 18 U.C.D. L. REV.
829 (1985) (proposal for state bargaining and civil service reconciliation).
289. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 56000-56865 (West 1978 & Supp. 1986) (establishing
mandatory special education programs); see also In re John K., 170 Cal. App. 3d 783, 216 Cal.
Rptr. 65 (1985) (litigation involving reimbursement of handicapped child's parents for cost of
private school placement); supra note 71 (integration litigation involving San Jose schools).
290. For example, the free school requirement of the California Constitution, CAL.
CONST. art. IX, § 5, was most recently reaffirmed in Hartzell v. Connell, 35 Cal. 3d 899, 679
P.2d 35, 201 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1984), in which the imposition of post-Proposition 13 athletic and
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A second major difference between the public and private sectors
involves greater regulation or prohibition of strikes in the public
realm.2 9 1 In California, for example, a public school strike is a presumptively unlawful bargaining practice if undertaken before the completion
of mediation and fact-finding procedures designed to resolve bargaining
impasses. 292 School employees engaging in a strike before completion of
music participation fees was invalidated. By its terms, the "free school" principle bars an
obvious source of revenue-tuition fees for basic education.
The discussion of public policy limitations on bargaining should not ignore the existence
of regulatory requirements affecting the ability of private employers to bargain freely. Certainly, there are health and safety regulations, minimum wage and overtime laws, environmental procedures, and the like that are not bargainable and that compel expenditures as a cost of
doing business. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S. Ct. 2380 (1985)
(state law mandating minimal health insurance coverage not preempted as interfering with
freedom to bargain under federal labor law). Inevitably, these laws and regulations reduce the
division of funds that can be allocated to employee wages and benefits. Many of these restraints also apply to public employers, indicating that a rough-hewn equal footing exists at the
start.
In theory, while such restraints can have an effect on private employers similar to public
sector policy limitations, public and private differences are compounded by the nature and
degree of the statutory and regulatory limitations. First, public employers usually are not free
either to terminate the essential nature of the business, in whole or in part, or to undertake a
new or supplemental mission less susceptible to regulatory control and more amenable to profitability. Second, the degree of state control is pervasive in the public sector, often as a result
of constitutional or legislative requirements to provide a service or to maintain civil service
benefits. This pervasive influence is apparent in the statutory structure alone, in which literally
thousands of laws control public entities. Simply put, policy and employment requirements
are dominating features in the public sector. For years this fact has troubled analysts seeking
to accommodate the public interest in maintenance of government service with the need that
bargaining have real meaning for public employees. See, e.g., ADVISORY COUNCIL FINAL

REPORT, supra note 282, at 108-15, 143-46.
291. See supra text accompanying notes 261-63. One comprehensive review of public sector labor relations suggested that the absence of a clear right to strike is the key distinguishing
feature between public and private sector labor laws. The "acid test of any labour relations
regime" is not whether employees can merely negotiate with their employer, but whether they
can resort to effective methods of self-help once an impasse is reached. Note, supra note 17, at
1700. Strikes also plainly have effects on parties outside the immediate bargaining relationship, as they "have been characterized as weapons of political embarrassment," which appeal
to the community whose services are disrupted. ADVISORY COUNCIL FINAL REPORT, supra

note 282, at 201-02.
292. See supra note 263. Mediation and fact-finding are requirements of many public sector bargaining laws, intended to help resolve disputes before strikes occur over the lack of
bargaining progress. See, eg., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3518, 3548-3548.4, 3590-3594 (West
1980 & Supp. 1986). In the context of public school negotiations, the California Supreme
Court stated:
The impasse procedures almost certainly were included in the EERA for the
purpose of heading off strikes .... Since they assume deferment of a strike at least
until their completion, strikes before then can properly be found to be a refusal to
participate in the impasse procedures in good faith and thus an unfair practice ....
San Diego Teachers Ass'n v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 1, 8-9, 593 P.2d 838, 893, 154 Cal.
Rptr. 893, 898 (1979) (citations omitted). This special facet of public sector labor relations
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impasse procedures are protected against employer reprisal only if employer unfair labor practices provoked the strike, and if the union continued its attempts to bargain in good faith. 293 Moreover, in order to ensure
the delivery of educational services, strikes are subject to injunctive re2 4
straint if a probable bargaining violation by the union would be found. 9
Accordingly, lawful strikes under the EERA 295 are confined to unfair
practice strikes in response to employer provocation and presumably to
those work stoppages carried out at the conclusion of the mandated dispute resolution procedure. 296 Hence, while there may be limited circumstances excusing public school strikes in California, a union advocating a
work stoppage must be ever mindful of the prerequisites of statutory bar297
gaining and dispute-resolution mechanisms.
provides a unique opportunity to utilize state-created dispute resolution procedures without
immediate recourse to bankruptcy proceedings.
293. Modesto City Schools, P.E.R.B. Dec. No. 291, at 62-63 (1983); see also Morgenstern.
The Right to Strike: A Comment on New PERB Cases, 56 CAL. PUB. EIi O1'EES REP..
March 1983, at 2.
294. See San Diego Teachers Ass'n v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 1, 9-11. 593 P.2d 838.
843-45, 154 Cal. Rptr. 893, 898-900 (1979); cases cited supra note 263; vee also Johnson. The
Scope of Injunction in California PublicSchool Employee Strikes, 17 U.S.F.L. Rnv. 203 (1983);
Note, PublicEmployee Strikes: Legalization Through the Elimination of Remedies. 72 C sill.
L. REV. 629 (1984).
295. See supra notes 262-63 & accompanying text.
296. While the PERB declined to reach this issue in Modesto City Schools, P.E.R.B. Dec.
No. 291, at 64 n.35 (1983), its rationale about utilizing mandatory dispute resolution leads to
that conclusion. A recent PERB decision denying an anti-strike injunction after mediation
and fact-finding procedures had been exhausted expressed further, but guarded. support for
the protected legality of post-impasse strikes. San Ramon Valley Unified School Dist..
P.E.R.B. Order No. IR-46 (1984). In that case, the PERB concluded that there was insufficient cause to believe an unfair practice had been committed in terms of the post-impasse
timing and objectives of the strike, but that the means used by the union-so-called surprise
strikes over several weeks-could be limited by an injunction requiring 60-hours advance notice to the employer. Id. at 13-14. This limitation was warranted, in the PERB's viev., to
minimize disruption of educational services. Id. at 14. Thus, although the PERB has not
determined that a third category of strikes exists as in the private sector, in which partial
intermittent stoppages may be neither unlawful nor protected, see NLRB v. Insurance Agents
Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 493-95 (1960), administrative and judicial relief based on the public
interest in ongoing education appears to be available to curb strike activity that constitutes an
excessively protracted and disruptive battle between contending forces.
297. This conclusion has not been altered by a May 1985 decision modifying the commonlaw ban on public sector strikes. County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees' Ass'n, 38 Cal. 3d 564, 699 P.2d 835, 214 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1985). In that case, arising
under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act ("MMBA"), CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3500-3511 (West
1980 & Supp. 1986), covering local government employees, substantial damages had been
awarded for a post-impasse economic strike. County Sanitation, 38 Cal. 3d at 568, 699 P.2d at
837, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 426. The majority reasoned that creation of a statutory collective bargaining process had "removed the underpinnings from the old" common-law rule protecting
government's unilateral authority. Id. at 591 n.39, 699 P.2d at 853 n.39, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 442
n.39. The majority argued that judicial construction was appropriate, in light of the legisla-
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Private sector unions, in contrast, are not obligated to refrain from
strikes during negotiations or to pursue mediatory assistance, but enjoy a
protected right to strike under section 13 of the NLRA.298 Significantly,
injunctions against such strikes are barred by the Norris-La Guardia
Act. 299 For this reason, private sector unions retain the right to strike
against the effects of contract rejection, free from injunctive restraint,
even if the relief sought by the strike would be inconsistent with federal
bankruptcy law. 3°° In comparison, if bankruptcy court rejection serves
to open a public sector agreement for renegotiation, an unprovoked and
premature strike could be enjoined under California law as a possible
unfair bargaining practice.
A third distinction between the public and private realms is that
significant political factors affect public sector bargaining in a way that is
uncommon, if not unknown, in the private arena. 30 1 For example, public
sector budget decisions inherently involve political policy choices over
specific services or programs. Issues such as layoffs, caseload, and school
and office closures are matters of intense public interest and political
ture's failure to address the strike issue directly, in order to secure a degree of equilibrium at
the bargaining table. Id. at 583-84, 699 P.2d at 847-51, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 436-40. However, the
court limited strike potential to those cases in which public health or safety was not endangered, id. at 586-87, 699 P.2d at 849-51, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 439-40, suggesting also that police
and firefighter strikes were presumptively unlawful because such services are essential. Id.
Damages for unlawful strikes remain a possible remedy as well. Id. at 593 n.40, 699 P.2d at
854 n.40, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 443 n.40. Additionally, the legislature was invited to substitute its
own statutory regulation of strikes for that adopted by the court. Id. at 590 n.39, 699 P.2d at
853 n.39, 214 Cal. Rptr. 442 n.39.
Despite the new judicial rule, the court cautioned that the MMBA did not establish
mandatory dispute-resolution procedures, id. at 571, 699 P.2d at 840, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 429,
and that potential statutory limits on strikes under other existing public sector labor laws were
not at issue. Id. at 573 n.17, 699 P.2d at 841 n.17, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 430 n.17. Presumably, if
mediation and fact-finding procedures are enacted, the logic of the County Sanitationdecision,
coupled with the San Diego injunction case, see supra notes 263, 292, would compel an exhaustion rule comparable to that presently established for public schools in California.
298. 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1982)
299. Id. §§ 101-115. There are limited statutory exceptions to the injunction bar, id.
§ 107, as well as an exception in suits under § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations (TaftHartley) Act, id. § 301, to compel arbitration of contractual disputes. See Boys Mkts., Inc. v.
Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 253 (1970).
300. See supra note 261.
301. See generally Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83
YALE L.J. 1156 (1974); Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public
Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107 (1969).
A recent analysis proposed a theoretical role-model approach to delineate the impact of
political factors on the scope of bargaining in the public domain, concluding that "for some
purposes, government may be seen as simply an employer competing with other employers in
the market for employee services; but for other purposes, its special function as a political
decisionmaker must be recognized." Note, supra note 17, at 1696-97.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 37

compromise and are not solely or easily resolved by models of economic
efficiency. Negotiations related to such decisions not only are affected by

political input from the local community, 30 2 but by the actions of other
localities 30

3

3 4
and statewide bodies. 0

Political factors also affect bargaining in the classic sense that dissatisfied unions can bypass the established negotiating framework. 30 5 Election campaigns that focus on bargaining issues in order to remove

governing boards or legislative officials can be a hidden cost of public
sector negotiations, serving to distort the process because of the fear of
upsetting public opinion.
Often, bargaining is limited politically because cost increases that
result from negotiations require electorate approval. Election approval
and fear of political reaction, however, can clash with a public employer's readiness to propose new taxes. These taxes may be necessary to
satisfy the bankruptcy law requirement that a public entity must exercise
its taxing power to the fullest extent possible as a prerequisite to court
confirmation.

30 6

What do these observations suggest in terms of finding the appropri302. In the public sector, whatever the other avenues of political pressure that exist, labor
statutes often include public notice provisions requiring advance publication of initial employer and union bargaining positions as well as disclosure of new subjects raised after opening
discussions. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3547 (West 1980). In California, this not only
permits easier public access to the bargaining process, but also entitles members of the public
to file enforcement proceedings with the PERB. Id. § 3547(e).
303. One way in which local options are affected by other localities is through use of
benchmark bargaining to link salaries for one city or county to those in another. See Kugler N.
Yocum, 69 Cal. 3d 371, 445 P.2d 303, 71 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1968). This technique is similar to
"most favored nation" or "prevailing wage" bargaining in the private sector, but is distinct in
that political issues affecting other public entities can skew the industry norm that negotiations
were intended to follow.
304. In the end, the state legislature's budget determination in 1983 added nearly $4 million to the San Jose budget projections that negotiators utilized at the local level. Indeed, in
California the problem of local dependence on the statewide budget has become so important
that budgeting a year ahead has been proposed. See, e.g.. Odgers, "Ability to Pay" Under
Factfinding:A Union Comment, 63 CAL. PUB. EMPLOYEES REP., Dec. 1984, at 9, 11.
305. Rehmus, Constraintson Local Government in Public Employee Bargaining,67 MICH.
L. REV. 919, 924 (1969).
306. Fano v. Newport Heights Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1940). In San Jose,
the unions claimed that a special tax election should have been called. The employer contended that electoral success would have been unlikely because two-thirds voter approval was
required. The bankruptcy court decided that, even if an election had been pursued, the proceeds would have been generated too late to help the District's immediate need to balance its
budget. As Professor Summers has observed with respect to wages, public employees especially are at a disadvantage because they stand in perceived opposition to the mass of voters
who want more service at less cost. Summers, supra note 301, at 1167-68. In this sense, protecting the bargaining requirement serves to enhance the power of workers against otherwise
substantial odds. Id. at 1165-66.
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ate balance between federal and state laws, consistent with congressional
intent to accommodate the two when the possibility of default arises?
The public employer has comparatively less to offer at the bargaining
table because the scope of representation is subject to civil service and
public policy limitations, many of which originate in state law. The public employer also can rely on the prospect of real or imagined discontent
by service recipients, or taxpayers at large, as a way of narrowing the
field for compromise and rushing toward settlement. Failure to do so
could spell the margin of difference at the next election. When the prospects for compromise dim, or perhaps receive a nudge by unilateral action, the public employer is not as threatened by a retaliatory strike
because work stoppages may be subject to reprisals and injunctive restraints that minimize their utility.
Finally, even if these distinctions do not suggest the need for continued labor negotiations after a Chapter 9 contract rejection, there remains
another important consideration: the possibility of employer unilateral
action in an emergency. This last feature of public sector labor law demonstrates that public employers retain an avenue for unilateral action
closed to their private sector counterparts, vitiating to some degree the
need for Chapter 9 proceedings at all.
Employer Unilateral Action and the Contract Clause
Assuming, from the perspective of the 1975 House Report, that employer conduct before and after rejection of a bargaining agreement in a
Chapter 9 proceeding must be viewed in light of relevant state labor law,
which restraints, if any, would apply to unilateral employer contract
modifications without a pending bankruptcy? This section will summarize the parallels between public and private sector law and analyze a key
point of departure between the two.
Restraints on UnilateralAction
As a general rule, following private sector precedent, a public employer violates California labor law if it changes a term or condition of
employment without first providing an exclusive bargaining representative with notice and an opportunity to negotiate about the proposed
change.3 0 7 In San Mateo Community College District,30 8 the PERB articulated four reasons for this prohibition. Some of these reasons take
307. California Government Code §§ 3519(c), 3543.5(c), and 3571 all make it unlawful for
a public employer to refuse to meet and negotiate in good faith with an exclusive representative, a prohibition that has been extended to unilateral changes, "'for it is circumvention of the
duty to negotiate which frustrates the objectives ... much as does a flat refusal.'" San Mateo
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into account unique features of the public sector bargaining process. 30 9
First, unilateral changes might have a destabilizing effect because
the employer's one-sided action forces unions to bargain to regain the
earlier status quo and can cause strikes or other workplace retaliation. 3 10
Second, unilateral changes interfere with union representation by impairing the organization's ability to perform a worthwhile function in the
eyes of unit employees. 3 11 Third, a rule against unilateral actions is consistent with the statutory structure, particularly in the public sector,
when dispute-resolution procedures such as mediation are available, and
when the electorate has input in formulating bargaining proposals. 3 12
Employer unilateral actions bypass this design. Fourth, in times of declining public sector revenue, unilateral employer action can shift community and political pressure to employees and unions, who are made to
appear overly self-interested. 31 3 This reduces an employer's accountability both to employee organizations and to the public.
One important example of the unilateral change rule is the requirement that contract terms, including wage provisions, be maintained during the duration of an agreement. 3 14 Again, this requirement parallels
private sector experience. Under federal law, the bar to unilateral
midterm contract modifications has existed since adoption of section 8(d)
of the NLRA in 1947. 3 15 Before then, an employer was obliged to barCommunity College Dist., P.E.R.B. Dec. No. 94, at 14 (1979) (quoting NLRB v. Katz, 369
U.S. 736, 743 (1962)).
308. P.E.R.B. Dec. No. 94 (1979).
309. The PERB's reasoning was restated in Moreno Valley Unified School Dist. v. Public
Employment Relations Bd., 142 Cal. App. 3d 191, 199-200, 191 Cal. Rptr. 60, 65-70 (1983)
(quoting San Mateo Community College, P.E.R.B. Dec. No. 94, at 14-16). In Moreno Valley,
an employer implemented various changes before impasse resolution procedures had been exhausted, constituting a similar but distinct bargaining violation of the EERA. See CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 3543.5(e) (West 1980). Other California appellate cases also have applied the bar
against unilateral changes to actions by public employers in local jurisdictions under the
MMBA. See, e.g., Solano County Employees Ass'n v. Solano County, 136 Cal. App. 3d 256,
186 Cal. Rptr. 147 (1982) (unilateral change adopting new policy for motorcycle use); Vernon
Fire Fighters v. City of Vernon, 107 Cal. App. 3d 802, 165 Cal. Rptr. 908 (1980) (unilateral
revocation of car-washing privilege).
310. San Mateo Community College, P.E.R.B. Dec. No. 94, at 14-15.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 15-16.
313. Id. at 16.
314. See Brawley Union High School Dist., P.E.R.B. Dec. No. 266, at 10 (1982): San
Mateo Community College, P.E.R.B. Dec. No. 94, at 14. This view echoed the reasoning of an
earlier California appellate decision overturning a library district's invalidation of established
salary and fringe benefit practices. See California League of City Employee Ass'ns v. Palos
Verdes Library Dist., 87 Cal. App. 3d 135, 140, 150 Cal. Rptr. 739, 742 (1978).
315. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982); see also Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburg Plate
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gain even if a contract covered the terms at issue. 3 16 In effect, in section
8(d) Congress determined that the need for workplace stability prevailed
over the benefits of continuous bargaining. Thereafter, midterm changes
were treated as violations even if the employer first offered to bargain and
3 17
the union refused.
Unilateral midterm wage reductions based on employer claims of
economic necessity also are treated as violations. For example, in Oak
Cliff-Golman Baking Co.3 18 the NLRB described wages as "perhaps the
most important element" in bargaining, upon which a "substantial por' 3 19
tion of the remaining aspects of a bargaining contract are dependent.
A midterm wage change "is not just a mere breach of the contract, but
amounts, as a practical matter, to the striking of a death blow to the
contract as a whole, and is thus, in reality, a basic repudiation of the
'320
bargaining relationship.
Although the NLRB accepted the employer's claim in Oak CliffGolman that it sought to bargain in good faith over its financial plight,
the Board concluded that "[n]owhere in the statutory terms is any authority granted to us to excuse the commission of the proscribed action
because of a showing either that such action was compelled by economic
need or that it may have served what may appear to us to be a desirable
' 32 1
economic objective."
Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 185-87 (1971) (discussing the statutory history and purpose of § 8(d));
supra note 81.
316. See NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 342 (1939).
317. C. & S. Indus., 158 N.L.R.B. 454 (1966).
318. 207 N.L.R.B. 1063 (1973), enforced, 505 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 876 (1975).
319. Id. at 1064.
320. Id.
321. Id. Two recent federal decisions allowing midterm changes under some circumstances have limited sweeping application of the Oak Cliff-Golman principle. See United Auto
Workers v. NLRB, 765 F.2d 1751 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (midterm transfer of bargaining unit work
to a nonunion facility to avoid high labor costs permitted absent contract bar and after impasse
in talks), enforcing 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984); Otis Elevator Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 891 (1984)
(relocation of bargaining unit work excused due to technology and production problems at old
facility). In neither case was the general rule prohibiting midterm contract modifications altered.
Additionally, financial or business necessity may justify a failure to provide advance notice of a management decision to go out of business, thereby depriving a union of an opportunity during the life of a contract to negotiate over the effects of the managerial decision before
it is carried out. See Yorke v. NLRB, 709 F.2d 1138, 1143-44 (7th Cir. 1983) (bankruptcy
trustee's plant closure without advance notice to union excused), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 1276
(1984). Similarly, in San Mateo Community College, P.E.R.B. Dec. No. 94, at 23-24, the
PERB excused a failure to bargain in advance over the effects of a summer school closure
because of the imminent starting date, the unknown economic situation, and a union waiver of
expedited negotiations. See also CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3504.5 (West 1980) (authorizing notice
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In short, the rule barring midterm modifications provides a general
protective cloak for contract terms within the scope of negotiations. The
rule's practical effect is to limit severely the possible range of unilateral
employer conduct during the life of an agreement.
A similar protective cloak governs unilateral action following the
expiration of an agreement. This is especially significant in light of the
requirement in the 1975 House Report that employment terms after contract rejection be maintained if state law also would require maintenance
in the post-termination period. 322 In general, post-expiration bargaining
is required before the employer can alter the status quo established by the
prior agreement. 323 This obligation to maintain established terms applies
until negotiations have resulted in a new agreement or until the parties
complete impasse procedures. 324 The post-termination obligation can be
avoided only if the contract, by its express terms, indicates that one or
325
more features do not survive contract expiration.
and meeting under MMBA after emergency enactments). Nonetheless, these cases may be
treated as narrow exceptions to the midterm negotiating bar and demonstrate the readiness of
courts and administrative agencies to maintain its overall vitality.
322. See supra note 211 & accompanying text.
323. See, e.g., Anaheim Unified School Dist., P.E.R.B. Dec. No. 364, at 18-19 (1983) (survival of grievance arbitration after contract expiration); Pittsburg Unified School Dist.,
P.E.R.B. Dec. No. 199, at 4 (1982) (assumed that negotiated grievance procedure survived
contract expiration). In Anaheim Unified, the PERB expressly applied leading federal cases
upholding post-termination survival of negotiated provisions. See, e.g., Nolde Bros. v. Bakery
Workers, 430 U.S. 243 (1977); American Sink Top & Cabinet Co., 242 N.L.R.B. 408 (1979);
see also Pittsburg Unified, P.E.R.B. Dec. No. 318. at 30-31 (violation for unilateral hours cutback after contract expiration even though decertification question barred negotiations).
California courts construing the MMBA governing city and county employers have
reached similar conclusions regarding the post-expiration maintenance of contract terms. See,
e.g., San Joaquin County Employees Ass'n v. City of Stockton, 161 Cal. App. 3d 813, 207 Cal.
Rptr. 876 (1984) (full payment of employee benefits required); Social Servs. Union v. County
of San Diego, 158 Cal. App. 3d 1126, 205 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1984) (preservation of holiday pay
dates). The San Joaquin court observed that the employer's "obligation is not premised in the
expired agreements per se but rather on its duty to maintain the status quo during negotiations." 161 Cal. App. 3d at 820, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
324. Once at final impasse, an employer may implement terms reasonably comprehended
in its prior offer to the union. Modesto City Schools, P.E.R.B. Dec. No. 291, at 45-48 (1983).
The PERB rule is based on a line of NLRA and federal court decisions establishing the impasse principle, particularly Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475 (1967). At least two
theoretical bases exist for permitting unilateral action when the parties are at impasse. First.
further productive talks may follow a broken deadlock; second, management's right to continue running the operation is balanced against a union's right to strike. See Heller, Unilateral
Action in a Concession BargainingContext, 35 LAB. L.J. 747, 755 (1984). If few subjects are at
issue, the parties can reach impasse in accelerated bargaining in a short period of time. See.
e.g., Lou Stecher's Supermkts., 275 N.L.R.B. No. 71, 1985 NLRB May (CCH) '" 17,266
(1985); Bell Transit Co., 271 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 1984-1985 NLRB Aug. (CCH) C 16,674
(1984)
325. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., P.E.R.B. Dec. No. 440, at 7 (1984) (affirming dis-
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Public Sector ContractImpiirment

In addition to the common features of private and public sector law
governing unilateral employer action before, during, and after agreement, there is a significant exception with important bankruptcy implications. In a marked departure from private sector principles, a California
public sector employer need not be hampered by the contract if a true
fiscal emergency requires modification of terms. This crucial exception
provides further justification for differing treatment of unilateral action
by private and public employers, both before and after contract rejection
in bankruptcy.
In Sonoma County drgani ioin of Public Employees v. County of
Sonoma,3 26 the California Supreme Court recognized a measure of relief
from otherwise binding contracts or established working conditions.
When the state legislature provided supplemental financial assistance to
offset local revenue losses following the passage of Proposition 13, a condition of this "bailout" law was a cap on salary increases equal to the
increase being given to state employees. This condition invalidated any
local contract clause authorizing a larger increase. Several unions challenged this provision.
The court concluded that the new law was an improper impairment
of contract obligations in violation of the federal and state constitutions.3 27 The local agencies that had denied contractual increases in deference to the state law had, in the court's view, failed to demonstrate the
fiscal emergency upon which the law purportedly was based. 328 Revenues lost after Proposition 13 had been replaced largely by surplus funds
from the state treasury, and the actual shortfalls were much less than
329
were anticipated or necessary to meet the contractual raises.
The Sonoma County analysis centered on "not whether the state
may in some cases impair the obligation of contracts, but the circumThis perstances under which such impairment is permissible ...
missal when arbitration expressly limited to contract period and transfer grievances arose after
expiration); Anaheim Unified School Dist., P.E.R.B. Dec. No. 364, at 19 (1983).
326. 23 Cal. 3d 296, 591 P.2d 1, 152 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1979).
1:
327. Id. at 314, 591 P.2d at 11, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 913 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.
"No State shall... pass any... law impairing the obligation of contracts," and a comparable
bar in CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 9). The Sonoma County finding of unconstitutional contract
impairment resolved the question expressly left open when the court otherwise approved the
measure in Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal.
3d 208, 238-42, 583 P.2d 1281, 1295-98, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 253-56 (1978).
328. Sonoma County, 23 Cal. 3d at 310, 591 P.2d at 8, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
329. Id. at 311, 591 P.2d at 8-9, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 911.
330. Id. at 305, 591 P.2d at 5, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 907. In the preliminary passages preceding the above quotation, the court noted that, under the MMBA's regulation of city and
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spective was based on the principle that the constitutional bar to contract
impairment is "not an absolute one and is not to be read with literal
33 1
exactness like a mathematical formula."
The analytical approach of the Sonoma County decision was directly linked to United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey.332 In
that case, the United States Supreme Court found a New Jersey law unconstitutional because it retroactively repealed a covenant between the
state and its public bondholders to reserve funds for payment. In United
States Trust, the Court rejected traditional deference to the reasonableness of a legislative modification when impairment of a public contract is
involved. 333 Instead, the Court required a more careful examination of
the legislation in light of the state's self-interest. 334 The Court authorized
contract impairment only if less drastic modifications or alternatives are
unavailable to meet unforeseen circumstances. 335 Commentators have
considered the issues of alternatives and foreseeability as crucial aspects
county labor relations, "the agreements between the respondent local entities and petitioner
are binding contracts." Id. at 304, 591 P.2d at 4, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 906. The court reasoned
that, even though a state's police power "remains paramount.... if the contract clause is to
have any effect, it must limit the exercise of the police power to some degree." Id. at 305, 591
P.2d at 5. 152 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
Although Sonona County did not expressly determine that the midterm contract changes
required by the new state law would have violated the MMBA, the precedent relied upon was
a case arising under the MMBA, in which an agreed-upon salary increase that was not implemented by the employer was found to be "indubitably binding." See Glendale City Employees' Ass'n v. City of Glendale, 15 Cal. 3d 328, 337-38, 540 P.2d 609, 615, 124 Cal. Rptr. 513,
519 (1975). quoted in Sonona County, 23 Cal. 3d at 304, 591 P.2d at 5, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
Hence, Sonona County can be applied by analogy in labor cases involving midterm contract
changes, as the PERB has done, because a labor relations statute could not provide less protection of union and employee rights than the minimum provided by the federal and state constitutions relied upon in Sonoma County. See supra notes 326-29, infra notes 348-60 & accompanying text.
331. Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 428 (1934), quoted in Sonoma
County, 23 Cal. 3d at 305, 591 P.2d at 5, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 907. In Blaisdell, the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of a mortgage moratorium law adopted by Minnesota to
afford relief against property foreclosures. The challenged law did not completely eliminate
foreclosure rights, but allowed an extended redemption period from foreclosure sales, subject
to rental value.
Public employment agreements also are protected by the contract clause. See Indiana ex
rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938).
332. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
333. Id. at 23.
334. Id. at 26. The Court applied a higher standard for public contracts because
a governmental entity can always find a use for extra money, especially when taxes
do not have to be raised. If a State could reduce its financial obligations whenever it
wanted to spend the money for what it regarded as an important public purpose, the
Contract Clause would provide no protection at all.
Id.
335. Id. at 29-32.
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of the United States Trust decision as it applies to public sector bargaining agreements, reasoning that the case arguably creates a form of consti336
tutional immunity from unjustifiable layoffs and wage freezes.
According to Sonoma County, four factors must be satisfied in order
to modify a labor contract obligation in the public sector. 337 First, a
declared emergency must be based on an adequate factual foundation.
Second, the agency's action must be designed to protect a basic social
interest and not benefit a particular individual. Third, the law must be
appropriate for the emergency and reasonable, avoiding if possible complete abrogation of the contractual obligation. Fourth, the agency decision must be temporary, limited to the immediate exigency that caused
the action. 33 8 The court determined that a one-year wage change is a
substantial impairment, and that a law valid when passed may cease to
339
be valid if the emergency ends or if the underlying facts change.
336. See McGarry, PublicSector Collective Bargainingand the Contract Clause, 31 LAB.
L.J. 67, 71 (1980); Note, supra note 17, at 1736-38.
Another contract decision cited in Sonoma County was Allied Structural Steel Co. v.
Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978). In that case, the Court invalidated a Minnesota law that
increased the bargained-for pension liability of corporations, concluding that it constituted a
"severe, permanent, and immediate change" in contract rights. Id. at 250, quoted in Sonoma
County, 23 Cal. 3d at 309, 591 P.2d at 7, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 909.
In two more recent decisions the Supreme Court sustained state legislative contract modifications, but without disturbing the special shield extended by United States Trust to public
contracts. In Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983),
the Court upheld a new state law limiting natural gas price escalator clauses, finding that the
field was already dominated by government regulation and that future changes were foreseeable. The second case, Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983), sustained legislation
that prohibited contract pass-through of oil and gas tax increases to customers. In the Court's
view, the broad social interest in controlling energy resources and the incidental disruption to
the contract relationship justified the new law. Id. at 191-92. For commentaries reviewing
Supreme Court treatment of the contract clause since United States Trust, see Note, Rediscovering the Contract Clause, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1414 (1984); Note, Revival of the Contract
Clause, 65 VA. L. REV. 377 (1979); Note, A Process-OrientedApproach to the Contract Clause,
89 YALE L.J. 1623 (1980).
337. Sonoma County, 23 Cal. 3d at 305-06, 591 P.2d at 5, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
338. Id. at 306, 591 P.2d at 5, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
339. Id. at 308-11, 591 P.2d at 7-9, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 912-15. Sonoma County separately
held that the bailout condition interfered with the local home rule authority of chartered cities
and counties to determine employee wages. Id. at 314-18, 591 P.2d at 11-13, 152 Cal. Rptr. at
913-15. Although the employers contended that the emergency situation excused the legislature's preemptive interference in local affairs, the court concluded that proof of an emergency
was lacking. Id. at 318, 591 P.2d at 13, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 915. Ironically, a public employer
now might argue that California statutes generally authorizing bankruptcy filings would permit the type of contract abrogation disapproved in Sonoma County, even though a specific
legislative decree, designed to deal with the same underlying fiscal problem, might not be sustained under the holding of that case.
The Sonoma County analysis, particularly its threshhold "emergency" emphasis, has been
criticized without challenging the result reached. See Note, Sonoma County Organization of
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In concluding that the legislature's action was unconstitutional, the
Sonoma County court distinguished a New York case relied upon by the
employers to support the post-Proposition 13 measure. In Subway-Surface Supervisors Association v. New York City Transit Authority,34° the
court permitted postponement of a bargained-for wage increase. Subway-Surface, however, involved an emergency that was uncontested by
34
the union and deferral rather than abrogation of the wage increase. 1
One instructive case consistent with Sonoma County is Ropico, Inc.
v. City of New York. 342 Ropico sustained legislation modifying note-

holder rights during the 1970's fiscal crisis affecting New York City. It
Public Employees v. County of Sonoma: The Contract Clause and Home Rule Powers Revitalized in California, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 829 (1980). There are several recent California appellate
decisions applying Sonoma County, some invalidating legislative action, see, e.g., Olson v.
Cory, 27 Cal. 3d 532, 609 P.2d 991, 164 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1980) (judicial pay); Valdes v. Cory,
139 Cal. App. 3d 773, 189 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1983) (retirement funding), and others upholding
contract modifications. See, e.g., Interstate Marina Dev. Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 155
Cal. App. 3d 435, 207 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1984) (rent control); Rue-Ell Enters., Inc. v. City of
Berkeley, 147 Cal. App. 3d 81, 194 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1983) (rent control).
340. 44 N.Y.2d 101, 375 N.E.2d 384, 404 N.Y.S.2d 323 (1978).
341. In addition, the Sonoma County decision questioned the rationale of the New York
court, reasoning that multi-year wage increase provisions require that a "contract must be
viewed as a whole; it cannot be fractured into isolated components." Sonoma County, 23 Cal.
3d at 313, 591 P.2d at 10, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 912. Subway-Surface has been criticized as paying
respect to United States Trust without following its methodological holding. See Note, supra
note 17, at 1736.
Two other New York cases also demonstrate differences with Subway-Surface. See Board
of Educ. v. Yonkers Fed'n of Teachers, 40 N.Y.2d 268, 353 N.E.2d 569, 386 N.Y.S.2d 657
(1976); Burke v. Bowen, 40 N.Y.2d 264, 353 N.E.2d 567, 386 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1976). In each,
the court protected contractual job security provisions against an employer claim that emergency legislation that authorized workforce attrition as the preferred reduction policy impliedly permitted layoffs.
Two other cases, however, decided after United States Trust, upheld contract modifications by public employers. In Board of Educ. v. Chicago Teachers Union, 88 Ill. 2d 63, 430
N.E.2d 1111 (1981), the court permitted a salary deduction for a one-day layoff that violated
the contract's annual wage clause because of the school board's funding problems and its reserved power to determine public educational needs. The court did not cite United States
Trust. And in Local Div. 589 v. Massachusetts, 666 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1117 (1982), the circuit court deferred to state legislation altering a contractual arbitration remedy that a union claimed would remain in effect indefinitely. The court distinguished
United States Trust on the basis that the incidental nonwage impairment did not eliminate the
arbitration remedy entirely, but merely placed a finite duration on its future use after the
existing agreement expired. Id. at 641. These decisions demonstrate that overriding public
policy concerns may excuse at least a partial contract modification, assuming that there is a
reasonable justification for a modest change. Cf. United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 22 n. 19
(emergency justification not essential in every case); Miscimarra, Inability to Pay: The Problem
of Contract Enforcement in Public Sector Collective Bargaining, 43 U. PiTr. L. REV. 703
(1982) (analyzing special concerns of public employers dependent on other sources of revenue).
342. 425 F. Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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demonstrates how emergency legislation can coexist with federal bankruptcy laws that affect state and local labor relations.
In Ropico, a state moratorium law extended the time to pay shortterm municipal notes, but provided added interest for those willing to
exchange their old notes for new ones. Those noteholders declining an
exchange received their interest on maturity, but no principal. The federal court rejected a challenge to the law under the contract clause, relying on the 1942 Supreme Court holding in Asbury Park that a plan
requiring noteholders to accept new bonds with a later maturity date and
343
lower interest was not an unconstitutional impairment.
A second major challenge to the New York moratorium law was
based on the post-Asbury Park bankruptcy statute prohibiting state compositions that bind nonconsenting creditors. 344 After analyzing the difference between debtor "compositions" and "extensions," the court
concluded that the New York law was an extension because it did not
contemplate partial settlement of the obligation, and because the contractual interest rate was paid through maturity. 34 5 The court conceded that
"this distinction must at some point, because of the length of the extension or the rate of interest after maturity, become blurred. ' 346 The
Ropico court, however, was concerned with the potential interference
with state sovereignty under the tension of federal bankruptcy law:
A federal court decision that the federal Bankruptcy Act precludes the New York State legislature from implementing this emergency measure aimed at dealing with a fiscal crisis of unprecedented
proportions affecting its largest city would raise very serious questions
about the right
of a state effectively to govern its political
347
subdivisions.
Viewed together, Sonoma County and Ropico illustrate the potential
343. Id. at 976 (citing Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502
(1942), discussed supra text accompanying notes 197-99).
344. 11 U.S.C. § 903(1) (1982).
345. Ropico, 425 F. Supp. at 982-83.
346. Id. at 983.
347. Id. at 984. A successful state court challenge to the New York moratorium law,
raising the same basic federal law issues as those in Ropico, was decided two months after the
federal court case. The court concluded, however, that the emergency law violated the city's
"faith and credit" pledge under the state constitution. Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal
Assistance Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 731, 358 N.E.2d 848, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976). The court did not
reach the federal contract clause and bankruptcy questions reviewed in Ropico. See generally
Note, The Constitutionalityof the New York Municipal Wage Freeze and Debt Moratorium:
Resurrection of the Contract Clause, 125 U. PA. L. REV.167 (1976) (detailed review of the
legislative response to New York City's financial distress). While the case law suggests that
careful contract and statutory analysis is required to draw a fine line in determining permissible emergency legislation, the important point is that a line can be drawn.
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for conflict if the federal bankruptcy court, by allowing midterm unilateral employer action, effectively displaces alternative state labor law remedies. Such an avenue, albeit a narrow one, exists in California.
The Public Sector Fiscal Necessity Defense
In California, the Sonoma County standard has been applied to several labor relations cases in which an employer has advanced a fiscal necessity defense to a claim that it had unilaterally modified wage rates. 348

In San Mateo Community College District,349 for example, the employer
unilaterally reduced salaries by 6.25% and froze yearly step increases
after the passage of Proposition 13. An existing contract provided for
these benefits subject to a reopener provision that became effective soon
after the employer announced the cutbacks. The employer did not wait
to negotiate before reducing wages because it feared a substantial deficit,
based on rumors about the level of pending statewide bailout assistance.
After reviewing the general principles prohibiting unilateral employer action, 350 the PERB rejected the employer's fiscal necessity defense. 35'
The San Francisco Community College District 3 52 decision also relied upon Sonoma County in concluding that the employer's unilateral
freeze of established wage and benefit levels was unlawful under the
EERA. 353 The PERB considered the employer's argument that Proposition 13 required preservation of the District's resources 354 and observed
that Proposition 13 "engendered statewide concern that it would result
in fiscal chaos. ' 35 5 Nevertheless, in the Board's view, "speculative concern over the effect a law may have on the economy of local public enti348. See, e.g., San Francisco Community College Dist., P.E.R.B. Dec. No. 105, at 9-10
(1979); San Mateo Community College Dist., P.E.R.B. Dec. No. 94, at 17 n.9 (1979). Both
cases involved post-Proposition 13 fiscal cutbacks.
349. P.E.R.B. Dec. No. 94, at 14 (1979).
350. See supra text accompanying notes 307-13.
351. San Mateo Community College, P.E.R.B. Dec. No. 94, at 17 n.9 (citing Sonoma
County, 23 Cal. 3d 296, 591 P.2d 1, 152 Cal. Rptr. 903). After finding a union bargaining
waiver on another issue, however, the Board cautioned that it was
mindful of the particular burdens that public sector finances may impose on employee representatives to reach speedy resolution of hard economic problems. Employee organizations may not shield themselves behind a restraint on unilateral
employer actions as a way of avoiding a measure of responsibility for mitigating or
resolving financial dilemmas confronting a public employer.
San Mateo Community College, P.E.R.B. Dec. No. 94, at 22.
352. P.E.R.B. Dec. No. 105 (1979).
353. Id. at 9.
354. Id. at 8.
355. Id. at 8-11.
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356
ties is not itself an emergency justifying unilateral change.
The PERB has continued to recognize the possibility that such a
claim could be sustained. In Calexico Unified School District,357 the
Board summarily adopted a hearing officer decision finding a violation of
the EERA for a unilateral wage freeze while contract reopener negotiations were underway. 358 The school district froze wages in order to arrive at a balanced budget for the upcoming school year and to account
for the uncertain level of statewide funding. The Board found that
[t]he District did present convincing evidence of the difficult financial
circumstances which it faced ....
[W]hat it must show in order to
establish a business necessity defense to unilateral action on salaries,
however, is an actual financial emergency which leaves no real alternative to the action taken
3 59and allows no time for meaningful negotiations
before taking action.
The financial justification was absent in Calexico because submission
of a balanced budget was feasible without a wage freeze, and because a
real cash flow shortage would not have arisen until the spring of the
3 60
school year, months after the unilateral action by the employer.
These cases show that, while a fiscal emergency claim may be raised,
it is unlikely to succeed when there is sufficient time to negotiate alternatives and when a sudden change of circumstances does not unavoidably
require immediate action. However, the feature that truly distinguishes
the effect of a financial emergency in the public sector, in light of Sonorna
County and its progeny, is that the employer has a unique midterm safety
valve. Although an employer's options may be limited, in appropriate
circumstances it can modify the express terms of an existing contract
while remaining in operation without reducing the scope of its required
services.
In comparison, no private sector labor case has recognized an employer prerogative akin to that of the public employer's police power to
impair a contract in an emergency. Only if a bankruptcy court has authorized contract rejection may a private employer continue to operate
with the same ownership, personnel, and location, the contract notwithstanding. Otherwise, private sector labor law restricting midterm contract modifications precludes unilateral abrogation of an agreement,
356. Id. at 10.
357. P.E.R.B. Dec. No. 357 (1983).
358. Id. at 1-2.
359. Id. (adopting Administrative Law Judge decision at 20 citing San FranciscoCommunity College, P.E.R.B. Dec. No. 105, at 8); see also Oakland Unified School Dist., P.E.R.B.
Dec. No. 236, at 13-15 (1982) (acute time frame not present as justification).
360. Calexico, P.E.R.B. Dec. No. 357 (adopting Administrative Law Judge decision at
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regardless of pressing financial crises. This qualitative distinction provides further support for a public sector rule requiring renegotiation after, and not just before, a bankruptcy court approves the rejection of a
labor contract.
The Tenth Amendment Factor
Relevance
A complete analysis of the proposed reconciliation of federal bankruptcy and state labor laws requires an assessment of the present relevance of the tenth amendment. 36 1 From the outset of municipal
bankruptcy law, Congress has recognized that some powers are reserved
to states by the Constitution. Currently, section 903 of the Bankruptcy
Code, a statutory version of the tenth amendment, expressly prohibits a
court order that would "limit or impair the power of a State to control by
legislation or otherwise, a municipality of or in such State in the exercise
of the political or governmental powers of such municipality, including
expenditures for such exercise ....-362 This provision is a continuation
of the judicial restraint contained in the original 1934 bill and retained in
363
the 1937 enactment.
The relevance of the tenth amendment also is evident in the earliest
Supreme Court decisions concerning municipal bankruptcy law. In Ashton, the Court did not cite expressly the tenth amendment, but relied on
principles of state sovereignty to invalidate the original law. 364 When it
upheld the revised law in 1937 in Bekins, the Court analyzed the structure of the legislation and the existence of implied state authorization and
concluded that tenth amendment sovereignty concerns were pro365
tected.
The tenth amendment issue also was significant in the congressional
debates of 1975 and 1976 that led to the most recent municipal bankruptcy revision, evidencing congressional sensitivity about excessive federal interference in state and local affairs. 366 By the time the 1978
legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act was prepared, Congress
361. The tenth amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.

362.

11 U.S.C. § 903 (1982).

363.

See supra note 186.

364. Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1,298 U.S. 513 (1978); see
supra text accompanying notes 171-74.
365. Bekins v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 304 U.S. 27 (1938); see supra text accompanying notes 180-90.
366. See supra text accompanying notes 209-25.
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reaffirmed the propriety of a public sector chapter by relying upon tenth
amendment doctrine as shaped by the Court in NationalLeague of Cities
367
V. Usery.
More recently, the relevance of the constitutional doctrine was reflected in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.36 8 In
Garcia, the Court upheld application of the minimum wage and overtime
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") to municipal
370
transit workers. 369 The Court overruled National League of Cities,
state immunity
abandoning full-scale judicial review aimed at preserving
'371
functions.
governmental
in areas of "traditional
Garcia strongly supports federal legislative authority and serves as a
check on judicial interpretation of the tenth amendment that would limit
congressional action. The case was decided by a narrow margin, however, and the dissenting justices suggested that the decision would not
remain unchallenged. 372 Because Garcia is the third major tenth amendment case since 1968,373 a close examination of its holding, its relationship to the law that evolved under National League of Cities, and its
potential effect on unilateral action in the context of contract rejection is
worthwhile.
The Garcia Decision
The specific issue in Garcia was whether municipal operation of a
mass-transit system is a traditional government function exempt from the
minimum wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA. 374 Circuit courts
367.

426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth.,

105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985); see also supra text accompanying notes 226-28.

368. 105 S.Ct. 1005 (1985).
369. Id. at 1020.
370. Id. at 1007, 1021.
371.

NationalLeague of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845.

372. Garcia, 105 S.Ct. at 1033 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 1038 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist's remarks were especially candid: "I do not think it incumbent on
those of us in dissent to spell out further the fine points of a principle that will, I am confident,
in time again command the support of a majority of this Court." Id. at 1033 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
373. In that year, Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), upheld the original wage and
hour amendments covering school and hospital employees. While Wirtz did not disturb the

scope of federal labor standards authority affirmed in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941), the dissent of Justices Douglas and Stewart suggested an emerging reexamination of
prior judicial deference. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 204-05 (Douglas & Stewart, JJ., dissenting). Just
eight years later, Wirtz was overruled by NationalLeagueof Cities, when the Court considered
additional amendments affecting police and firefighters, among others. National League of
Cities, 426 U.S. at 840.
374. Garcia, 105 S.Ct. at 1007.
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had reached conflicting conclusions 3 75 in their attempts to apply the state
immunity standard set in NationalLeague of Cities. This standard invalidated federal legislation if it "operated to directly displace the state's
freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional govern'376
mental functions.
In NationalLeague of Cities, the Court declared that determination
of employee wages and hours of work was an "undoubted attribute of
state sovereignty. '377 It also stated that states should be free to "structure employer-employee relationships" in key areas as part of "their dual
functions of administering the public law and furnishing public
37 8
services."
Garcia marked an change in viewpoint by Justice Blackmun, who
had concurred in National League of Cities.379 His Garcia opinion was
joined by the dissenters in NationalLeague of Cities.38 0 Justice Blackmun
observed that since 1976, "[f]ederal and state courts have struggled with
the task thus imposed, of identifying a traditional function for purposes
of state immunity under the Commerce Clause."' 38 1 In the Garcia majority's view, however, two problems prevented continued efforts to carry
out this task: "Our examination of this 'function' standard now persuades us that the attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory
immunity in terms of 'traditional governmental function' is not only unworkable but is inconsistent with established principles of federalism
"382

One of the problems described by Justice Blackmun was selecting
those "integral" or "traditional" state and local functions deserving
protection:
The essence of our federal system is that within the realm of authority
left open to them under the Constitution, the States must be equally
free to engage in any activity that their citizens choose for the common
weal, no matter how unorthodox or unnecessary anyone else-includ375. Id. at 1007 n.1 (citing conflicting lower court decisions).
376. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 842. Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority
opinion, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Stewart, Powell, and Blackmun. Justice
Blackmun also wrote a separate concurrence suggesting a balancing test to uphold legislation
in instances of great federal concern when state compliance would be essential. ld. at 856
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
377. Id. at 845.
378. Id. at 851. The decision also applied to local political subdivisions, because 'they
derive their power from their respective States." Id. at 856 n.20.
379. Id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
380. Id. at 856, 880.
381. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1007. The opinion provides a sampling of lower court cases. Id.
at 1011.
382. Id. at 1007.

November 1985]

PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING AGREEMENTS

ing the judiciary--deems state involvement to be.383

Regarding the problem of consistency, Justice Blackmun conceded
that "[t]he states unquestionably do retain a significant measure of sovereign authority," 384 but that protection was available through the federal

design, not through judicial intervention. 38 5 Justice Blackmun concluded that the representative nature of national government protects
"the States from overreaching by Congress, ' 386 and that any limit
imposed
is one of process rather than one of result. Any substantive restraint
on the exercise of Commerce Clause powers must find its justification
in the procedural nature of this basic limitation, and it must be tailored
to compensate for possible failings in the national political 387
process
rather than to dictate a "sacred province of state autonomy.

Garcia'slead dissent by Justice Powell essentially restated the viewpoint adopted in NationalLeague of Cities. He charged that the majority
decision "effectively reduces the Tenth Amendment to meaningless rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant to the Commerce Clause. ' 38 8 From
the minority's perspective, "[t]he States' role in our system of government is a matter of constitutional law, not of legislative grace. '3 89 Al383. Id. at 1015. As a consequence, the state immunity rule, tied to notions of integral or
traditional functions, "inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about
which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes." Id.
In particular, the court based this conclusion on a review of unsuccessful judicial attempts
to fashion limits for state immunity from federal taxation. Id. at 1012-14. The earlier distinction between essential governmental functions and nonessential proprietary functions led to
great uncertainty and was abandoned in New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
384. Garcia, 105 S.Ct. at 1017 (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 269 (1983)
(Powell, J., dissenting)).
385. Garcia, 105 S.Ct. at 1018 ("Apart from the limitation on federal authority inherent
in the delegated nature of Congress' Article I powers, the principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the states lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself.").
Justice Blackmun perceived state influence through congressional representation, particularly
in the Senate, as well as through a voice in electoral qualifications and presidential elections.
Id. at 1017-19. Justice Stevens' dissent in NationalLeague of Cities pointed out a potential for
inconsistency later noted by Justice Blackmun in Garcia:
The Federal Government may, I believe, require the State to act impartially when it
hires or fires the janitor, to withhold taxes from his paycheck, to observe safety regulations when he is performing his job, to forbid him from burning too much soft coal
in the capitol furnace, from dumping untreated refuse in an adjacent waterway, from
overloading a state-owned garbage truck, or from driving either the truck or the
Governor's limousine over 55 miles an hour.
NationalLeague of Cities, 426 U.S. at 881 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
386. Garcia, 105 S.Ct. at 1018.
387. Id. at 1019-20 (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 236 (1983)).
388. Garcia, 105 S.Ct. at 1022 (Powell, J., Burger, C.J., Rehnquist & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting). Justice Powell was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor;
the latter two also contributing their own dissents.
389. Id. at 1026. In his dissent, Justice Powell argued that the majority's proposed limita-
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lowing federal political officials to judge the limits of their power, Justice
Powell believed, permitted federal control "over the terms and condi' 390
tions of employment of all state and local employees.
The Garcia decision was not entirely surprising in light of judicial
and scholarly developments since National League of Cities.39 1 In four
major decisions between 1976 and 1983, the Court had not applied its
state immunity theory to invalidate any federal legislation. 392 The first
decision, Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association,
Inc.,393 upheld federal mining regulations. It also suggested a balancing
test to weigh federal and state interests as an alternative means of resolving tenth amendment disputes. 394 Next, a unanimous decision in United
Transportation Union v. Long Island Railroad395 applied federal railroad
legislation to a state-owned commuter railway, which was formerly privately owned, thereby protecting the right to strike despite contrary state
law. Then, in FERC v. Mississippi 396 the Court approved preemptive federal legislation that conditioned state involvement in the field of energy
regulation. Finally, in EEOC v. Wyoming 397 the Court rebuffed an attack on the federal age discrimination law.
tion had created a line-drawing exercise at least as troubling as the integral or traditional
function distinction expressed in 1976:
The Court's failure to specify the "affirmative limits" on federal power, or when and
how these limits are to be determined, may well be explained by the transparent fact
that any such attempt would be subject to precisely the same objections on which it
relies to overrule National League of Cities.
Id. at 1025 n.7.
390. Id. at 1032. This issue has major financial implications. One study estimated that
state and local costs to comply with Garcia would range from $320 million to $1.5 billion. 23
GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP.(BNA) 748 (May 20, 1985). Critics of Garcia also have charged that
the extra costs imposed will result in layoffs and the widespread undoing of state and local
bargaining agreements. See 119 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 103, 103-05 (July 1, 1985). By fall
1985, with a compliance date set by the Labor Department, Congress enacted compromise
legislation to soften Garcia'sfiscal impact. The law allows compensatory time off at overtime
rates, rather than extra pay, and requires a cash payment for accumulated time over a fixed
figure. 23 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 1644, 1644-45 (Nov. 18, 1985); id. at 1573-74; 120
LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 163, 163-64 (Oct. 21, 1985).
391. The history of Garcia itself suggested a Court turnaround in the making. The case
was originally argued in the 1983-1984 term of the Court, but was held over to 1984-1985 for
reargument. When the case was reset, reconsideration of National League of Cities was expressly at issue, not merely its application to local public transit. Garcia, 105 S.Ct. at 1010.
392. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742
(1982); United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982); Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 265 (1981).
393. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
394. Id. at 286-93.
395. 455 U.S. 678 (1982).
396. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
397. 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
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Lower federal courts had applied NationalLeague of Cities in a variety of commerce power cases and often concluded that federal legislation
was permissible. 39 8 Public entity creditors also raised the tenth amendment challenge in several bankruptcy cases, but to no avail. 399 However,
the issue was not raised in any proceeding involving a public entity in a
debtor capacity seeking to adjust creditor obligations or to reject an exec-

utory contract. 4'0
The viability of NationalLeague of Cities also was doubtful given

the critical treatment it received from legal scholars. 4° 1 Some reviewers
398. Compare Molina-Estrada v. Puerto Rico Highway Auth., 680 F.2d 841 (1st Cir.
1982) (local highway authority immune from federal regulation) and Amersbach v. City of
Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979) (municipal airport immune from federal regulation)
with Public Serv. Co. v. FERC, 587 F.2d 716 (5th Cir. 1979) (oil and natural gas sales subject
to federal regulation) and Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. FCC, 553 F.2d 694 (1st Cir. 1977) (telephone system subject to federal regulation). See also Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1007 n.1, 1011.
399. Those entities raising tenth amendment claims sought to extend state sovereignty to
comparable federal powers under article I of the Constitution. In National League of Cities,
the Court had expressly refrained from reaching these other issues. NationalLeague of Cities,
426 U.S. at 852 n.17.
For pertinent bankruptcy cases, see In re Glidden, 653 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1981) (Child
support obligations assigned to the state are dischargeable.), cert denied,454 U.S. 1143 (1982);
In re Nashville White Trucks, 22 Bankr. 578 (M.D. Tenn. 1982) (automatic stay does not
directly impair state's ability to collect and use taxes); In re Galbraith, 15 Bankr. 549 (E.D.
Pa. 1981) (welfare liens voidable to ensure debtor's fresh start).
400. One case that could have, but did not, raise either the tenth amendment or the National League of Cities doctrine involved the bankruptcy of a public sector labor union. In re
Lane County Sheriff's Officers Ass'n, 16 Bankr. 190 (D. Or. 1981). The bankruptcy trustee of
the union sought to assume the bargaining agreement with the local county. In approving the
request, the court ordered assignment to the trustee of dues receipts from wage checkoffs. The
debtor union, or affected employees, retained enforcement authority over the other portions of
the agreement that were to remain in effect. But the court did not explain how, after severing
the contract in this fashion, the debtor or employees would finance ongoing contract administration. Presumably, this diversion of income could undermine any state law interest in effective administration of labor relations, to the detriment not only of covered workers, but also of
citizens concerned about law enforcement services. But cf International Ass'n of Machinists
v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 771-72 (1961) (upholding exclusive representative's need for ongoing
income to perform statutory bargaining duties).
401. See, e.g., Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-a-Vis the States: The Dispensability ofJudicialReview, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977); La Pierre, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism Redux: IntergovernmentalImmunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH.
U.L.Q. 779 (1982); Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977); Rotunda, The Doctrine of ConditionalPreemption and Other Limitations on Tenth Amendment Restrictions, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 289 (1984); Tribe, UnravelingNational League of Cities: The New Federalism
and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1977);
Tushnet, Constitutionaland StatutoryAnalyses in the Law ofFederalJurisdiction,25 UCLA L.
REV. 1301 (1978); Note, Redefining the National League of Cities State Sovereingty Doctrine,
129 U. PA. L. REV. 1460 (1981); Comment, RailroadRegulation After National League of
Cities: United Transportation Union v. Long Island Railroad, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 809 (1981);
Comment, Recent Tenth Amendment Decisions-JudicialRetreat from a Metaphysical Uni-
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believed that National League of Cities contained a concept of sover42
eignty entitling the public to the delivery of basic government services. 0
Others suggested upholding federal legislative action that conditions
state activity in an area subject to preemption. 40 3 Still another urged,
with substantial success in light of Garcia, that
the federal judiciary should not decide constitutional questions respecting the ultimate power of the national government vis-a-vis the states;
the constitutional issue whether federal action is beyond the authority
of the central government and thus violates "states' rights" should be
treated as40 4nonjusticiable, with final resolution left to the political
branches.

For all of these reasons, the result in Garcia was somewhat predictable.
Garcia: The Effect

How, then, does Garcia affect the relationship between a bankruptcy
court, acting under federal law at the behest of a local employer, and
state law bargaining requirements? The Court's constitutional analysis is
40 5
compatible with two answers.
verse and a Return of FederalismAnalysis to the CongressionalForum, 1983 UTAH L. REV. 359
(1983); see also articles cited in Rotunda, supra, at 291 n.9, 295 n.38.
402. See Michelman, supra note 401, at 1172-73. 1180; Tribe, supra note 401, at 1076.
Criticism of this intepretation has been noted in Rotunda, supra note 401, at 293 n.27;
Tushnet. supra note 401, at 1335.
403. See. e.g., Rotunda, supra note 401, at 322-25. To do otherwise, by prohibiting laws
that conditioned state participation on compliance with federal standards, would "invite the
Court to return to its pre-1937 legacy and, in the guise of constitutional analysis, invalidate
economic policy with which it disagrees." Id. at 324.
404. Choper, supra note 401, at 1557; see also Tushnet, supra note 401, at 1328-29 n.136,
1349. Without this cautious approach, the range of the National League of Cities decision
could jeopardize a host of innovative federal programs that impinge on state affairs, thereby
calling into question fundamental national political decisions affecting modern industrial society. Choper, supra note 401, at 1595-600. Still, Professor Choper distinguished practical issues of federalism, in which state interests are protected by representation at the national level,
from disputes over principles of individual rights, for which the judiciary can act as an appropriate guardian. Id. at 1554-57; see infra note 410.
405. Any per se constitutional bar on bankruptcy court authorization of unilateral action
must grapple with the Court's vague formulation that any limit on Congress is "'oneof process
rather than result," Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1019, with restraint being acceptable only if it is
"tailored to compensate for possible failings in the national political process." Id. at 1019-20.
A case cited as an illustration of "affirmative limits" on federal action invalidated a law that
dictated the location of a state capital, thereby interfering with state sovereignty. Id. at 1020
(citing Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911)). Could one argue that, absent national legislation preempting the field, a state's determination about collective bargaining procedures falls
within a comparable field of reserved jurisdiction? This argument is strengthened by the traditional state law prerogative to control local labor relations, as well as by the express congressional exclusion of state and local employers from the NLRA. In fact, the Garcia majority
referred to this exclusion as evidence that the national legislature was respectful of state concerns. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1019.
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The first answer focuses upon the lack of clarity found in the alleged
statutory intrusion by Congress. The federal code is not explicit regarding the impact of a bankruptcy petition and rejection decree upon state
law negotiating procedures. 4° 6 Instead, the bankruptcy court has broad
authority to consider employer rejection requests. 4 °7 Although the statute does not refer to state labor laws, a countervailing perspective is implicit in section 903, which restrains the bankruptcy court's impairment
of state control over political or governmental powers of a municipality. 40 8 In this ambiguous statutory situation, tenth amendment tools are
useful to guide judicial inquiry and to bring about statutory
reconciliation. 40 9
A second basis for judicial scrutiny after Garcia flows from the dual
characteristics of a contract rejection decree. While on the one hand
such a federal court order has an inevitable impact on state law financial
interests, after Bekins and Garcia it would be futile to argue that Congress was overreaching when it extended bankruptcy law to municipalities. On the other hand, contract rejection impairs individual and
organizational rights that are the product of the bargaining process, and
judicial review is an appropriate means of reconciling these competing
4 10
legal claims.
406. See supra notes 202-31.
407. See supra notes 202-31.
408. See supra text accompanying notes 186, 362. Other countervailing implications are
present in the Bankruptcy Code. For example, exceptions to the automatic stay, incorporated
in Chapter 9, include not only actions to enforce governmental policy or regulatory powers, 11
U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1982), but also "enforcement of a judgment, other than a money judgment
obtained by such a governmental unit." Id. § 362(b)(5); see NLRB v. Evans Plumbing Co.,
639 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1981). And although a monetary judgment arising from a successful
claim based on employer anti-union discrimination or unlawful bargaining still may be subject
to the temporary stay, it probably should be treated as a first-priority administrative expense in
order to protect the state law interest in deterring similar misconduct in the future. See Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471 (1968); see also infra note 420; cases cited supra note 112.
409. Professor Choper, who otherwise advocated a federalism perspective in which tenth
amendment challenges to congressional action under the commerce power would be nonjusticiable, recognized the need for statutory analysis because "federal statutes ... are rarely so
plain and precise as not to require interpretation," noting that in cases of federal overreaching,
"the Court will virtually always be able to interpret the statute or executive action as inapposite." Choper, supra note 401, at 1605.
410. As Professor Choper observed, "true constitutional questions of personal rights may
arise from action of the central government that is also independently alleged to be beyond
national power vis-a-vis the states." Id. at 1558.
As an example of this duality, he cited challenges to a presidential executive agreement
involving foreign assets within states, in which it was charged that there was "an invasion of
states' rights and that the agreement violated the Fifth Amendment by depriving individual
creditors of property without due process of law or just compensation." Id. at 1559 (emphasis
in original) (citing United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301
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Under these circumstances, judicial inquiry cannot be foreclosed by
suggesting that bankruptcy proceedings inevitably amount to an authorized impairment of contract rights. This assertion only begs the question
of whether the bankruptcy process jeopardizes other constitutional
rights. Judicial inquiry is an effective means of protecting individual interests that otherwise might get lost in the conflict of bankruptcy creditors seeking an accommodation with a struggling employer. This is
especially so in the public employment field because employee job interests might involve constitutionally protected property rights subject to
due process requirements. 4 11 Thus, a court might determine that unilateral midterm employer action subsequently ratified by a bankruptcy
court does not satisfy due process when vested individual rights in layoff
protection, vacations, sabbaticals, pensions, and the like are involved. 41 2
In sum, Garcia is not an uncritical enhancement of federal authority. Absent a clear legislative mandate allowing unilateral employer
modification of bargaining agreements during Chapter 9 proceedings, judicial inquiry into such employer conduct is not precluded. Nor does
Garcia preclude judicial attempts to reconcile federal bankruptcy law
with state negotiating requirements. In fact, the opposite is true. Judicial inquiry remains appropriate under section 903 to protect the sovereignty of state and local government by resolving statutory ambiguity
and to ensure that individual and organizational rights are treated with
constitutional dignity.
Maintenance of Terms as a Policy Reconcilation
The author proposes the following accommodation of the poten3
tially conflicting federal and state authority: 41
U.S. 324 (1937)). A similar dual claim was presented in a landmark civil rights case. Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (charge that ban of racial discrimination in places of public accomodation was outside of the proper scope of congressional power
to regulate interstate commerce, was a violation of fifth amendment due process, and was a
violation of the thirteenth amendment proscription against involuntary servitude).
411. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 284.
412. Moreover, the issue becomes more complicated when these property interests are subject to renegotiation by an exclusive representative that may feel compelled to trade some
employee interests for others, such as job security. See Note, Public Sector Grievance Procedures, Due Process, and the Duty of FairRepresentation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 752 (1976) (proposing more limited union discretion in the public employee grievance procedures); supra note
156.
413. The suggested approach is similar to the analytical perspective advanced in Note,
Municipal Bankruptcy, supra note 165, at 1888-91. In particular, the note author concluded
that judicial review should determine not only whether Congress intended to establish a procedure implicating state interests, as reflected in literal statutory terms, id. at 1888-89, but
whether Congress also selected "the least intrusive means for accomplishing its goal." Id. at
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Unilateralemployer action modifying or repudiating terms established by public sector collective bargaining agreements should be
barred, before or after a bankruptcy court has approved a rejection request, until, if required by state law, the parties have renegotiated in
goodfaith, reached an agreement or impasse, or a fiscal emergency excuses contract impairment. Maintenance of terms during the interim
period, while potentially burdensome to a financially troubled public
employer, is nonetheless the least intrusive means of reconciling thefederal interest in bankruptcy reorganizationwith the unique state interest
in labor relations recognized by Congress.

Several arguments support this proposition. First, the proposal is
consistent with statutory intent. Fairly read, congressional interpretation of the 1976 municipal bankruptcy revision requires maintenance of
bargained-for contract terms, in accord with state law, before and after
court-approved rejection. This was the accommodation described in the
House Report. 4 14 Even the dissenting House Republicans argued only in
favor of employer leeway to act unilaterally after court approval. Despite the dissenting views, the majority report was never challenged in
the official Senate or Conference reports.
Interpretation of the House Report's position is not changed by the
single, brief interchange on the Senate floor in 1976.4 15 The Senate dialogue suggesting that post-petition unilateral action was permissible was
never advanced as an amendment, and was implicitly contradicted by
remarks on the House floor regarding the bill's impact on pension
funds. 4 16 The 1978 Senate Report not only mischaracterized the scholarly commentary upon which it relied, but advanced an overbroad and
inconsistent federal preemption analysis that contradicted the stated congressional intention of preserving state sovereignty over bargaining.4 17
In contrast, the House Report's requirement that employment terms
be maintained pending renegotiation, when state law requires maintenance, was a reasonable outgrowth of congressional desire to avoid excessive interference in state and local affairs. 4 18 Even with the state's
1889. The note author reviewed several features of the 1976 municipal bankruptcy revision,
determining that the voluntary and consensual nature of the proceeding adequately protected
state and local interests against federal interference, id. at 1903-04, and that the law also was a
valid accommodation of the federal interest in regulation of the nationwide credit market. Id.
at 1904. Aside from these general observations, however, the note author did not assess the
specific statutory ambiguity about the role of state labor law negotiating requirements before
or after contract rejection by a local entity.
414.
415.

See supra notes 211-13 & accompanying text.
See supra notes 220-21 & accompanying text.

416. See supra notes 222-25 & accompanying text.
417. See supra notes 229-31, 237-44 & accompanying text.
418.

See supra note 211 & accompanying text.
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implied authorization, a precondition relied upon in Bekins,4 19 the House
Report recognized that state control over fundamental decision-making
could not be abridged. Repeated retention of the language later incorpo420
rated in section 903 is the best evidence of that recognition.
The scholarly treatment of the 1976 municipal bankruptcy revision
by Professor King is consistent with a legislative interpretation requiring
maintenance of established terms in accord with state law.4 2 1 Other
commentators agree that unilateral changes before rejection are not authorized, but because of fears of government collapse, they attempt to
skirt the post-rejection negotiating requirement described in the House
Report. 422 One author relies on the "new entity" or successorship rationale to suggest a state law construction that would retain the duty to
bargain without compelling continuation of established terms. 423 That
approach was rejected in Bildisco with the observation that the new entity theory would make contract rejection unnecessary because the em' 424
ployer "would not be bound by such contracts in the first place.
A second commentator suggests, in addition to the successorship
analogy, that post-rejection unilateral changes could be justified by a
state's general authorization allowing local entities to file bankruptcy petitions.4 25 Such consent, however, also would eliminate any post-petition
419. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 49 (1937).
420. Moreover, § 903 is not exceptional, as deference to state law is common in federal
bankruptcy law and practice. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1982) (debtors in posession
"shall manage and operate the property" in accord with state law "in the same manner" as the
owner or posessor); Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases (pts. I & II), 47
N.Y.U. L. RiFv. 407, 631 (1972). In general, the creation and definition of claims is governed
by state law, and the federal bankruptcy process disposes of those claims. See, e.g., Harrigan v.
Bergdoll. 270 U.S. 560, 564 (1926) (state law determining stockholder liability in bankruptcy).
And. although the 1978 code reform extended federal jurisdiction to cases "related to" bankruptcy. this extension covering contract and tort actions, among others, was not designed to
disturb underlying substantive rights established by state law. Note, Bankruptcy and the Linits of Federal Jurisdiction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 703, 707-08 (1982). Other significant examples
of state law deference in the 1978 Code reform include: exception of state criminal and regulatory proceedings from the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(1), (4) (1982); choice of state
property exemptions, id. § 522(b)(1); determination of domestic support exceptions to dischargeability, id. § 523(a); and status to invoke avoiding powers, id. §§ 544-548. Notably.
state law governs basic aspects of rejection requests, such as the classification of transactions as
executory contracts. Shaw v. Dawson, 48 Bankr. 857, 861 (D.N.M. 1985) ("[T]he principle is
well settled that in a bankruptcy proceeding state law ordinarily provides the guide for decision of property and contract issues."); In re Britton, 43 Bankr. 605 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (Land
contracts are not executory contracts under Michigan law.).
421. See supra notes 233-35 & accompanying text.
422. See supra notes 237-44, 245-49 & accompanying text.
423. See supra notes 237-44 & accompanying text.
424. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S.Ct. 1188, 1197 (1984).
425. See supra notes 245-49 & accompanying text.
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duty to bargain, including the need to wait for court-approved rejection
prior to changing terms and conditions. Indeed, there appears to be no
limit to the number of state laws that could be impaired under the authorization theory, the result depending only on the employer's prefer426
ence in shaping a plan.

A state legislature might adopt bankruptcy consent and authorization statutes that expressly supersede contrary state bargaining laws.
California's authorization statutes, however, were approved four decades
before the 1976 municipal bankruptcy revision. 427 It could be asserted
that these statutes continue to justify Chapter 9 proceedings because they
existed when the state laws were passed. But it is more difficult to argue
that the legislature authorized rejection of executory bargaining agreements when such public sector agreements did not exist at the time the
law was enacted, and when contract rejection generally was not within
the scope of municipal bankruptcy proceedings. Under such circumstances, reliance on implied authorization and consent invites disrespect
of legal forms in a situation in which open-mindedness and willingness to
compromise are of utmost importance.
A third argument supporting post-rejection maintenance of terms is
derived from comparing public sector bankruptcy proceedings to Chapter 11 reorganization. 428 The differences between the two dramatically
illustrate a major imbalance of power once an employer is before the
bankruptcy court. The employer in Chapter 9 has exclusive control over
the decision to file a petition and the plan eventually proposed for confir426. The employer's consent is significant because under § 904, absent consent, the court
is prohibited from interfering with political or governmental powers, or with any property or
revenues of the debtor. See supra note 209. Thus, under the above theory, the local entity
could utilize restricted budget accounts, property sales, and borrowing powers to shift actual
or future assets to meet a current deficit.
427. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 53760-53761 (West 1983). These statutes provide for the right
to file a petition and for application of the national bankruptcy act of 1898, as amended; however, there is neither express nor implied incorporation of the successor legislation adopted in
1976 and 1978 that repealedthe prior bankruptcy law. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-598, tit. IV, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326
(1982)). California Government Code § 53760 states:
Any taxing agency or instrumentality of this State, as defined in Section 81 of the act
of Congress entitled "An act to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout
the United States," approved July 1, 1898, as amended, may file the petition mentioned in Section 83 of the act and prosecute to completion all proceedings permitted
by Sections 81, 82, 83, and 84 of the act.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53760 (West 1983).
Section 53761 states: "The State consents to the adoption of Sections 81, 82, 83, and 84
by Congress and consents to their application to the taxing agencies and instrumentalities of
this State." Id. § 53761.
428. See supra notes 250-73 & accompanying text.
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mation. 429 During the period the case is pending, the Chapter 9 employer
has full authority to determine the direction and administrative expense
of operations. Employees of a Chapter 9 petitioner have no priority as
unsecured creditors seeking lost wages, nor have they the right, without
the debtor's consent, to be reimbursed for the substantial professional
fees and expenses that creditors are likely to incur to protect their
430
interests.
In private sector cases, on the other hand, creditors have greater
leverage against arbitrary employer conduct or wasteful management.
An involuntary liquidation proceeding under Chapter 7 can be
threatened, or if the case remains in Chapter 11, the creditors themselves
can propose a reorganization plan after a lapse of time. 43 1 The post-petition operations and administrative costs of the debtor-in-possession are
subject to review and disapproval, not only by creditors organized into
powerful committees, but by the bankruptcy court as well. 432 Employees
as unsecured creditors stand to gain from priority treatment for lost
wages as well as for other benefits the employer fails to provide. 433 In
this context, a counterbalancing restraint on post-rejection unilateral
conduct in the public sector is a reasonable construction of the applicable
law.
A similar conclusion is warranted based upon public sector labor
principles. A bargained-for public sector agreement is a type of powersharing between state and local government and their organized employees, with the ultimate goal of improving labor-management relations and
delivery of public services. Although there is no constitutional requirement that public entities engage in labor negotiations, widespread state
and local involvement is an indication that these governments willingly
have ceded some of their unilateral authority in order to achieve larger
social objectives. Vital aspects of employment are subject to negotiations, superseding not only traditional employer prerogatives, but also
important aspects of civil service systems. The scope and effect of public
sector bargaining is a delicate construction within the larger body of public law and is endangered by the potential effects of premature unilateral
434
action during bankruptcy.
Unilateral action can interfere with broader statewide social policy
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.

See
See
See
See
See
See

upra notes 251-56 & accompanying text.
supra notes 256, 259-60 & accompanying text.
supra note 254 & accompanying text.
supra notes 254, 267-72 & accompanying text.
supra notes 259-60 & accompanying text.
supra notes 285-90 & accompanying text.
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objectives, especially improved labor-management communications and
strike prevention. 4 35 Employer unilateral action without completing
good faith negotiations can improve the balance sheet in the short run,
but it will not win long-term cooperation and prevent disruptions. There
is nothing inherent in the bankruptcy process to alter this result. In fact,
the opposite result may follow when a bankruptcy petition or rejection
order is used as a justification for unilateral changes.
Thus, formal bankruptcy court approval of unilateral conduct
would distort the public sector bargaining process more than the private
sector counterpart. The scope of public sector representation tends to be
more circumscribed, and labor enjoys neither a full-fledged right to strike
nor an anti-injunction bar.43 6 Vastly increasing employer leverage in
bargaining, coupled with the employer's leverage under Chapter 9, would
virtually nullify the positive influence of any continuing duty to bargain.
Union responses to such frustrating situations often may be strikes or
other concerted activity at the workplace. Because the public sector involves so many essential social services, the consequences of allowing
unilateral action under Chapter 9 may be far more damaging to the public interest than comparable private sector modification. Rather than a
mechanism to foster reorganization, unilateral action can be a recipe for
437
disaster.
Another effect of unilateral action would be to deprive local communities of the ability to influence political choices over programs, services,
and employee benefit levels. Instead, elected and appointed officials
would be shielded partially from accountability because the bankruptcy
proceeding transfers substantial aspects of public policy decision-making
to lawyers and a federal bankruptcy court. In this situation, an employer
seeking to avoid contractual commitments to its own workers may be less
motivated to abide by customary democratic forms of behavior when a
435. See supra notes 310-13 & accompanying text.
436. See supra notes 286-300 & accompanying text.
437. The labor dispute involving Continental Airlines is a private sector example that
demonstrates the extended labor-management conflict that can arise after unilateral changes in
the bankruptcy context, even if the employer eventually receives rejection approval. The
strike, called by the three principal unions, continued long after the bankruptcy petition and
contract rejection, with the last union abandoning its strike after 25 months, and only then as
part of a larger settlement of bankruptcy and labor issues. 120 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 226
(Nov. 11, 1985). Continental had restarted operations with a smaller workforce comprised of
new hires and employees crossing picket lines. 117 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 177 (Oct. 29,
1984). Although Continental reportedly bounced back to modest profitability after two years
of cost-cutting measures, the court had still not approved its reorganization plan, and a decertification drive challenged the continuing recognition of the striking pilot's union. N.Y. Times,
Sept. 11, 1985, at 34, col. 1.
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bankruptcy petition or court rejection has given the employer authoriza4 38
tion for future modifications.
A more desirable policy approach maintains negotiations as the primary means of dispute resolution. Not only is this consistent with traditional bankruptcy practice, it allows room for legislative solutions and
public input at the local level. In a democratic society, these are the
forums that presumably are most sensitive to the problems and most accountable for the resolution of public employer financing problems. 4 39 In
brief, shifting responsibility to a particular federal court and to a single
employer on a case by case basis will do little in the long run to promote
negotiations by others or to solve problems that are shared by local political entities.
Unilateral modifications without negotiation also threaten to affect
adversely the distribution and utilization of financial resources among
public entities. For example, in the San Jose case, 440 contract modification altering the budget after contracts had been signed inevitably distorted the statewide equalization and revenue limit goals and promoted
disparities with other school districts. 44 1
Because the public sector is largely labor intensive, 442 these effects
438. Action by a bankruptcy court also may effectively undermine a separation of powers
that, by statutory design, provides the California judiciary with authority to review emergency
regulations adopted by public entities in the state. See Poschman v. Dumke, 31 Cal. App. 3d
932, 941-42, 107 Cal. Rptr. 596, 602-03 (1973) (applying CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11440. repealed
by 1979 Cal. Stat. 567 to invalidate purported emergency resolution by university trustees).
439. An overintrusive bankruptcy court order can interfere with the state government's
ability to fulfill a particular destiny in the federalism model:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility.
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the
Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State, may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 385 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
440. See supra notes 19-73 & accompanying text.
441. See supra note 19 & accompanying text. Related to the adverse impact on statewide
social financing goals is the potential effect on the relevant labor market, making it more difficult for government to hire and keep employees. In San Jose, for example, an urban school
district with a large minority population, the flight of teachers or other skilled personnel would
undermine the significant social interest in preserving the vital public school institution. See
supra notes 19-73 & accompanying text. Additionally, there may be collateral effects on neighboring labor markets, depressing wages or prompting replacement hiring from an increasing
pool of qualified applicants. In these circumstances, public employees may be especially hard
pressed compared to their private sector counterparts because municipal monopolies over services, particularly in large geographic areas, would reduce the scope of available job alternatives while also driving down wages.
442. California school district budgets, for example, allocated an average 87% to salaries
and benefits in 1982-1983. See supra note 19.
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will be magnified when labor agreements are modified. Instead of the San
Jose employer working out an adjustment with its labor unions solely
under the state bargaining law, the employer relied on the bankruptcy
process to trim its budget and allocate funds for uses other than employee wages. 443 This example might be followed by other public employers in the future, wreaking havoc with a larger social design. Indeed,
there is a special short-term incentive for public employers if a Chapter 9
petition and its attendant publicity effectively shifts blame to employees.
Regardless of fault, governing officials thus can shirk responsibility and
avoid the stigma of mismanagement. 444 These potential consequences of
unilateral action provide strong support for respecting state interests by
carefully circumscribing federal preemption of contrary state law.
These effects of unilateral action can be minimized, if not eliminated
entirely, by requiring post-rejection maintenance of terms. Although
public and private sector employers must abide by the general rule
prohibiting unilateral changes during the term of an agreement or after
its expiration, the unique safety valve of fiscal necessity gives the public
employer an option not available to private employers. 445 When negotiations fail and emergency circumstances demand action, the government,
as the sovereign, and not the employer, has the authority to change the
44 6
rules.
There are, nonetheless, several arguments against post-rejection
maintenance of contract terms. The first issue is whether the post-rejection maintenance of established terms can fit comfortably within Chapter
9 proceedings without jeopardizing several other elements of the bank443.

See supra notes 41-52 & accompanying text.

444. State officials, too, may be tempted to sidestep pressing political issues assuming that
federal intervention can save the day. As Professor Tribe observed:
Indeed, what we may fear even more than congressional action unresponsive to individual service needs is state or local temptation to use the federal regulatory presence

as an excuse, a convenient screen behind which to hide managerial failure or unwillingness to pay the political costs of raising debt or taxes in order to provide essential
services while complying with reasonable wage and hour regulations.
Tribe, supra note 401, at 1003.
445. See supra notes 326-60 & accompanying text.

446. See supranotes 326-60 & accompanying text. A historical irony is that the municipal
bankruptcy law was adopted largely because of limits on contract impairment by state govern-

ments; yet, that obstacle has given way to excuse strict contract compliance by the use of
moratoriums or extensions that accommodate the long-term need for contract performance
with the short-term need for an adequate cash flow to cover basic operations. Strictly viewed,
the simple fact may be that municipal bankruptcy proceedings are no longer needed. Nevertheless, the bankruptcy process retains its attractiveness because it permits a wide variety of financial and operational problems to be dealt with in a single, comprehensive package, thereby
avoiding the potential for separate litigation over multiple disputes in several forums. This
author's proposal attempts to recognize this reality while giving deference to state sovereignty.
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ruptcy process. One could argue that approval of any contract rejection
request by a bankruptcy court is per se an impermissible interference
with state bargaining laws because it opens a contract for midterm renegotiation that otherwise would be barred. There are two responses to
this argument.
First, permitting new talks subject to state law negotiating procedures is distinguishable from, and less offensive to, state bargaining law
allowing an employer unilaterally to establish new terms and conditions
of employment in a way that flatly contravenes state law. In the former
situation, negotiations presumably proceed to agreement or impasse; in
the latter situation, there may be no talks at all prior to an employer's
unilateral action. Second, in light of the federal interest in a uniform
bankruptcy plan, the intrusion on state interests by rejection, subject to
renegotiation, is a minimal step necessary to effectuate the federal design.
It is difficult to imagine any plan that could integrate the interests of
diverse creditors without incorporating potential modifications to relevant bargaining agreements. In any event, it is clear that Congress intended to include rejection authority in the 1976 revision 447 and, in light
of Garcia,4 4 8 it is unlikely to be ruled unconstitutional.
Another Chapter 9 issue is the appropriate standard for bankruptcy
court rejection of a public sector bargaining agreement. Must the contract impairment standard used in United States Trust 449 and Sonoma
County450 be used as the test for the rejection decision, or is it sufficient
45
to maintain the balancing of equities approach approved in Bildisco 1
and incorporated into section 1113?452
There appears to be no need to import constitutional standards governing contract impairment into Chapter 9. To the contrary, to do so
would negate the fact that bankruptcy proceedings are, by their nature, a
45 3
type of contract impairment authorized by the federal Constitution.
447. See supra note 212 & accompanying text.
448. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985); see supra
notes 374-90 & accompanying text.
449. United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 432 U.S. 1 (1977); see supra
notes 332-36 & accompanying text.
450. Sonoma County Org. of Pub. Employees v. County of Sonoma, 23 Cal. 3d 296, 591
P.2d 1, 152 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1979); see supra notes 326-41 & accompanying text.
451. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984); see supra notes 87-91 & accompanying text.
452. See supra note 141. Congress appears to have disapproved of the "business judgment" test when it passed the 1976 municipal bankruptcy reform and favorably cited labor
cases applying a higher standard for rejection of bargaining agreements. H.R. REP. No. 686,
94th Cong., Ist Sess. 17-18 (1975); see supra note 212.
453. Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902). Sources describing early
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Bankruptcy proceedings look beyond the four corners of an agreement.
They are concerned not solely with whether contract problems were foreseeable or whether adequate alternatives existed, but also with attempting to harmonize debtor and creditor interests and promoting a fair
distribution of assets. Limiting contract rejection to the strict test that
permits state and local contract impairment could result in extensive delay and frustrate the underlying purpose of bankruptcy proceedings. The
balancing of equities approach, however, is consistent with the overall
objectives of bankruptcy because it represents a concern for prompt rehabilitation and broad social interests beyond the immediate preferences of
the contracting parties. Under the newly-enacted section 1113, 4 4 the
balancing standard requires an inquiry into an employer's negotiating
conduct, its proposed modifications, and the justification for a union's
response.4 5 5 If applied by analogy to public sector cases under Chapter
9, this inquiry serves as sufficient protection against unwarranted contract rejection, which, in any event, merely reopens the contract for further negotiations. Thus, the balancing standard is one area in which
private and public bankruptcy law principles can overlap.
A third Chapter 9 concern is whether the above proposal would be
applicable to executory contracts other than bargaining agreements. Not
all executory contracts by public employers, however, give rise to the
same fears about contravening state law regulation of local authority.
For example, rejection of commercial agreements with private providers
usually would entail little risk of subverting fundamental state law policy
decisions such as laws that compel collective bargaining. For this reason,
private sector bankruptcy precedent easily could be applied to such commercial agreements.
Labor contracts, in comparison, involve basic policy issues because
the state or political subdivision often is dealing with the scope of services to be offered. Moreover, under state collective bargaining law,
agreements with employee organizations have a unique elevated status
because the legislature has divested itself of unilateral control over sub4 56
stantial features of traditional governing authority.

legislative history about the scope of the bankruptcy power are cited in Miller, supra note 6, at
1121-23.
454. See supra note 15.
455. See supra notes 135-41 & accompanying text. For example, what are good faith negotiations in the context of an impending bankruptcy petition? What must an employer's prerejection plan contain in order to be deemed fair and equitable to employees, remaining creditors, and other interested parties, thereby triggering a reciprocal bargaining obligation on the
part of a union? When does a union have good cause to resist the employer's proposal?
456. See supra notes 277-90.
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Finally, comprehensive federal legislation expanding coverage of the
NLRA to public employees, a proposal advanced on and off for many
years, 457 is not necessarily precluded by restraining unilateral contract
modification. Nationwide public employee legislation would affect state
and local government authority over employment relations and would
supersede the diverse methods now used for regulating labor-management affairs throughout the states. Legislation establishing a uniform
procedural framework affecting all public entities of similar type within a
state would be far different from legislation, such as the Bankruptcy
Code, that isolates one or more local entities for separate, disparate treatment. 4 58 Justification for federal regulation could be based on the effect
on interstate commerce of state and local collective bargaining, the prospect of disruptive strikes, and the similarity of labor-management economic concerns across the country. 459 Growing links between federal
and state spending and revenue-sharing offer further justification for applying the federal spending power as a rationale for nationwide
regulation.

460

457. For authors discussing these proposals and related tenth amendment issues, see Fox.
FederalPublic Sector Labor Relations Legislation: The Aftermath of National League of Cities v. Usery, 26 KAN. L. REV. 105 (1977); Shaller, The Constitutionalityofa FederalCollective
BargainingStatute for State and Local Employees, 29 LAB. L.J. 594 (1978); Weil & Manas.
Can a Federal Collective BargainingStatute for Public Employees Meet the Requirement of
National League of Cities v. Usery: A Management Perspective,6 J. LAW & EDUC. 510 (1977):
Note, Federalism and Federal Regulation of Public Employers: The Implications of National
League of Cities v. Usery, 26 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 259 (1977).
458. Cf Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (2d Cir.) (holding that federal procedural regulations for environmental protection did not interfere with substantive policy-making at the state level), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977).
A federal collective bargaining statute, if it follows in the tradition of American labor
relations laws, would not by itself establish either economic obligations or specific working
conditions. These results would stem from the bargaining process alone. See H.K. Porter Co..
Inc. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970). Section 8(d) of the NLRA expressly provides that the duty
to bargain "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
459. The Court provided the groundwork for federal authority over labor relations of state
entities in California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957), which upheld application of collective
bargaining under the Railway Labor Act ("RLA") to a state-owned rail line. While railroad
affairs were distinguished in National League of Cities as not involving "'essential decisions
regarding the conduct of integral governmental functions," National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976), overruled, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S.
Ct. 1005 (1985), broader congressional action after Garcia could justify an intent to preempt
the field. Similarly, the proposal in this Article is consistent with the interstate commerce
rationale for federal regulation of municipal bonds owed by defaulting public entities, a principal initial justification for municipal bankruptcy legislation. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 686, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3-6, 8 (1975); Note, Municipal Bankruptcy, supra note 165, at 1902-02.
460. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947) (sustaining federal fund withholding for state failure to comply with the Hatch Act). The spend-
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A further argument against post-rejection maintenance of terms is
that it would be an overbroad protection that disregards employer and
public apprehension about the potential harm of a negotiating delay. Excessive delay could aggravate pressing fiscal problems and eventually
lead to deferral or diminution of essential public services. 46 1 While apprehensions about obstructive bargaining practices are legitimate, unilateral contract modification after a bankruptcy petition or after rejection is
not necessarily the best way to respond.
First, long-term public sector budgetary planning and the relative
stability of income projections based on tax revenues usually provide
room to maneuver before a fiscal crisis becomes unmanageable. Typically, the main issue is whether there is sufficient political will and creativity to solve financial problems. If problems are worse than anticipated, or unexpected events occur, the public employer need not delay
negotiations. Negotiations can be scheduled as circumstances require,
consistent with the proposition that mutual good faith bargaining is
judged by the situation at hand. For example, if a major source of funding power link, as establishing one form of conditional preemption by the federal government,
was reaffirmed after National League of Cities in Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773 (1983),
which allowed for federal recovery of misused grant funding. See also Choper, supra note 401,
at 1598-99; Rotunda, supra note 401, at 296-97.
One effect of Garcia, however, is that the spending power justification may be less significant in the future. The Court referred to substantial federal contributions to local transit systems, but cautioned that, even without the funds, application of the federal wage lav to local
transit would be constitutional. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct.
1005, 1020 n.21 (1985).
461. Similar doubts about employer viability during protracted negotiations were raised in
Professor Countryman's analysis of contract rejection under the RLA. Countryman, (pt. II),
supra note 76, at 496-98. Section 1167 of the Bankruptcy Code expressly provides that bargaining agreements affecting railroads can be altered only in accord with § 6 of the RLA. 11
U.S.C. § 1167 (1982). Section 2 of the RLA bars unilateral employer modification during the
term of an agreement and appears to prohibit a bankruptcy court rejection decree unless the
employer has given advance notice of a proposed change, engaged in negotiations, and if
needed, completed the RLA mediation process. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Seventh (1982) (referring to
45 U.S.C. § 156 (1982)). But see Brotherhood of Ry. Employees v. REA Express, Inc., 523
F.2d 164 (2d Cir.) (allowing changes without completing RLA procedure), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1017 (1975). Professor Countryman concluded that, under the RLA, "the operation of
the Act seems effectively to preclude the resolution of most labor relations disputes in a bankruptcy rehabilitation proceeding.... ." Countryman, (pt. II), supra note 76, at 498. However,
the proposed model for the public sector differs from the pattern for railroads under the RLA.
Instead of requiring exhaustive negotiations and mediation prior to a rejection decree, the
bankruptcy court order in a Chapter 9 case would accelerate the process and enhance the
employer's position by reopening the contract without extensive preconditions. Thereafter,
although bargaining and mediation may be necessary under both the RLA and public sector
law before an employer could act unilaterally upon impasse, the RLA situation is distinguishable, as is the private sector generally, because the public employer retains the crucial ability to
alter established conditions by acting unilaterally in a financial emergency.
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ing has dried up unexpectedly, a Chapter 9 employer can demand postrejection negotiations to allow for the new financial situation. In such a
case, assuming a bankruptcy court rejection order allows midterm contract renegotiation, sufficient employer bargaining leverage still exists. If
the parties do not reach agreement, and good faith negotiations have led
to impasse, unilateral employer action can occur. Even without courtapproved rejection or a bargaining impasse, the fiscal emergency rationale might justify unilateral action after all viable alternatives have been
exhausted.
Given these existing alternatives of bargaining, impasse, and emergency contract impairment, speculation about the inhibitory effect of
post-rejection maintenance of terms is inappropriate. Further, such speculation does not take into account the stabilizing effect of successful negotiations upon the debtor's reorganization by avoiding disruptive strikes
and by encouraging employee cooperation in the employer's reform
efforts.
Indeed, if speculation about fiscal crisis were an acceptable motivating rationale justifying disregard of contrary state bargaining law, there
would be no reason to limit the bankruptcy court's ability to override
other state laws that appear to obstruct rehabilitation. If true flexibility
were appropriate, all state laws governing political subdivisions could be
altered, not simply those laws governing employee benefits. It is this
contradiction that the bankruptcy court failed to reconcile in the initial
stages of the San Jose case; a consistent interpretation of section 903 was
undermined because the District invoked rejection of the labor agree462
ments as a single financial panacea.

462. Several examples of this contradictory interpretation of § 903 are apparent in the
bankruptcy court's decision. 11 U.S.C. § 903 (1982); see supra notes 53-63 & accompanying
text. In particular, the judge accepted state law requirements regarding the deadline for
budget submission, the need for a balanced budget at the start of a school year to secure any
appropriations, the ban on using restricted funds for general fund purposes, and the prohibition on applying income in future years for payment of past debts. Whatever the merits of the
judge's interpretation of these state laws, there is no clear reason that these state law limitations also could not have been harmonized with federal bankruptcy proceedings, as was attempted with the state bargaining law, to allow flexibility and further time for the District's
reorganization. Instead, the reason that the court disregarded the state bargaining law was
financial expedience; it provided a simple way to balance the District's budget.
The bankruptcy court's decision, however, altered the negotiating balance between the
parties and tilted the scales in the District's favor by eliminating potential resources that could
have been applied to a settlement. Unfortunately, despite the bankruptcy court's later reconsideration of several state law issues when the unions challenged the disclosure statement, the
earlier rejection decision probably had the unintended effect of complicating and prolonging
the dispute because it was so one-sided.
Not surprisingly, the unions dug in their heels, appealed the decision to federal district
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A final consideration regarding a post-rejection negotiating requirement under Chapter 9 involves either Bildisco 463 or the recently adopted
section 1113464 as alternative models for rejection cases.
Although Bildisco seems to apply at first blush because section 365
expressly has been incorporated into Chapter 9, the decision does not
easily fit the very different circumstances of public sector labor and bankruptcy law, especially in light of section 903. First, there is strong evidence that statutory intent underlying public sector bankruptcy law
prohibits unilateral employer conduct that subverts state labor laws. 4 65
Second, public sector bankruptcy proceedings, vesting substantially
greater authority with the employer and reducing creditor and court in4 66
fluence, seem to preclude a literal application of the Bildisco rule.
Third, the differences between public and private sector labor laws, particularly the emergency safety valve available to public employers to
modify bargaining agreements lawfully, also militates against the Bildisco
model.

467

Nor is the nature and extent of the public employer's negotiating
obligation resolved by section 1113. Although this law overturns one
aspect of Bildisco by largely barring unilateral action without court approval and by requiring good faith labor-management negotiations, its
terms are limited expressly to Chapter 11 private sector reorganization
cases. Attempting to apply section 1113 to the public sector absent congressional clarification might result in inappropriately allowing a union
or bankruptcy court to second-guess municipal determinations of necessary services to the public. If section 1113 were applied to permit public
employer unilateral changes after court-approved rejection and without a
court, and filed unfair practice charges, hoping to offset the District's advantage. The em-

ployer, having secured the desired basic wage reduction, took nearly six months to submit a
bankruptcy plan that offered far less than the District eventually agreed to pay. Throughout
this period negotiations virtually ceased, despite the District's improved financial condition
and the prospects of lucrative property sales.
It was not until the unfair practice cases were litigated that renewed talks began in earnest. Eventually other factors influenced a negotiated outcome. See supra notes 67-72 & accompanying text. During the uncertainty of a lengthy appeal period, the short-term budgetary

benefit from the rejection order could disappear, leaving both financial and psychological scars.
Ironically, the argument that focused initially on financial urgency led to an outcome that
appears to have impeded the goal of speedy and effective rehabilitation.
463.

See supra notes 74-121 & accompanying text.

464.

11 U.S.C. § 1113 (Supp. 11 1984); see supra notes 122-63 & accompanying text.

465.

See supra notes 211-31 & accompanying text.

466. As discussed above, public employers stand in a substantially different position and
have more authority than private sector employers. See supra notes 250-73 & accompanying
text.
467. See supra notes 274-306, 326-61 & accompanying text.
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bargaining impasse, section 903 would be deprived of meaning, and the
congressional policy preference of maintaining employment terms if state
law so provides would be undermined. 468 At best, judicial interpretation
of the new law may provide partial guidelines for the public sector.
In the final analysis, there are significant ramifications for municipal
rehabilitation that must be reconciled with a bankruptcy rule requiring
post-rejection maintenance of terms in accordance with state bargaining
law. The presence of complexities, however, is always a feature of developing legal doctrine and is no reason to disregard the need for harmonizing seemingly disparate concerns. Instead, it is the task of those interpreting and applying laws to weigh the competing considerations in
order to arrive at solutions consistent with legislative policy and the public interest.
In light of the potential for conflicting judicial rulings, however, it
appears that legislative bodies can provide the clearest resolution of the
bankruptcy and labor law issues discussed above. On the federal level,
Congress could amend Chapter 9 explicitly to subordinate contract rejection to state law bargaining requirements, thereby restraining unilateral
employer action. Congress also should consider changes in Chapter 9
that readjust the burdens of that proceeding. For example, Congress
could extend administrative priority status to employee wages and benefits, or allow creditors, the court, and the public a more active role in
formulating a reorganization plan.
A state legislature, on the other hand, could expressly prohibit unilateral contract modifications by bankrupt political subdivisions governed by a continuing state law duty to bargain. A legislature might
consider other bankruptcy-related actions as well, including provisions
for operational takeovers, relaxation of taxing requirements, wage lien
laws, and wage insurance. In all likelihood, if proponents of clarification
could muster sufficient political force, congressional and state legislative
reform would provide consistent standards, reducing the chance for uncertainty and disruption inherent in the present system.
Conclusion
When a public employer is faced with collectively bargained labor
costs in the context of severe budgetary shortfalls, the appropriate course
is not unilateral contract modification under a bankruptcy shield, but
renegotiation in accordance with state labor law. This federal-state accommodation applies even if a bankruptcy petition has been filed and
468.

See supra notes 211-25 & accompanying text.
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even if a bankruptcy court has approved an employer motion to reject
the executory contract.
Both congressional intent and scholarly analysis support this view,
as does an equitable perspective that balances employee and union interests against an employer's significant authority under Chapter 9. A
Chapter 9 debtor manages its post-petition affairs, chooses its expenses,
selects its managers, and submits its plan to the bankruptcy court, largely
free from creditor or court controls and any threat of forced liquidation
for continued mismanagement. The limits of public sector collective bargaining, particularly restraints on the right to strike and statutory supersession, augment the employer's relative power over employee and union
creditors. Moreover, if a fiscal emergency requires unilateral action, the
government employer has the ability and, perhaps, the duty to act.
Such power, however, does not guarantee a stable, successful reorganization of public employer affairs. That goal can best be achieved by
maintaining employment terms throughout a renegotiation process. Employees and unions with some input into the outcome are bound to accept modifications more easily than employees and unions with virtually
no input at all.
The fundamental principle of requiring post-rejection renegotiations
and maintenance of employment terms in accord with state law should
be settled. Without agreement on that basic premise, the parties will approach the bankruptcy process unrealistically, with each side resisting
the process and neither prepared to work together to ensure the longterm success that the participants need and the public deserves.

